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  INTRODUCTION   
In its landmark decision Michigan v. EPA, the Supreme 
Court held that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is 
required to consider costs before deciding to regulate the hazard-
ous air pollutant emissions of power plants through its Mercury 
and Air Toxics Standards,1 which were promulgated during the 
Obama Administration.2 The Court, however, did not decide how 
benefits should be taken into account, and identified, but left 
open, a significant question: how to address the benefits from 
reductions in particulate matter beyond the levels already re-
quired under the Clean Air Act’s National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards (NAAQS).3 Reductions of hazardous air pollutant 
emissions are the direct benefits of the Mercury and Air Toxics 
Standards, whereas particulate reductions are the indirect ben-
efits, also referred to as co-benefits or ancillary benefits,4 which 
result from the actions that power plants are expected to take in 
order to comply with these standards.5 
Courts may soon have the opportunity to address the ques-
tion of how to treat particulate matter co-benefits as a result of 
President Trump’s efforts to undo the most significant environ-
mental regulations of the Obama Administration. In particular, 
a top priority of the Trump Administration is repealing the 
Clean Power Plan,6 which would regulate the greenhouse gas 
 
 1. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015). 
 2. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from 
Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of 
Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial-In-
stitutional, and Small Industrial-Commercial-Institutional Steam Generating 
Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304, 9304 (Feb. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 
60 and 63) [hereinafter MATS Rule]. 
 3. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2711 (“Even if the Agency could have considered 
ancillary benefits when deciding whether regulation is appropriate and neces-
sary—a point we need not address—it plainly did not do so here.”). 
 4. See Samuel J. Rascoff & Richard L. Revesz, The Biases of Risk Tradeoff 
Analysis: Towards Parity in Environmental and Health-and-Safety Regulation, 
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1763, 1766 (2002) (discussing the difference between direct 
and ancillary benefits). Throughout the literature, co-benefits are alternatively 
referred to as ancillary benefits, secondary benefits, or indirect benefits. See 
David Pearce, Policy Frameworks for the Ancillary Benefits of Climate Change 
Policies, in ANCILLARY BENEFITS AND COSTS OF GREENHOUSE GAS MITIGATION 
518 (2000). For simplicity, this Article uses the term “co-benefits.” 
 5. MATS Rule, supra note 2. 
 6. Trump Moves to Let States Regulate Coal Plant Emissions, NPR (Aug. 
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emissions of power plants.7 A proposed rule to that effect has al-
ready been published.8 Attacking the consideration of co-benefits 
is an important strategy in this quest. Indeed, it is only by com-
pletely disregarding the Clean Power Plan’s principal co-bene-
fits—particulate reductions under the level of the NAAQS—that 
the Trump Administration is able to conclude that the cost sav-
ings from repealing the rule exceed the forgone benefits.9 The 
 
21, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/08/21/639396683/trump-moves-to-let 
-states-regulate-coal-plant-emissions (detailing President Trump’s targeting of 
the Plan for repeal). 
 7. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary 
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,663 (Oct. 23, 
2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) [hereinafter Clean Power Plan]. 
 8. See Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Sta-
tionary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035 (pro-
posed Oct. 16, 2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) [hereinafter Clean Power 
Plan Proposed Repeal].  
Instead of finalizing that repeal, as this Article was going to press, the EPA 
proposed a significant roll-back of the Clean Power Plan. See Emission Guide-
lines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Electric Utility Generating 
Units, 83 Fed. Reg. 44,746 (Aug. 31, 2018). As in the case of the proposed repeal, 
see infra note 9, the forgone benefits are higher than the cost savings except 
where all PM2.5 benefits below the NAAQS are ignored. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, EPA-452/R-18-006, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE PRO-
POSED EMISSION GUIDELINES FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM EXIST-
ING ELECTRIC UTILITY GENERATING UNITS; REVISIONS TO EMISSION GUIDELINE 
IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS; REVISIONS TO NEW SOURCE REVIEW PROGRAM, 
at 6-16 tbl.6-14 (2018), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-08/ 
documents/utilities_ria_proposed_ace_2018-08.pdf. Even then, the proposed re-
placement appears net beneficial only under one of the three illustrative com-
pliance scenarios modeled by the EPA. Id. 
 9. See Clean Power Plan Proposed Repeal, supra note 8, at 48,045–46. The 
EPA presents the net benefits of repeal under different scenarios: rate-based 
and mass-based implementation. At a 3% discount rate, net benefits of the re-
peal are negative in the year 2030—meaning that the forgone benefits from the 
Clean Power Plan (or, put differently, the costs of repeal) are higher than the 
benefits of repeal in every scenario, except where all PM2.5 benefits below the 
NAAQS are ignored. 
The EPA also presents calculations of benefits at a 7% discount rate, but 
that figure is out of line with economists’ practice. See Richard G. Newell, Un-
packing the Administration’s Revised Social Cost of Carbon, RESOURCES FOR 
THE FUTURE (Oct. 10, 2017), http://www.rff.org/blog/2017/unpacking- 
administration-s-revised-social-cost-carbon (“It is clearly inappropriate . . . to 
use such modeling results with OMB’s 7 percent discount rate, which is in-
tended to represent the historical before-tax return on private capital. . . . Prac-
tically speaking, the use of such a high discount rate means that the effects of 
our actions on future generations are largely unaccounted for in the new analy-
sis. This is incompatible with the long-lived nature of greenhouse gas emissions 
in the atmosphere, and the fact that damages from emissions today will con-
tinue to be felt for generations to come.”). 
In order to justify the repeal, the EPA also needs to significantly downplay 
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validity of co-benefits will certainly be at issue in the inevitable 
ensuing litigation.10 
Further, on remand from the Supreme Court in the Mercury 
and Air Toxics Standards litigation, the EPA evaluated the rea-
sonableness of the rule’s costs under multiple metrics and put 
forward two approaches to demonstrate that the rule is cost-ben-
efit justified in a Supplemental Finding; one of which includes a 
discussion of co-benefits.11 However, because this method is the 
EPA’s alternative approach, the D.C. Circuit would need to rule 
on the validity of including co-benefits only if it does not uphold 
the rule under the EPA’s preferred approach. The case is now 
being held in abeyance12 while the Trump Administration con-
siders whether to modify the Supplemental Finding.13 However, 
if the Trump Administration reverses itself on the inclusion of 
 
the direct benefits of carbon dioxide reductions. Cf. Niina Heikkinen, EPA Re-
vises the Social Cost of a Potent Greenhouse Gas, SCI. AM. (Nov. 20, 2017), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/epa-revises-the-social-cost-of-a 
-potent-greenhouse-gas (reporting on the Trump Administration’s plans to re-
duce the “social cost of methane” measure and suggesting that the Administra-
tion could use this change to support deregulation on the grounds that compli-
ance costs would outweigh the value of any methane reductions). 
 10. Cheryl Hogue, Trump Administration Is Considering Reweighing Costs 
and Benefits of EPA Regulations, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS (Aug. 5, 
2018), https://cen.acs.org/policy/regulation/Trump-administration-considering 
-reweighing-costs/96/i32 (arguing “[a] lawsuit challenging [the] repeal is inevi-
table” and co-benefits will factor strongly into the lawsuit). 
 11. See Supplemental Finding that It Is Appropriate and Necessary To Reg-
ulate Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam 
Generating Units, 81 Fed. Reg. 24,420, 24,423–24 (Apr. 25, 2016) (to be codified 
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63) [hereinafter Supplemental Finding]. The EPA’s preferred 
approach weighed the costs of compliance against the volumetric reduction in 
hazardous air pollutants. Id. at 24,426. In turn, the Agency’s alternative ap-
proach compared the costs against the quantified benefits, including co-benefits 
and unquantified benefits. See id. at 24,427, 24,437–42. 
 12. See Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, No. 16-1127 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 27, 2017) 
(per curium) (order granted to continue oral argument). 
 13. See Respondent EPA’s Motion to Continue Oral Argument at 6, Murray 
Energy Corp. v. EPA, No. 16-1127 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 18, 2017). It seems highly 
likely that the Trump Administration will reverse the EPA’s position on the use 
of co-benefits: in an early iteration of this litigation, former EPA Administrator 
Scott Pruitt, then the Attorney General of Oklahoma, filed a brief, together with 
a number of other state attorneys general and industry groups, strongly arguing 
that the particulate reduction co-benefits were not cognizable for the purposes 
of evaluating the permissibility of the EPA’s decision to regulate hazardous air 
pollutant emissions of power plants. See Opening Brief of State and Industry 
Petitioners at 41–55, Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, No. 16-1127 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 
18, 2016). 
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co-benefits, environmental groups would likely challenge the de-
cision, bringing the question before a federal court.14  
How courts ultimately respond to challenges of the reliance 
on co-benefits of particulate reductions below the NAAQS will 
have far reaching consequences for climate change regulations, 
as well as for public health rules more generally. Co-benefits of 
particulate reductions under the NAAQS are a substantial por-
tion of the total benefits from regulating the emissions from sta-
tionary sources and, strikingly, a substantial portion of the ben-
efits of all federal regulation. The NAAQS standards are not 
intended to eliminate all risks from pollutant exposure, so reduc-
tions beyond the standards have significant health benefits. 
Indeed, EPA rules accounted for 61% to 80% of the mone-
tized benefits from all major federal regulations over the past 
ten years, and 98% to 99% of those monetized benefits come from 
air quality rules.15 And, the large estimated benefits of air qual-
ity rules “are mostly attributable to the reduction in public expo-
sure to fine particulate matter.”16 Furthermore, as the Mercury 
and Air Toxics Standards and the Clean Power Plan illustrate, 
a highly significant proportion of these reductions come from the 
co-benefits of particulate reductions.17 The Mercury and Air Tox-
ics Standards, in particular, have the second-highest quantified 
benefits of all of the EPA’s twenty-two clean air rules of the past 
decade.18 The EPA estimated $4 to $6 million in direct quantified 
benefits under the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards from the 
target hazardous pollutants,19 in addition to significant unquan-
tified benefits,20 but quantified benefits of $37 to $90 billion in 
health co-benefits from particulate reductions.21 For the Clean 
 
 14. See Hogue, supra note 10 (predicting a challenge to the repeal of the 
Clean Power Plan). 
 15. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 2016 DRAFT REPORT TO CONGRESS ON 
THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND AGENCY COMPLIANCE 
WITH THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT 2, 7–8, 11–12 (2016), https:// 
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/legislative_ 
reports/draft_2016_cost_benefit_report_12_14_2016_2.pdf. 
 16. Id. at 12. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Brief for the Federal Respondents at 55, Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 
2699 (2015) (No. 14-46). 
 20. See id. (“[V]irtually all of the direct benefits from reducing emissions of 
hazardous air pollutants are unquantifiable.”). 
 21. Id. at 54; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-452/R-11-011, REGULATORY 
IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE FINAL MERCURY AND AIR TOXICS STANDARDS, at 5-1 
(2011) [hereinafter MATS RIA], https://www3.epa.gov/ttnecas1/regdata/RIAs/ 
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Power Plan, the EPA under President Obama calculated $20 bil-
lion in climate benefits, and an additional $13 to $31 billion from 
particulate reduction co-benefits.22 
The bulk of these particulate co-benefits come from reduc-
tions below the NAAQS.23 For example, in the case of the Mer-
cury and Air Toxics Standards, the EPA notes that a small per-
centage of the co-benefits come from reductions in particulate 
matter above the NAAQS, as the regulation would help to bring 
out-of-compliance areas into compliance, but that “[a] large frac-
tion of the . . . related benefits . . . occur below the level of the 
National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS).”24 
The preceding analysis reveals how much is at stake in the 
controversy over the permissibility of relying on the co-benefits 
of particulate reductions below the NAAQS. Ignoring these ben-
efits will threaten significant regulatory initiatives and ad-
versely affect populations such as the elderly and asthmatic chil-
dren, who are particularly sensitive to the adverse health effects 
caused by particulate matter at levels below the NAAQS.25 
 
matsriafinal.pdf. These numbers were calculated using a 3% discount rate. Id. 
 22. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-452/R-15-003, REGULATORY IM-
PACT ANALYSIS FOR THE CLEAN POWER PLAN FINAL RULE, at ES-23, 4-27 (2015) 
[hereinafter CLEAN POWER PLAN RIA], https://www3.epa.gov/ttnecas1/docs/ria/ 
utilities_ria_final-clean-power-plan-existing-units_2015-08.pdf. This estimate 
includes reductions in SO2, which is both a precursor to the formation of PM2.5 
as well as a component of PM2.5 (since SO2 itself is often present as a fine parti-
cle). Id. at 4-11. Notably, the Clean Power Plan rule is cost-benefit justified 
without these additional health benefits; the EPA estimated that the regulation 
would cost between $5.1 and $8.4 billion in 2030, a range dwarfed by the total 
estimated benefits of between $34 and $54 billion. See id. at ES-20, ES-22, ES 
-23. Moreover, recent analyses of Clean Power Plan compliance costs suggest 
that the cost of complying with the Plan has fallen since 2015, when the EPA’s 
analysis was released. See DENISE A. GRAB & JACK LIENKE, INST. FOR POLICY 
INTEGRITY, THE FALLING COST OF CLEAN POWER PLAN COMPLIANCE 
1 (2017), https://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/Falling_Cost_of_CPP_ 
Compliance.pdf. These compliance costs fell due to declines in the cost of renew-
able energy, declines in the forecast price of natural gas, extensions of federal 
tax credits for renewable energy, and expansions of state programs supporting 
the adoption of clean energy. See generally id. (collecting and analyzing reports 
of independent groups calculating the updated costs of compliance with the 
Clean Power Plan). 
 23. MATS RIA, supra note 21, at ES-4. 
 24. Id. 
 25. In a 2017 study of Medicare recipients, discussed further in Part III, 
researchers observed a rising risk of death in association with PM2.5 exposure 
beginning at levels significantly below the NAAQS for PM2.5. Qian Di et al., Air 
Pollution and Mortality in the Medicare Population, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
2513, 2513 (2017). In a study of inner-city children with asthma, short-term 
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Opponents of these regulations employ a few key arguments 
to suggest that these benefits should not be cognizable in evalu-
ating EPA regulations. In this Article, we address each of these 
arguments in turn. Relying on scientific evidence, EPA practice, 
and judicial decisions, we show that these arguments are un-
founded. 
Critics argue first that the benefits from particulate matter 
reduction do not exist.26 They do so by assuming that particulate 
matter is a threshold pollutant.27 By implication, these critics 
make the same assumption for all “criteria pollutants,” which 
are pollutants regulated by NAAQS pursuant to § 108 of the 
Clean Air Act: ground level ozone, particulate matter, carbon 
monoxide, lead, sulfur dioxide, and nitrogen dioxide.28 A thresh-
old is the level below which there are no quantifiable health ef-
fects from pollutant exposure,29 and threshold pollutants are 
those pollutants for which a threshold can be identified. The 
Clean Air Act requires that NAAQS levels allow an “adequate 
 
increases in PM2.5 concentrations below the NAAQS were associated with ad-
verse respiratory health effects. George T. O’Connor et al., Acute Respiratory 
Health Effects of Air Pollution on Children with Asthma in US Inner Cities, 121 
J. ALLERGY & CLINICAL IMMUNOLOGY 1133, 1135 (2008). 
 26. See infra notes 286–90 and accompanying text; see also JONATHAN A. 
LESSER, MISSING BENEFITS, HIDDEN COSTS: THE CLOUDY NUMBERS IN THE 
EPA’S PROPOSED CLEAN POWER PLAN 5 (2016), https://www.manhattan 
-institute.org/download/8988/article.pdf (“The EPA’s estimates of co-benefits 
from future air-pollution reductions also suffer from significant uncertainty and 
modeling errors . . . [including the] use of epidemiological models that assume 
that there are no threshold air-pollution concentration levels below which addi-
tional health benefits cannot be obtained, even though under the Clean Air Act, 
the EPA is required to establish exposure levels that are supposed to incorpo-
rate an adequate margin of safety to protect the public health . . . .”); id. at 18–
19 (“But because the magnitude of CO2 reductions under the [Clean Power Plan] 
is below the threshold level (assumed to be the level where there are measurable 
climate impacts), the [Plan]’s actual CO2 reduction benefits are effectively 
zero.”); C. Boyden Gray, EPA’s Use of Co-Benefits, FEDERALIST SOC’Y (2015), 
https://fedsoc.org/commentary/publications/epa-s-use-of-co-benefits (“As a for-
mer Chairman of the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality has ex-
plained, ‘[i]f reducing particulate matter had the enormous benefits that EPA’s 
analysis claims, it has a legal responsibility to lower the national ambient 
standard to a level that is actually protective of human health. The fact that it 
has not done so suggests that the EPA does not really believe its own numbers.’ 
. . . [Agencies should not] be allowed to count reductions of pollutants in areas 
where they appear below the national standard EPA has already set for those 
pollutants.”). 
 27. See infra notes 286–93 and accompanying text. 
 28. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (2012). 
 29. Al McGartland et al., Estimating the Health Benefits of Environmental 
Regulations, 357 SCI. 457, 458 (2017). 
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margin of safety . . . requisite to protect the public health.”30 The 
logic of critics who claim criteria pollutants have a threshold is 
that NAAQS are set with reference to the threshold, plus an ad-
equate margin of safety.31 Thus, they argue, there should be no 
adverse health effects below the threshold, and therefore, no 
benefits from lowering pollution levels below the NAAQS.32 
The Trump Administration has embraced these criticisms 
despite their lack of empirical foundation. In its proposed rule to 
repeal the Clean Power Plan, announced in October 2017, the 
Trump EPA presents radically different estimates of the costs 
and benefits than those presented in the original plan.33 The pro-
posed rule includes three estimates of health benefits, the first 
of which closely mirrors the estimates in the original rule prom-
ulgated during the Obama Administration and includes the full 
range of particulate matter benefits.34 The middle estimate as-
sumes—without scientific basis—that the benefits of particulate 
matter reductions fall to zero below the “lowest measured level” 
or LML, which is the lowest level of exposure studied.35 There is 
no scientific support for the proposition that risks are nonexist-
ent below this level, though there is greater uncertainty about 
the magnitude of risk below this level.36 Finally, the lowest esti-
mate of benefits incorporates the assumption that NAAQS rep-
resent a threshold for particulate matter.37 This estimate com-
pletely eliminates all particulate matter benefits below the 
NAAQS,38 essentially ignoring a bulk of the benefits of the rule 
 
 30. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1). According to the EPA, the margin of safety com-
ponent is “intended to address uncertainties associated with inconclusive scien-
tific and technical information available at the time of standard setting . . . [and] 
to prevent lower pollutant levels that [the Administrator] finds pose an unac-
ceptable risk of harm, even if that risk is not precisely identified as to nature or 
degree.” Revisions to the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particu-
late Matter, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,634, 24,634–35 (July 1, 1987) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pt. 50) [hereinafter 1987 Revisions to NAAQS]. 
 31. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.  
 32. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 33. Compare Clean Power Plan Proposed Repeal, supra note 8, at 48,044–
47, with Clean Power Plan, supra note 7, at 64,928–29, 64,934–35. 
 34. See Clean Power Plan Proposed Repeal, supra note 8, at 48,044–47. 
 35. Id. at 48,044. 
 36. See infra notes 409–25 and accompanying text. 
 37. See Clean Power Plan Proposed Repeal, supra note 8, at 48,044 (setting 
the threshold at the model-predicted air quality annual average). 
 38. See id. at 48,045–46 (calculating that there are fewer benefits associ-
ated with this measurement, while using the full range of ambient concentra-
tions does not favor repeal due to the lare amount of benefits). 
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in order to more easily justify its repeal.39 Even with the signifi-
cant changes made to other cost and benefits estimates through-
out the proposed rule, only this last estimate makes the repeal 
cost-benefit justified.40 The issue of how particulate matter ben-
efits are calculated will thus be of central importance in the in-
evitable slew of litigation challenging the repeal.41 
The EPA’s own early treatment of criteria pollutants poten-
tially contributed to confusion over whether these pollutants 
have a threshold, as some early analyses arguably implied that 
criteria pollutants had thresholds.42 However, the EPA has sub-
sequently adjusted its practices in ways that make clear the 
Agency views particulate matter and most criteria pollutants as 
non-threshold.43 
As a general matter, the EPA currently assumes that car-
cinogenic pollutants do not have a threshold and that non-crite-
ria noncarcinogenic pollutants do have a threshold.44 In its ear-
liest analyses in the late 1970s, the EPA treated criteria 
pollutants similarly to other noncarcinogens.45 For example, the 
Agency used language that suggested thresholds when setting 
 
 39. See id. at 48,043 (“[T]his analysis increases transparency of the 2015 
[Clean Power Plan] analysis by presenting the energy efficiency cost savings as 
a benefit rather than a cost reduction and provides a bridge to future analyses 
that the agency is committed to performing. The current analysis also provides 
alternative approaches for examining the forgone benefits, including more 
clearly distinguishing the direct benefits from the co-benefits and exploring al-
ternative ways to illustrate the impacts on the total net benefits of the uncer-
tainty in health co-benefits at various PM2.5 cutpoints. This approach shifts the 
focus to the domestic (rather than global) social cost of carbon, and employs both 
3 percent and 7 percent discount rates. Finally, we consider how changing mar-
ket conditions and technologies may have affected future actions that may have 
been undertaken by states to comply with the [Clean Power Plan] and how these 
changes may affect the potential benefits and costs of the [Plan’s] repeal.”). 
 40. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 41. See Caroline Cecot & W. Kip Viscusi, Judicial Review of Agency Benefit-
Cost Analysis, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 575, 578 (2015) (noting that “[a]s agen-
cies rely more on [cost-benefit analyses] in their decision making, challenges to 
[cost-benefit analyses] will rise, and judicial review of [cost-benefit analyses] 
will become increasingly important”). 
 42. See infra note 182. 
 43. See infra Part II.C. 
 44. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND DECISIONS: ADVANCING 
RISK ASSESSMENT 8 (2009) [hereinafter SCIENCE AND DECISIONS]. 
 45. See infra note 182. 
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allowable pollutant levels, such as the “critical populations, crit-
ical effects” model.46 However, as scientific research accumu-
lated showing adverse health effects at lower concentrations, the 
EPA quickly departed from this approach, and the Agency has 
not treated criteria pollutants as threshold pollutants for several 
decades under administrations of both parties.47 First, the EPA 
has explicitly acknowledged in many NAAQS rulemakings that 
there is no evidence to support the view that specific criteria pol-
lutants have a threshold.48 Further, the EPA has stopped using 
the “critical effects” language when setting NAAQS.49 Addition-
ally, the EPA has calculated benefits for reducing criteria pollu-
tants below NAAQS levels—a practice that is inconsistent with 
the notion of a threshold.50 The EPA’s modern treatment of the 
NAAQS moved the Agency in line with current science on this 
question, which supports a non-threshold model.51 
Critics next argue that the EPA “double counts” benefits by 
claiming benefits already implemented through other regula-
tions.52 For example, Senator John Barrasso asserted in an En-
vironmental and Public Works Committee hearing in 2015 that 
 
 46. See infra notes 185–95 and accompanying text. The “critical popula-
tions, critical effects” model refers to a way of setting the NAAQS with reference 
to a sensitive population and key early health effects of the pollutant. Id. 
 47. See infra Part III.B. 
 48. See infra Part II.C. 
 49. See infra notes 207–08 and accompanying text. 
 50. See infra Part II.C. 
 51. See infra Part II.C. 
 52. See Michael Bastach, Critics Accuse EPA of Fudging the Math on Its 
Global Warming Rule, DAILY CALLER (Oct. 1, 2015), http://dailycaller.com/2015/ 
10/01/critics-accuse-epa-of-fudging-the-math-on-its-global-warming-rule (“For-
mer Sen. John Kyl, an Arizona Republican, also criticized the EPA over double-
counting PM2.5 reduction benefits in its [Mercury and Air Toxics Standards] 
rule. In 2012, Kyl took to the Senate floor to lambast the EPA for double-count-
ing the benefits of reducing particulates.”); Jude Clemente, The Clean Power 
Plan Is Irrelevant, FORBES (Oct. 29, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
judeclemente/2017/10/29/the-clean-power-plan-is-irrelevant (“And there seems 
to be some serious ‘double counting’ going on under the promoted [Clean Power 
Plan] benefits. That’s mostly because the emissions of criteria pollutants NOx, 
SO2, and PM have been regulated for decades, but they are erroneously counted 
in the claimed benefits of the [Plan].”); Diana Furchtgott-Roth, Ten Problems 
with EPA’s Clean Power Plan Analysis, MANHATTAN INST. (Mar. 20, 2017), 
https://economics21.org/html/ten-problems-epa’s-clean-power-plan-analysis 
-2275.html (“If reductions in particulates can be counted as a health benefit of 
reducing mercury, the first of three major rules put in place by EPA, the agency 
cannot then count these same reductions as a benefit from reducing ozone and 
carbon dioxide.”); Gray, supra note 26 (“[W]henever EPA counts PM2.5 or ozone 
reductions in its cost-benefit analysis for other rules, it is double-counting re-
ductions already mandated by the NAAQS.”). 
  
2019] NEXT BATTLEGROUND 1359 
 
multiple EPA rules were using “the same reductions in particu-
late matter [to] claim the same health benefits,” including the 
Clean Power Plan.53 Other opponents of the Clean Power Plan 
likewise contend that “not only are [the Agency’s] estimates of 
co-benefits highly subjective and uncertain, but the EPA has al-
most surely double-counted some of those estimates.”54 These 
critics also allege that the Agency achieves the same end by fail-
ing to properly calibrate its baseline levels from which to meas-
ure costs and benefits.55 In fact, the EPA’s longstanding guide-
lines on baselines state that it is the Agency’s practice “to 
assume full compliance with regulatory requirements,” includ-
ing newly enacted regulations that are not yet implemented.56 
Moreover, the EPA expressly discusses the methods by which it 
accounts for benefits previously achieved under the NAAQS re-
gime and other rules, which include an explanation of how the 
Agency accounted for existing regulations of particulate mat-
ter.57 
Finally, critics suggest that, even if these benefits are real 
and not “double-counted,” they should not be considered in cost-
benefit analyses because they are “co-benefits” instead of direct 
benefits.58 For example, while the Mercury and Air Toxics Stand-
ards primarily target mercury pollution59 and the Clean Power 
Plan directly regulates carbon dioxide emissions,60 both rules 
 
 53. Economy-Wide Implication of President Obama’s Air Agenda: Hearing 
Before the Comm. on Env’t & Pub. Works, 114th Cong. 82 (2015) (statement of 
Sen. John Barrasso) (“Yet when you take a look at the EPA’s own documents, 
you [s]tate that you are counting co-benefits of reducing the same PM 2.5 in 
other rules before [the] 111(d) rule for existing power plants was even re-
leased.”). 
 54. LESSER, supra note 26, at 19. 
 55. See id. at 5. 
 56. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC 
ANALYSES, at 5-3 (2010) [hereinafter GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC 
ANALYSES]. 
 57. See infra notes 431–40. 
 58. See Michael Bastach, Trump’s Executive Order to Repeal Regulations 
Puts EPA in the Crosshairs, DAILY CALLER (Jan. 13, 2017), http://dailycaller 
.com/2017/01/31/trumps-executive-order-to-repeal-regulations-puts-epa-in-the 
-crosshairs (“Republicans have long criticized EPA for counting ‘co-benefits’ of 
regulation towards its cost effectiveness.”); Furchtgott-Roth, supra note 52 (“If 
EPA believes that their levels of other substances should be reduced, it should 
issue rules to lower them, with their own comment periods and cost-benefit 
analysis.”); infra notes 455–65 and accompanying text. 
 59. MATS Rule, supra note 2, at 9305. 
 60. Clean Power Plan, supra note 7, at 64,663, 64,710. 
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would reduce particulate matter as well.61 Opponents claim that 
accounting for co-benefits skews cost-benefit analyses in favor of 
regulation62 and exceeds the statutory bounds of the EPA’s 
power to regulate these pollutants under the Clean Air Act.63 
The Trump Administration, a key critic of these rules, decries 
these benefits and asserts that their inclusion “essentially 
hid[es] the true net cost” of rules like the Clean Power Plan.64 
This view, however, conflicts with four decades of EPA prac-
tice under administrations of both parties: the EPA during that 
time has taken co-benefits under consideration when evaluating 
air pollution regulations.65 Further, Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) Circular A-4, issued during the George W. Bush 
Administration, instructs agencies like the EPA to look at and 
consider co-benefits and their mirror image: indirect costs.66 In-
direct costs are consistently calculated for Clean Air Act and 
 
 61. Id. at 64,670, 64,679; MATS Rule, supra note 2, at 9305. Some of these 
rules would also have the co-benefit of reducing other criteria pollutants. See, 
e.g., MATS Rule, supra note 2, at 9305, 9380 (noting incidental reductions in 
sulfur dioxide pollution). While this Article focuses primarily on particulate 
matter because of the scope of those benefits and the clarity of the scientific 
evidence that particulate matter lacks a threshold, there is likewise no reason 
to exclude co-benefits of reductions of other NAAQS pollutants where sufficient 
evidence shows that such pollutants also lack a threshold. 
 62. See Kyle Feldscher, Senate Republicans Take Aim at Cost of EPA Regs, 
WASH. EXAMINER (Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/senate 
-republicans-take-aim-at-cost-of-epa-regs (quoting Senator Mike Rounds’ state-
ment that “[b]ecause of [its] exorbitant regulations, the EPA attempts to justify 
. . . the costs by identifying ancillary benefits, which the EPA refers to as co-
benefits, to help outweigh the cost of regulations”). 
 63. See Gray, supra note 26 (“EPA is treating the Clean Air Act as a com-
pletely open-ended grant of power, precisely as the Supreme Court forbids. . . . 
The costs of complying with a given regulation should be compared against the 
social goods that that regulation is authorized to achieve—not incidental co-
benefits . . . .”); infra notes 445–54 and accompanying text. 
 64. News Releases: EPA Takes Another Step To Advance President Trump’s 
America First Strategy, Proposes Repeal of “Clean Power Plan,” U.S. ENVTL. 
PROTECTION AGENCY (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa 
-takes-another-step-advance-president-trumps-america-first-strategy-proposes 
-repeal. 
 65. See infra Part IV.B. 
 66. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4: REGULATORY ANALY-
SIS 26 (2003) [hereinafter CIRCULAR A-4: REGULATORY ANALYSIS], https:// 
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/circulars/ 
a004/a-4.pdf (articulating that agencies should “look beyond the direct benefits 
and direct costs . . . and consider any important ancillary benefits and counter-
vailing risks”). Just as there are various terms for “co-benefits,” there are like-
wise multiple names for “indirect costs,” including countervailing risks. This 
Article primarily uses the term “indirect costs” but occasionally employs “coun-
tervailing risks” as well. 
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other EPA regulations,67 and it would be inconsistent to consider 
the negative indirect effects of regulations without similarly con-
sidering the positive indirect effects.68 The benefits from reduc-
ing particulate matter below the levels of the NAAQS in terms 
of avoided health harms and premature mortality are scientifi-
cally well established and have been acknowledged by the EPA 
for decades.69 There is thus no reason to exclude them from anal-
yses of air pollution regulations. 
Courts likewise have long held that when a rule’s justifica-
tion includes economic analyses, agencies may not ignore im-
portant costs or benefits, whether the effect is direct or ancil-
lary.70 For example, the D.C. Circuit, the most important court 
of appeals for federal environmental regulation,71 has held that 
the EPA must consider indirect effects in its rulemakings.72 In 
1999, the court remanded a revision to the NAAQS for ozone and 
particulate matter because the Agency had failed to consider the 
potential indirect health costs from strengthening the regulatory 
standards.73 Likewise, in American Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, the 
court held that the Agency must consider incidental countervail-
ing risks.74 More recently, in Sugar Corp. v. EPA the court up-
held an EPA regulation that relied on co-benefits in its analysis 
 
 67. See Rascoff & Revesz, supra note 4, at 1786 (discussing the number of 
bills that have been passed that discuss health risk tradeoffs); infra Part IV.B. 
 68. See generally id. (making the argument that ancillary benefits should 
be considered, given the rise in consideration of risk tradeoffs). 
 69. See infra Part III. 
 70. E.g., Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1036–37 (D.C. Cir. 
1999), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 
U.S. 457 (2001). 
 71. Richard J. Lazarus, Senator Edmund Muskie’s Enduring Legacy in the 
Courts, 67 ME. L. REV. 239, 242 (2015) (“[T]he D.C. Circuit of course is the na-
tion’s most important court for federal environmental law because it has origi-
nal jurisdiction to hear challenges to EPA rules promulgated under a host of 
federal environmental laws, including the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, and 
exclusive jurisdiction to consider some of those challenges.”). 
 72. E.g., id. 
 73. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 175 F.3d at 1036–37. 
 74. Id. at 1051–53; cf. Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Rethink-
ing Health-Based Environmental Standards, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1184, 1250 
(2014) (“In a portion of its American Trucking opinion not reviewed by the Su-
preme Court, the D.C. Circuit stated that at least certain types of secondary 
effects must be considered by the agency when setting the NAAQS. . . . The 
court noted that it ‘seems bizarre that a statute intended to improve human 
health would . . . lock the agency into looking at only one half of a substance’s 
health effects in determining the maximum level for that substance.’ Thus, the 
D.C. Circuit required the agency to account for the negative secondary conse-
quences of regulation—the countervailing risks.” (quoting Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 
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of the effects of reducing hazardous air pollutants from boilers, 
process heaters, and incinerators.75 The labels “benefit” and 
“cost” merely serve as useful shorthand for positive effects ver-
sus negative effects. In the context of cost-benefit analysis, nei-
ther possesses any inherent quality warranting different weight 
or analytical treatment from the other.76 
Because the frontal attack on the co-benefits of particulate 
reductions below the NAAQS arose so recently, there is no exist-
ing academic literature in this area. Neither is there sustained 
discussion on the evolution in the understanding of thresholds 
for criteria pollutants following the enactment of the Clean Air 
Act in 1970 or on how this understanding developed alongside 
different approaches used for carcinogens and noncarcinogens 
other than criteria pollutants. And there is no historical, scien-
tific, and practical analysis of the question of how the competing 
arguments on thresholds interact with cost-benefit analysis. 
This Article fills these voids. Part I discusses the EPA’s ap-
proaches for assessing the risks of carcinogenic and noncarcino-
genic pollutants other than criteria pollutants. The EPA has con-
sistently treated carcinogens as non-threshold pollutants, 
whereas for noncarcinogen, non-criteria pollutants, the EPA’s 
approach has lagged behind the scientific evidence and assumes 
that there is a no-harm threshold. Part II turns to criteria pollu-
tants. It examines Congress’s growing doubts about the exist-
ence of NAAQS thresholds, which resulted in a significant con-
ceptual change in the understanding of criteria pollutant 
reflected in the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act. It also 
shows how the EPA’s approach has evolved, from embracing 
threshold models in the 1970s to consistently rejecting them 
since the 1980s. Part III addresses the critics’ first two argu-
ments: that benefits from particulate matter reductions below 
the NAAQS do not exist, and that the EPA erroneously “double 
counts” benefits by failing to adjust its estimation baselines to 
account for prior regulation of particulate matter. We explain the 
scientific basis for calculating particulate matter benefits below 
the NAAQS, as well as the EPA’s longstanding practice of meas-
uring and quantifying these benefits. We also examine how the 
 
175 F.3d at 1051–52)). 
 75. U.S. Sugar Corp. v. EPA, 830 F.3d 579, 591, 625 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 76. See INST. FOR POLICY INTEGRITY, THE IMPORTANCE OF EVALUATING 
REGULATORY “CO-BENEFITS” 2 (2017), https://policyintegrity.org/files/media/ 
Co-Benefits_Factsheet.pdf (arguing that there is no “logical reason for agencies 
to treat indirect benefits differently than indirect costs”). 
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Agency deals with uncertainty and sets its baselines when revis-
ing the NAAQS. Part IV assesses the final assertion of the crit-
ics: that even if real, these benefits should not be included in 
cost-benefit analyses when they are co-benefits as opposed to di-
rect benefits. We discuss the treatment of co-benefits in a range 
of contexts over the past four decades by academics, the EPA, 
and the judiciary, and argue that there is no plausible justifica-
tion for excluding them from cost-benefit analyses. 
I.  TRADITIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT MODELS   
The EPA currently uses different risk assessment ap-
proaches for carcinogens, noncarcinogens, and NAAQS criteria 
pollutants, respectively. This Part analyzes the Agency’s current 
models for evaluating the health and environmental risks posed 
by carcinogens and by noncarcinogens other than criteria pollu-
tants. 
A. CARCINOGENS 
The EPA assumes that carcinogens have no thresholds un-
less sufficient pollutant-specific data leads the Agency to con-
clude that a particular carcinogen has a threshold.77 Under this 
approach, the EPA first attempts to discern a “mode of action” 
for carcinogens,78 which describes the sequence of key events and 
 
 77. See SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 44, at 127. The EPA will adjust 
its model to include a threshold where there is such evidence. For example, the 
EPA treats chloroform as a threshold carcinogen. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, CASRN 67-66-3, INTEGRATED RISK INFORMATION SYSTEM: CHLORO-
FORM CHEMICAL ASSESSMENT SUMMARY 1–2, 10 (2001), https://cfpub.epa.gov/ 
ncea/iris/iris_documents/documents/subst/0025_summary.pdf. However, the 
EPA has not identified many exceptions to its general rule that carcinogens 
should be treated as non-threshold and noncarcinogens should be treated as 
having a threshold. See Wendy Wagner et al., Misunderstanding Models in En-
vironmental and Public Health Regulation, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 293, 335 
(2010) (discussing the EPA’s assumption that carcinogens have no threshold of 
effect and noting that the EPA has identified threshold carcinogens, including 
chloroform, and has struggled with accommodating such exceptions). In 2000, 
the D.C. Circuit spurred the Agency to action on chloroform, finding that the 
EPA’s use of an assumption of linearity for chloroform violated the Safe Drink-
ing Water Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-24 (2012), because it “openly 
overrode the best available scientific evidence, which suggested that chloroform 
is a threshold carcinogen.” Chlorine Chemistry Council v. EPA, 206 F.3d 1286, 
1290 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (internal quotation omitted). 
 78. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA/630/P-03/001F, GUIDELINES FOR CAR-
CINOGEN RISK ASSESSMENT, at 1-10 (2005) [hereinafter GUIDELINES FOR CAR-
CINOGEN RISK ASSESSMENT], https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013 
-09/documents/cancer_guidelines_final_3-25-05.pdf. 
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processes resulting in cancer formation.79 When the EPA can de-
termine the mode of action, it will model the risk-exposure rela-
tionship based on that mode of action.80 If the mode suggests a 
linear, non-threshold relationship, the EPA will so model the re-
lationship; if, in contrast, the mode suggests a threshold, the 
EPA will model the threshold. Where the EPA does not have suf-
ficient data to determine the mode of action, the Agency assumes 
that pollutants that cause tumors in animals are harmful to hu-
mans,81 that cancer risks of these pollutants do not have a 
threshold,82 and that the effects can be modeled by low dose lin-
earity,83 which describes a relationship between exposure and 
risk under which additional exposure will result in additional 
risk at a constant rate.84 
Next, the Agency reviews the evidence available from scien-
tific studies and produces a “weight of evidence narrative,” which 
is intended to assess the health impacts of a pollutant and the 
 
 79. Id. at 1-10 n.2 (defining “mode of action”). 
 80. See id. at 1-11, 1-11 n.3 (discussing the relationship between mode of 
action and risk exposure). 
 81. Id. at 1-10 to -11. 
 82. See id. at 1-11, 1-11 n.3 (stating that “cancer risks are assumed to con-
form with low dose linearity” and that such models are necessarily non-thresh-
old); SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 44, at 8 (“For cancer, it is generally 
assumed that there is no dose threshold of effect . . . .”). 
 83. See GUIDELINES FOR CARCINOGEN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 78, at 
1-11. 
 84. See id. at 1-11 n.3 (“A low-dose-linear model is one whose slope [com-
paring dosage to risk] is greater than zero at a dose of zero. A low-dose-linear 
model approximates a straight line only at very low doses; at higher doses . . . 
[it] can display curvature.”). This approach comports with cancer policies of 
other federal agencies. For example, the EPA, the FDA, and OSHA “all . . . em-
ploy a linear mathematical model for low-dose extrapolation” of carcinogenic 
risk assessment. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-01-810, CHEMICAL 
RISK ASSESSMENT: SELECTED FEDERAL AGENCIES’ PROCEDURES, ASSUMP-
TIONS, AND POLICIES 40, 173, 197 (2001), https://www.gao.gov/assets/240/ 
232303.pdf (noting the FDA’s assumption of a “linear, no-threshold approach” 
for low dose cancer estimation, as well as OSHA’s acceptance of the “overwhelm-
ing scientific consensus . . . that genotoxins follow low-dose linear functions”); 
cf. NAT’L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, DEPT. OF HEALTH & HU-
MAN SERVS., CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 68, NIOSH CHEMICAL CARCIN-
OGEN POLICY 19 (2017) [hereinafter NIOSH CHEMICAL CARCINOGEN POL-
ICY], https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2017-100/pdf/2017-100.pdf?id=10.26616/ 
NIOSHPUB2017100revised (“For carcinogen risk assessment, the NIOSH gen-
erally treats exposure-response as low-dose linear unless a non-linear mode of 
action has been clearly established, in which case the NIOSH will adopt a mod-
eling approach defined by the data (including non-linear approaches when ap-
propriate). In general, whether the model forms are linear or non-linear, any 
nonzero exposure to a carcinogen is expected to yield some excess risk of can-
cer.”). 
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strength of the evidence of those effects.85 The EPA considers 
factors such as whether tumors were found in humans or ani-
mals, the agent’s chemical and physical properties, and studies 
addressing its mode of action.86 The Agency uses standard de-
scriptors to express the weight of the evidence: “Carcinogenic to 
Humans, Likely to Be Carcinogenic to Humans, Suggestive Evi-
dence of Carcinogenic Potential, Inadequate Information to As-
sess Carcinogenic Potential, and Not Likely to Be Carcino-
genic.”87 
Dose response assessments, the next phase of the EPA’s 
analysis of risk from carcinogens, are generally completed for 
pollutants labeled “Carcinogenic to Humans” and “Likely to Be 
Carcinogenic to Humans.”88 Dose response assessments aim to 
measure health effects at different exposure levels.89 These as-
sessments are performed by first assessing data to determine a 
“point of departure,”90 which “marks the beginning of extrapola-
tion to lower doses” based on experimental data.91 Above the 
point of departure, the EPA attempts to develop a tailored model 
of dose-response pattern.92 Where the EPA lacks sufficient data 
to develop one, the Agency states that “an appropriate policy 
choice” is to use a standard curve-fitting model, which is a stand-
ardized mathematical function for drawing a trend line among 
data points.93 Below the point of departure, the EPA assumes 
that risk is related to exposure in a linear pattern.94 
The EPA’s cancer guidelines emphasize that “a critical anal-
ysis of all of the [relevant] available information . . . [is] the start-
ing point from which a default option may be invoked if needed 
to address uncertainty or the absence of critical information.”95 
 
 85. GUIDELINES FOR CARCINOGEN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 78, at 1-
11. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 1-12 (internal quotations omitted). 
 88. Id. at 3-2. 
 89. Id. at 1-12. 
 90. Id. at 1-13. 
 91. Id. at 1-13 n.4. 
 92. See id. at 1-14 (“The first step of dose-response assessment is evaluation 
within the range of observation.”). 
 93. Id. at 1-9 to -10. 
 94. See SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 44, at 127 (“After adjustment 
for animal-human differences in the dose metric, risk is assumed to decrease 
linearly with doses below the [point of departure] for carcinogens . . . .”). 
 95. GUIDELINES FOR CARCINOGEN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 78, at 1-7 
(emphasis added). 
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Thus, if evidence emerges that a particular carcinogenic pollu-
tant does in fact have a threshold, or is non-linear at low levels 
or all levels (for example if data instead suggests a logarithmic 
relationship), the EPA may depart from the default no-thresh-
old, linear model.96 
Other agencies have taken similar approaches to regulating 
carcinogens. The Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion (OSHA), under its guidance for regulating potential carcin-
ogens,97 has not standardized its classification and regulation of 
carcinogens to the degree that the EPA has. Rather than identi-
fying default models that will be used when data is insufficient 
to tailor a model, as the EPA has done, OSHA will evaluate ar-
guments for a “threshold” effect in an individual rulemaking, but 
only if there is sufficient evidence to suggest there may be levels 
of exposure below which no health effects are observed.98 Fur-
ther, OSHA guidance has been affected by the landmark Benzene 
Case in which the Supreme Court struck down OSHA’s standard 
for exposure to benzene.99 The Labor Secretary had set that 
standard at one ppm (one part benzene per million parts air) af-
ter concluding that, because benzene was a carcinogen, no level 
of exposure to this substance was safe.100 The Court faulted the 
Secretary for not quantifying the reduction in risks that resulted 
from tightening the prior standard of ten ppm.101 In order to sat-
isfy the requirements of the Benzene Case, OSHA now estimates 
“the risk to workers subject to a lifetime of exposure at various 
possible exposure levels.”102 It is more difficult to discern what 
 
 96. A linear model is not synonymous with a non-threshold model. See id. 
at 1-11 n.3. A non-threshold model may be non-linear, so long as it includes 
health effects even at very low levels. Id. 
 97. See 29 C.F.R. § 1990.101–.152 (2017) (providing guidance for the iden-
tification, classification, and regulation of carcinogens). 
 98. See id. § 1990.143. The scientific evidence for a threshold, below which 
adverse health effects do not occur, must comport with certain research require-
ments such as the length of time of the study and size of the population group 
studied. See id. § 1990.144 (providing “criteria for consideration of arguments 
on certain issues,” including threshold status); id. § 1990.145 (providing criteria 
for “consideration of substantial new issues or substantial new evidence”). 
 99. Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL–CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene Case), 
448 U.S. 607, 662 (1980). 
 100. Id. at 613. 
 101. See id. at 630–34 (finding that though a ten ppm standard was reason-
able, the Agency lacked sufficient support for a further reduction to one ppm). 
 102. Chemical Management and Permissible Exposure Limits (PELs), 79 
Fed. Reg. 61,384, 61,387 (proposed Oct. 10, 2014) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. 
pts. 1910, 1915, 1917, 1918, and 1926). 
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OSHA’s specific models are for evaluating risks posed by carcin-
ogens. However, OSHA carcinogen guidance makes clear that 
the Agency treats carcinogens as non-threshold pollutants.103 
The Agency develops models for risk that “best fit the existing 
data and are consistent with available information on mode of 
action,” but also notes that there is “a reasonable body of scien-
tific evidence that genotoxic carcinogens, and perhaps other car-
cinogenic modes of action, display linear, non-threshold behavior 
at very low dose levels.”104 
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
(NIOSH), established under the same legislation as OSHA105 
and empowered to “develop and establish recommended occupa-
tional safety and health standards,”106 recently released a re-
vised chemical carcinogen policy.107 NIOSH, like the EPA, gen-
erally treats the exposure response relationship as linear at low 
doses, which implies a non-threshold model.108 Also like the 
EPA, NIOSH will depart from this model where a non-linear 
 
 103. See 29 C.F.R. § 1990.143(h) (“No determination will be made that a 
‘threshold’ or ‘no-effect’ level of exposure can be established for a human popu-
lation exposed to carcinogens in general, or to any specific substance.”). 
 104. Chemical Management and Permissible Exposure Limits (PELs), 79 
Fed. Reg. at 61,391. 
 105. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 
Stat. 1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–75, 677–78 (2012), 42 
U.S.C. § 3142-1 (2012)). The section creating NIOSH is found at 29 U.S.C. § 671 
(2012). 
 106. 29 U.S.C. § 671(c)(1). NIOSH was originally conceived as the research 
arm of a coordinated federal effort to regulate workplace safety, and OSHA was 
to be the standard-setting agency. See About NIOSH, CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/about/ 
default.html (“The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 established 
NIOSH as a research agency focused on the study of worker safety and health.”); 
All About OSHA, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN. (2006), https:// 
www.osha.gov/Publications/about-osha/3302-06N-2006-English.html (“The 
OSH Act established the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
in the Department of HHS as the research agency for occupational safety and 
health. NIOSH conducts research on various safety and health problems, pro-
vides technical assistance to OSHA, and recommends standards for OSHA’s 
consideration.”).  
 107. See NIOSH CHEMICAL CARCINOGEN POLICY, supra note 84. NIOSH’s 
2017 guidance on carcinogens post-dates OSHA’s guidance, which was pub-
lished in 1980. Compare id., with 29 C.F.R. § 1990 (1980). As such, it is not 
entirely clear how extensively OSHA relies on NIOSH data to set regulations 
on carcinogens in the workplace. OSHA guidance does, however, reference con-
sulting with the Director of the NIOSH. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1990.104, 1990.106 
(2017). 
 108. See NIOSH CHEMICAL CARCINOGEN POLICY, supra note 84. 
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mode of action has been clearly established.109 Further, NIOSH 
explicitly notes that even where there is evidence of a non-linear 
relationship between risk and exposure at low doses, “it is highly 
unlikely that one can demonstrate empirically that a threshold 
exists.”110 
In summary, the EPA, OSHA, and NIOSH all treat carcino-
gens as non-threshold contaminants, and make this determina-
tion based on the relevant scientific evidence. Further, the EPA 
and NIOSH both assume linearity at low doses, unless the data 
strongly suggests a different relationship between exposure and 
risk to health. The assumption of non-threshold low dose linear-
ity presumes health impacts even at very low levels of expo-
sure.111 Because health effects can be estimated at low doses un-
der this model, the agencies can include these health benefits in 
cost-benefit analyses used to support allowable standards for 
carcinogenic pollutants. Considering these benefits of pollution 
regulation allows agencies to more accurately weigh the effects 
of regulations at different stringencies, facilitating more in-
formed decision-making. 
Accounting for adverse health impacts from very low levels 
of pollution does not mean that the EPA or other agencies must 
or will require the elimination of that pollutant.112 For example, 
 
 109. See id. (“For carcinogen risk assessment, NIOSH generally treats expo-
sure-response as low-dose linear unless a non-linear mode of action has been 
clearly established, in which case NIOSH will adopt a modeling approach de-
fined by the data (including non-linear approaches when appropriate).”). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Commentators have suggested that the non-threshold approach to car-
cinogens was responsible for the EPA’s reluctance to list carcinogenic pollutants 
during the 1970s and much of the 1980s. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Against 
“Individual Risk”: A Sympathetic Critique of Risk Assessment, 153 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1121, 1150 (2005) (“Thus EPA faced the dilemma of either banning all 
emissions of carcinogenic pollutants (with huge economic costs) or allowing 
some emissions and therewith a nonzero probability of some deaths, in apparent 
violation of the ‘ample margin of safety’ language of section 112.”); John P. 
Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 251–52 
(1990) (discussing the EPA’s use of “cumbersome” regulatory processes to avoid 
making tough choices); Bradford C. Mank, What Comes After Technology: Using 
an “Exceptions Process” to Improve Residual Risk Regulation of Hazardous Air 
Pollutants, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 263, 268 (1994) (“The ‘ample margin of safety’ 
language proved counterproductive because the EPA was reluctant to effec-
tively shut down entire industries by listing pollutants, where such listing 
would require zero emission standards.”); Deanna Schmitt, Note, North Caro-
lina Air Toxics Regulations, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1579, 1581–82 (1991) (“To avoid 
such dire consequences and in response to pressure from industry, the EPA in-
stead chose only to regulate a few pollutants.”). Originally, § 112 of the Clean 
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under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA),113 the EPA is re-
quired to set maximum contaminant level goals (MCLG), which 
is the maximum level of a contaminant in drinking water at 
which no known or anticipated health effects would occur.114 
When the EPA regulates carcinogens under the SDWA, the 
Agency sets the MCLG at zero where there is evidence that the 
chemical may cause cancer, and there is no dose below which the 
chemical is considered safe.115 However, the MCLG is not an en-
forceable standard. Rather, the enforceable standard, known as 
the maximum contaminant level, is set as close to the MCLG as 
 
Air Act required an “ample margin of safety” for “hazardous air pollutants.” 42 
U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(B) (1988), amended by Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 301, 104 Stat. 
2399, 2531 (1990). Because carcinogens have no threshold below which they are 
safe, EPA officials feared listing a pollutant as a carcinogen might forbid emit-
ting the pollutant at all, shuttering entire industries. See Adler, supra; Dwyer, 
supra, at 251; Mank, supra; Schmitt, supra, at 1581. However, the U.S. Su-
preme Court determined that zero tolerance for carcinogens was not an appro-
priate approach, at least with regard to OSHA regulations. In the Benzene Case, 
Justice Stevens relied heavily on statutory language mandating that OSHA 
only regulate standards for toxic materials “to the extent feasible,” and deter-
mined that before the Agency enact more stringent standards, OSHA had to 
determine the regulated chemical exposure posed “significant risks of harm.” 
Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene Case), 448 U.S. 
607, 612, 641 (1980). Eventually the EPA linked safety to “best available tech-
nology” standards: after identifying the lowest level of emissions possible with 
the best available technology, the EPA would decide whether to set emissions 
at an even lower level by weighing the reduction in health risks against the 
costs of setting the lower standard. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 
1146, 1163–64 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In 1987, the D.C. Circuit rejected this approach, 
favoring instead a two-step process in which the EPA first determined what 
would be an “acceptable” risk to health without any consideration of cost or 
technological capability, and in a second step, determined the ample margin of 
safety, incorporating feasibility considerations. Id. at 1164–65. The EPA then 
settled on this approach for regulating carcinogenic air pollutants: the EPA 
would set standards so that the maximally exposed individual had a risk of one 
in ten-thousand or less, and if economically feasible, further regulate the pollu-
tant to minimize the number of people with a risk greater than one in one mil-
lion. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 54 Fed. 
Reg. 38,044, 38,044–45 (Sept. 14, 1989) (40 C.F.R. pt. 61); Adler, supra, at 1151. 
 113. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-24 (2012). 
 114. Id. § 300g-1(b)(4)(A) (“Each maximum contaminant level goal estab-
lished under this subsection shall be set at the level at which no known or an-
ticipated adverse effects on the health of persons occur and which allows an 
adequate margin of safety.”). 
 115. See How EPA Regulates Drinking Water Contaminants, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/dwregdev/how-epa-regulates 
-drinking-water-contaminants#develop (last updated June 6, 2018) (“For chem-
ical contaminants that are carcinogens, EPA sets the MCLG at zero if . . . there 
is evidence that a chemical may cause cancer [and] there is no dose below which 
the chemical is considered safe.”). 
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feasible, taking into consideration costs and available technol-
ogy.116 In short, even where the EPA recognizes that a carcino-
gen is unsafe at any level, the Agency can, and does, set stand-
ards above zero. Including health costs from low level exposure 
to carcinogenic pollutants does not force the EPA to ban the pol-
lutant; it merely facilitates more informed decisions about how 
to regulate these pollutants. 
A proposed rule released April 30, 2018 would move the EPA 
away from its longstanding use of a default linear dose response 
model, purportedly because “there is growing empirical evidence 
of non-linearity in the concentration-response function for spe-
cific pollutants and health effects.”117 The proposed rule would 
encourage the EPA to incorporate a variety of “competing” mod-
els on low dose risk assessment, including linear but also thresh-
old, U-shaped, J-shaped, and bell-shaped models.118 Yet the EPA 
cites no studies in support of the assertion that there is empirical 
evidence of non-linearity, nor does it mention any pollutants in 
particular as justification of the rule.119 The proposed rule also 
does not mention its current cancer guidelines or the guidelines’ 
default assumption of low-dose linearity in the absence of evi-
dence to the contrary.120 However, the proposed rule could dra-
matically impact the default assumptions used by the Agency in 
regulating carcinogenic pollutants. It would apply to all signifi-
cant regulatory actions121 and specifically refers to the “dose re-
 
 116. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(4)(B)–(D). 
 117. Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory Science, 83 Fed. Reg. 
18,768, 18,770 (proposed Apr. 30, 2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 30) [here-
inafter Strengthening Transparency]. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See id. 
 120. Id.; see also Maria Hegstad, Draft Science Rule Targets EPA’s Use of 
Strict Default Linear ‘Dose’ Models, INSIDE EPA (May 2, 2018), https://insideepa 
.com/daily-news/draft-science-rule-targets-epas-use-strict-default-linear-dose 
-models (discussing the responses of both critics and supporters of the proposed 
rule and the potential result of less stringent regulations). 
 121. The regulation incorporates the definition of “significant regulatory ac-
tions” included in Executive Order 12,866. See Strengthening Transparency, su-
pra note 117, at 18,771. Executive Order 12,866 defines “significant regulatory 
actions” as: 
any regulatory action that is likely to result in a rule that may: (1) Have 
an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely 
affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, produc-
tivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or 
State, local, or tribal governments or communities; (2) Create a serious 
inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an action taken or planned 
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sponse data and models that underlie . . . ‘pivotal regulatory sci-
ence.’”122 There is nothing in the proposed rule to suggest that it 
does not encompass carcinogenic pollutants. The EPA’s posture 
in this proposed rule suggests a drastic departure in the 
Agency’s treatment of carcinogens and other pollutants for 
which there is strong evidence of linearity of health effects. 
B. NONCARCINOGENS OTHER THAN CRITERIA POLLUTANTS 
In contrast to carcinogens, the EPA treats noncarcinogens 
other than criteria pollutants as threshold pollutants. The EPA 
assumes that there is a threshold below which such pollutants 
do not have adverse health impacts,123 despite the fact that this 
assumption is inconsistent with modern scientific understand-
ing.124 This Section analyzes the EPA’s current practice and then 
criticizes its continued reliance upon this assumption. 
The EPA assessments for noncarcinogens focus on finding a 
“reference dose,” which is the quantity “likely to be without an 
appreciable risk of deleterious effects.”125 The reference dose is 
derived from the point of departure, which is the point from 
which the EPA extrapolates the risk-exposure relationship.126 
 
by another agency; (3) Materially alter the budgetary impact of entitle-
ments, grants, user fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations 
of recipients thereof; or (4) Raise novel legal or policy issues arising out 
of legal mandates, the President’s priorities, or the principles set forth 
in this Executive order. 
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. §§ 638, 641–42 (1994). 
 122. Strengthening Transparency, supra note 117, at 18,770 (defining “piv-
otal regulatory science” as the “studies, models, and analyses that drive the 
magnitude of the benefit-cost calculation, the level of a standard, or point-of-
departure from which a reference value is calculated. In other words, they are 
critical to the calculation of a final regulatory standard or level, or to the quan-
tified costs, benefits, risks and other impacts on which a final regulation is 
based”). 
 123. See SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 44, at 128 (“For noncancer end 
points, it is assumed that homeostatic and defense mechanisms lead to a dose 
threshold (that is, there is low-dose nonlinearity) below which effects do not oc-
cur or are extremely unlikely.”); LOUIS THEODORE & R. RYAN DUPONT, ENVI-
RONMENTAL HEALTH AND HAZARD RISK ASSESSMENT: PRINCIPLES AND CALCU-
LATIONS 289 (2012) (“The noncancer hazard quotient assumes that there is a 
level of exposure . . . below which it is unlikely for even sensitive populations to 
experience adverse health effects . . . .”). 
 124. See SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 44 (“Noncancer effects do not 
necessarily have a threshold, or low-dose nonlinearity . . . .”). 
 125. Id. at 128 (quoting U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, A REVIEW OF THE REF-
ERENCE DOSE AND REFERENCE CONCENTRATION PROCESSES, at 4-4 (2002), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-12/documents/rfd-final.pdf ) . 
 126. See id. (“As in cancer dose-response assessment, the [reference dose] is 
also derived from a [point of departure], which could be a no-observed-adverse-
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For non-cancer pollutants, this point of departure is generally 
the no-observed-adverse-effect level (NOAEL),127 which is “the 
highest exposure level at which no statistically or biologically 
significant increases are seen in the frequency or severity of ad-
verse effect[s],”128 or the lowest-observed-adverse-effect level 
(LOAEL), which is “[t]he lowest dose in a study in which there 
was an observed toxic or adverse effect.”129 The reference dose 
might also be derived based on the “benchmark dose,” which is 
calculated using “a predetermined change in the response rate 
of an adverse effect.”130 Once the EPA determines the NOAEL, 
LOAEL, or benchmark dose, the Agency divides that dose by the 
“uncertainty factor,” a margin of safety intended in part to reflect 
the possible differences between human and animal re-
sponses.131 The resulting number is the reference dose.132 This 
model presumes a threshold at the reference dose: below this ex-
posure level, the health risk from exposure to noncarcinogenic 
pollutants is considered to be effectively zero.133 
Modern scientific studies have challenged the accuracy of 
the EPA’s threshold approach for noncarcinogens, and suggest 
that many of these pollutants do not have a population thresh-
old.134 Epidemiological studies now provide information about 
the health impacts of pollutants across a range of human expo-
sures, including at very low levels.135 Most significantly, a 2009 
 
effect level (NOAEL) or a benchmark dose (BMD).”). 
 127. See id. 
 128. Conducting a Human Health Risk Assessment: Dose-Response, U.S. EN-
VTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/risk/conducting-human-health 
-risk-assessment#tab-3 (last updated June 20, 2017) [hereinafter Conducting 
Human Health Risk Assessment]. 
 129. ToxTutor, Glossary, NAT’L INSTITUTES HEALTH, https://toxtutor.nlm. 
nih.gov/glossary.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2018); see Conducting Human 
Health Risk Assessment, supra note 128 (stating that the EPA uses LOAEL “in 
cases in which a NOAEL has not been demonstrated experimentally”). 
 130. Conducting Human Health Risk Assessment, supra note 128. 
 131. See id. (“These uncertainty factors take into account the variability and 
uncertainty that are reflected in possible differences between test animals and 
humans (generally 10-fold or 10x) and variability within the human population 
(generally another 10x) . . . .”). 
 132. See id. (“Thus, the RfD is determined by use of the following equation: 
RfD = NOAEL (or LOAEL or BMDL)/UFs.”). 
 133. See SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 44, at 128. 
 134. See id. at 8. 
 135. See McGartland et al., supra note 29 (“Epidemiological studies of crite-
ria air pollutants provide dose-response relationships applicable across a range 
of human exposures. These dose-response functions allow for quantifying and 
monetizing the benefits of reducing exposures at every level of exposure.”). 
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report of the National Research Council of the National Academy 
of Sciences136—an independent organization comprised of distin-
guished scholars in science and engineering,137 dedicated to the 
use of science and technology to improve the general welfare, and 
created by an act of Congress with a mandate to provide inde-
pendent and objective advice to the federal government138—ex-
plained that the EPA’s current threshold assumption model for 
noncarcinogens is based on outdated approaches developed be-
tween the 1950s and the 1980s.139 The report observed that non-
carcinogenic pollutants do not necessarily have a threshold,140 
and recommended that the EPA evaluate all noncarcinogens 
without assuming that they have a threshold.141 According to the 
report, the current model yields end products “inadequate for 
benefit-cost analyses or for comparative risk analyses,”142 and 
instead “creates an inconsistent approach for bringing toxicology 
and risk science into the decision-making process.”143 The EPA 
has largely ignored this particular recommendation from the 
2009 report and has not changed its model for assessing noncar-
cinogens.144 
 
 136. See generally SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 44. 
 137. NAS was chartered by the Senate in 1863 with the purpose to, “when-
ever called upon by any department of the Government, investigate, examine, 
experiment, and report upon any subject of science or art.” Steve Olson, The 
National Academy of Sciences at 150, PNAS EARLY EDITION 1, 1 (2014), http:// 
www.pnas.org/content/111/Supplement_2/9327.full. The organization is “a pri-
vate agency with the public role of advising the government on policy-related 
technical issues.” Id. The National Research Council is the “principal operating 
agency” of the National Academies. Articles of Organization of the National Re-
search Council, NAT’L ACADEMIES SCI., ENGINEERING & MED. (June 1, 2015), 
http://www.nationalacademies.org/nasem/na_070358.html.  
 138. The National Research Council was established in 1916 at the request 
of President Wilson to recruit specialists to participate in the National Academy 
of Sciences’ advisory work for the government. See History, NAT’L ACAD. SCI., 
http://www.nasonline.org/about-nas/history (last visited Nov. 19, 2018). 
 139. See McGartland et al., supra note 29. The report concluded that the 
EPA’s approach is no longer scientifically supportable, as it “does not make the 
best possible use of available scientific evidence.” SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, su-
pra note 44, at 177. 
 140. SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 44. 
 141. See id. at 132 (“There are multiple toxicants . . . for which low-dose lin-
ear concentration-response functions rather than thresholds have been derived 
for noncancer end points . . . for critical end points driving the risk characteri-
zation at low doses, such cases may be common, and a new framework and prac-
tice are needed.”). 
 142. Id. at 133. 
 143. Id. 
 144. It is interesting to note that Dr. Thomas Burke, who chaired the NAS 
committee that wrote SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, served as the Deputy Assistant 
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Even if there were a threshold for an individual of average 
sensitivity, that level would, by definition, be lower for more sen-
sitive individuals. Especially sensitive individuals would have 
an even lower threshold. And for the most sensitive individuals 
in a population, there might be no threshold at all.145 While there 
might be individual thresholds for average people, there would 
be no population threshold—the level at which a population ex-
periences no negative health effects.146 Thus, deciding to treat 
one individual’s threshold as a population threshold is neces-
sarily a decision to leave some individuals—those with lower 
thresholds—unprotected. For example, very young children, 
pregnant women, or the elderly might have harm thresholds for 
certain pollutants that are much lower than the average popula-
tion threshold.147 By assuming a threshold for a typical person, 
the EPA overlooks sensitive individuals who may experience 
negative health impacts at exposure levels lower than the regu-
latory standard. The question of how many people to leave un-
protected is ultimately a policy question. An accurate accounting 
 
Administrator of the EPA’s Office of Research and Development during the 
Obama Administration and did not, during that time, usher in implementation 
of the SCIENCE AND DECISIONS recommendation to eschew the threshold as-
sumption for noncarcinogens. See About the Deputy Assistant Administrator of 
EPA’s Office of Research and Development, and EPA’s Science Advisor, U.S. EN-
VTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (Jan. 19, 2017), https://19january2017snapshot.epa 
.gov/aboutepa/about-deputy-assistant-administrator-epas-office-research-and-
development-and-epas-science_.html. 
 145. See SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 44, at 153 (“[A study on indi-
vidual thresholds] provides good physiologic plausibility of low-dose linearity on 
a population basis, given ubiquitous exposures that imply that a substantial 
number of people will be found to be at least as sensitive as the 99.9th percentile 
individual.”). 
 146. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SUMMARY OF EXPERT OPINIONS ON THE 
EXISTENCE OF A THRESHOLD IN THE CONCENTRATION-RESPONSE FUNCTION FOR 
PM2.5-RELATED MORTALITY 16 (2010), https://www3.epa.gov/ttnecas1/regdata/ 
Benefits/thresholdstsd.pdf (defining a population threshold as “the concentra-
tion below which no member of the study population would experience an in-
creased risk of death”). 
 147. See, e.g., National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Mat-
ter, 78 Fed. Reg. 3086, 3104 (Jan. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50, 
51, 52, 53, and 58) [hereinafter NAAQS Particulate Matter] (“There is emerging, 
though still limited, evidence for additional potentially at-risk populations, such 
as those with diabetes, people who are obese, pregnant women, and the devel-
oping fetus.”); Bingheng Chen & Haidong Kan, Air Pollution and Population 
Health: A Global Challenge, 13 ENVTL. HEALTH & PREVENTIVE MED. 94, 96 
(2008) (noting that for “[a]dverse health effects associated with exposure to air 
pollution . . . [h]igh-risk subgroups include young children, the elderly, persons 
with predisposed diseases, and persons with low socioeconomic status (SES)”). 
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of the effects of these pollutants on sensitive people does not ne-
cessitate draconian regulations to completely eliminate all risks; 
rather this information facilitates more informed decision-mak-
ing that accurately accounts for the impacts on all members of 
the population. 
The current threshold model also ignores all scientific evi-
dence of health effects that lacks a high level of confidence. This 
problem is built in to the EPA’s process for determining the lim-
its for these pollutants: when the EPA determines standards, it 
performs a benefits analysis that includes evidence of different 
health impacts of the pollutant.148 It classifies evidence as 
“likely” or “known” if there is a “high degree of confidence in the 
association between exposure and a health outcome,” or as “sug-
gestive” where there is lesser confidence in the link.149 “Sugges-
tive” evidence is generally excluded from the potential health 
risks assessed by the EPA in its primary benefits analysis for 
noncarcinogenic effects.150 As a result, the EPA essentially gives 
no weight to health effects that have not been conclusively 
demonstrated when determining the benefits of a regulation. In 
effect, the EPA imposes a sharp discontinuity in the level of risk 
depending on how the Agency classifies the evidence: the Agency 
assumes there is a risk associated with “known” and “likely” ev-
idence, the specific level of which is based on data, but assumes 
a zero percent probability of risk when evidence is “suggestive.” 
But the probability of an adverse impact is not zero.151 “Sugges-
tive” evidence, instead, presents some other positive level of risk 
which is arbitrarily ignored. 
Economics has a way of addressing uncertainty without ig-
noring it completely. Using the concept of expected value, econ-
omists can incorporate the level of uncertainty into the calcula-
tion of overall risk.152 In the example of noncarcinogenic 
pollutants, if the EPA employed this concept, the expected value 
 
 148. McGartland et al., supra note 29, at 457 (“EPA risk assessments for 
cancer and ‘criteria’ air pollutants . . . use standard terms to summarize the 
strength of evidence regarding a health effect.”). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See id. at 457–58 (“This practice implicitly assumes that exposed popu-
lations have zero [adverse impacts] for reduced exposure when there is some 
evidence of an adverse health effect but that evidence is not unambiguous. This 
assumption . . . is contradicted by findings.”). 
 152. See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS 
IN THE FACE OF UNCERTAINTY 167–69 (2013) (discussing the applications of 
value-of-information analysis, which attempts to quantify uncertainty and the 
value of additional information). 
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of the health risk posed by exposure to these pollutants would 
incorporate both the best estimates for overall harm from expo-
sure and the level of uncertainty. The fact of uncertainty would 
lower the estimated potential risk, but some level of risk would 
still be calculated from exposure at low levels. 
Another way to better account for this risk would be to look 
at the willingness of individuals to pay to avoid risks from low 
level exposures. The “willingness to pay” measure can be calcu-
lated by directly asking people what they would hypothetically 
pay to avoid a risk, or by comparing wages from similar jobs that 
are more or less risky.153 Workers who take riskier jobs receive 
higher wages to compensate for that risk.154 By measuring this 
difference, it is possible to calculate the risk premium, or will-
ingness to pay for the additional risk posed by the job.155 By as-
suming there is zero risk below the threshold, the EPA has pre-
sumed that there is zero willingness to pay to avoid low level 
exposure. There is evidence to suggest, however, that individuals 
actually display a greater willingness to pay when risk is ambig-
uous than they do for unambiguous risks with the same expected 
value.156 A willingness to pay or expected value model would bet-
ter account for the magnitude and the certainty of these risks. 
The EPA’s failure to update its noncarcinogen model to ac-
count for more recent scientific evidence, sensitive populations, 
and scientific uncertainties has important policy implications. 
Because the EPA ignores risks below the threshold, the Agency 
is unable to fully incorporate data on health effects at low levels 
of exposure. The EPA cannot calculate what percentage of the 
population or how many additional people would be protected by 
reductions in pollution below the reference dose. Further, when 
the EPA regulates these pollutants it does not include any health 
benefits from reducing pollution below the reference dose, thus 
 
 153. See John Bronsteen et al., Well-Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analy-
sis, 62 DUKE L.J. 1603, 1645–46 (2013) (discussing two measures of willingness-
to-pay: revealed preferences and surveys of hypothetical willingness to pay for 
a given benefit). 
 154. Id. at 1646. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See Paul A. Kivi & Jason F. Shogren, Second-Order Ambiguity in Very 
Low Probability Risks: Food Safety Valuation, 35 J. AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON. 
443, 454 (2010) (finding in the context of food safety that “people prefer unam-
biguous food safety choices over ambiguous ones with the same expected value,” 
asserting that “[a]mbiguity premiums—how much more people are willing to 
pay to avoid an ambiguous situation than an equivalent unambiguous one—are 
positive” for scenarios the authors tested, and noting that the findings are con-
sistent with previous studies). 
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undercounting potential benefits of regulation. The resulting 
standards therefore do not reflect any potential harm from 
lower-level exposure. If the EPA instead modeled the marginal 
risk of reductions or increases in dose exposure at every level 
using a tool like willingness to pay or expected value, the Agency 
would be able to calculate with greater accuracy the overall costs 
and benefits of different levels of regulation, which would facili-
tate more informed decision-making. 
II.  TREATMENT OF CRITERIA POLLUTANTS   
The previous Part analyzed the EPA’s risk assessment mod-
els of carcinogens and noncarcinogens other than criteria pollu-
tants. That discussion provides a useful foundation upon which 
to examine NAAQS criteria pollutants. The EPA’s understand-
ing of criteria pollutants has evolved over five decades of imple-
menting the Clean Air Act, shifting from a model that resembled 
the one used for other noncarcinogens, which are treated as 
threshold contaminants, to one that more closely approximates 
its handling of carcinogens, which are treated as non-threshold 
contaminants. Under multiple presidential administrations of 
both parties, the Agency has calculated benefits from reducing 
criteria pollutants below the NAAQS, thereby acting inconsist-
ently with the existence of thresholds. Further, recent EPA rules 
have explicitly stated that there is no evidence of thresholds for 
certain criteria pollutants. 
This Part first explores Congress’s understanding of criteria 
pollutants, and describes how even by the mid-1970s, Congress 
had already recognized that criteria pollutants likely do not have 
thresholds. It then presents the EPA’s revision of lead NAAQS 
in 1978 and 2008 as a case study demonstrating the EPA’s shift 
away from threshold language in its promulgation of criteria pol-
lutant standards. The Part concludes with a survey of the EPA’s 
rejection of thresholds, both in its rulemaking language and in 
its calculation of benefits, for the remaining criteria pollutants 
excepting particulate matter, which receives an in-depth exami-
nation in Part III. 
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A. CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1977 
The NAAQS criteria pollutants are six air pollutants for 
which there are clearly established public health concerns at his-
toric ambient levels.157 The Clean Air Act governs the “establish-
ment, review, and revision” of the NAAQS to “provide protection 
for the nation’s public health and the environment.”158 Health-
based standards have been developed for each pollutant, and the 
standards are periodically reviewed based on human exposure 
assessments, health risk assessments, and ecological risk as-
sessments.159 
Critics of clean air regulations have asserted that the 
NAAQS levels are adequate to fully address criteria pollutant 
risks, and that reductions in these pollutants below the level of 
the standard are not beneficial.160 Even though the statute does 
not refer to thresholds, some of these critics argue that thresh-
olds are implied by the statutory requirement commanding the 
EPA to set the NAAQS at levels that, “allowing an adequate 
margin of safety, are requisite to protect the public health.”161 
This argument requires the significant leap of equating “requi-
site to protect the public health” with a no-risk standard. 
An examination of the legislative history of the 1977 Clean 
Air Act Amendments reveals that in the years following the 1970 
Act, Congress developed a more nuanced understanding of the 
 
 157. SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 44, at 368. 
 158. Criteria Air Pollutants: Process of Reviewing the National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/ 
criteria-air-pollutants/process-reviewing-national-ambient-air-quality 
-standards (last updated July 10, 2018); see also Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7401(b)(1) (2012) (“The purposes of this subchapter are—(1) to protect and en-
hance the quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public health 
and welfare and the productive capacity of its population.”). 
 159. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(1) (mandating periodic review of NAAQS every 
five years); SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 44, at 369 (“Human exposure 
and/or health risk assessments and ecological risk assessments are performed 
during the periodic reviews of these standards.”). 
 160. See supra note 26 (providing examples of criticism). 
 161. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91–604, § 109(b)(1), 84 Stat. 
1676, 1680 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012)). 
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relationship between air pollution at low concentrations and ad-
verse health effects162—so much so that by the mid-1970s, Con-
gress expressly rejected the view that criteria pollutants have 
thresholds.163 
Congress’s understanding of thresholds by the time of the 
1977 amendments was influenced by the National Academy of 
Sciences’ (NAS) evaluation of the implementation of the 1970 
Clean Air Act,164 which had been requested by the Senate Public 
Works Committee.165 The report addressed in part the question 
of whether the NAAQS were based on “threshold levels” and 
what evidence there was of a threshold for NAAQS pollutants.166 
The NAS conducted a review of existing studies on air pollu-
tants, including several it had completed for both the Committee 
 
 162. Congress’s early acknowledgement of the threshold concept’s inapplica-
bility to air pollutants has been discussed extensively in literature about the 
Clean Air Act. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & Gary E. Marchant, Shifting Sands: 
The Limits of Science in Setting Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255, 1288–
90 (2004) (“The absence of clear thresholds for these pollutants was a well-
known fact to members of Congress during deliberations over the 1977 amend-
ments to the Clean Air Act, if not earlier.”); Christopher T. Giovinazzo, Defend-
ing Overstatement: The Symbolic Clean Air Act and Carbon Dioxide, 30 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 99, 112 (2006) (“By 1977, when Congress undertook major revi-
sions to the [Clean Air Act], it was perfectly clear that most pollutants had no 
clear thresholds, and that it would therefore be impossible to set NAAQS ‘req-
uisite to protect the public health’ without considering cost. Yet Congress chose 
to maintain the fiction that thresholds exist . . . .”); Craig N. Oren, Prevention 
of Significant Deterioration: Control-Compelling Versus Site-Shifting, 74 IOWA 
L. REV. 1, 71 (1988) (“Judging from its frequency of citation, the apparent lack 
of thresholds was considered by PSD supporters to be a powerful argument for 
the program.”). 
 163. See, e.g., Giovinazzo, supra note 162 (noting Congress’s recognition that 
pollutants had no clear thresholds). 
 164. See Coglianese & Marchant, supra note 162, at 1288–89 n.146 (“Con-
gress was strongly influenced by a 1974 report prepared for the Senate by the 
National Academy of Sciences and National Academy of Engineering which con-
cluded that, contrary to the assumption underlying the 1970 Act, there were no 
thresholds for criteria pollutants.”). 
 165. COORDINATING COMM. ON AIR QUALITY STUDIES, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., 
AIR QUALITY AND AUTOMOBILE EMISSION CONTROL: A REPORT 22 (1974) [here-
inafter 1974 NAS REPORT] (prepared for the Senate Public Works Committee) 
(reviewing the Committee’s charge to NAS). According to the Committee, “[t]he 
Academy was chosen as the body most likely to provide an independent and 
objective study of issues relating to health effects of air pollution at a time when 
the Committee found it increasingly difficult to obtain sufficient independent 
and objective information through its own limited staff investigative capacity.” 
Id. 
 166. Id. at 23. The Senate Public Works Committee asked NAS to specifi-
cally examine “(1) the adverse health effects of air pollutants, (2) the relation of 
[automobile] emissions to ambient air quality, and (3) the costs and benefits 
associated with control of automobile emissions.” Id. at 4. 
  
1380 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:1349 
 
and for the EPA.167 The result of that effort was the NAS’s 1974 
“Air Quality and Automobile Emission Control” report, which 
embraced a non-threshold view of NAAQS pollutants: 
The present standards were derived on the assumption that such 
thresholds do exist. . . . However, in no case is there evidence that the 
threshold levels have a clear physiological meaning, in the sense that 
there are genuine adverse health effects at and above some level of pol-
lution, but no effects at all below that level. On the contrary, evidence 
indicates that the amount of health damage varies with the upward 
and downward variations in the concentration of the pollutant, with no 
sharp lower limit.168 
The NAS’s guidance for the Committee was clear: “[A]t any con-
centration, no matter how small, health effects may occur, the 
importance of which depends on the gravity of the effect.”169 
Similarly, the House Committee report for the 1977 amend-
ments emphasized that there was “neither empirical evidence 
nor a theoretical basis for a threshold phenomenon” for any of 
the NAAQS pollutants.170 The report, analyzing the limitations 
of the NAAQS in 1976, also stated as one of its key findings: “The 
national primary standards are based on the assumption that a 
no-effects threshold level exists and can be proved: in fact, this 
assumption of a safe threshold appears to be false.”171 The report 
likewise discounted the utility of a threshold’s “margin of safety”: 
From the fact that the “safe threshold” concept is, at best, a necessary 
myth to permit the setting of some standards, it necessarily follows 
that the margin of safety concept is also an illusion. . . . [T]he supposed 
existence of even a modest (two or threefold) margin of safety is hardly 
reassuring.172 
 
 167. See id. at 4 (previewing the sources used in the report). 
 168. Id. at 17. 
 169. Id. at 18. The report further noted that “[o]ther considerations also ar-
gue against accepting a threshold model of health effects literally. Even if there 
were sharp threshold levels for individual persons, the levels would certainly 
not be the same for different persons, or even for the same person in different 
states of health.” Id. at 17. Moreover, thresholds fail to account for “synergistic 
effects” of combining several pollutants, both in the human body and in the at-
mosphere. See id. at 18–19 (explaining the possible outcomes from the presence 
of multiple pollutants). The D.C. Circuit cited NAS’s discussion of NAAQS 
thresholds in its Lead Industries Ass’n v. EPA decision, one of the early legal 
challenges to the 1977 amendments. See Lead Indus. Ass’n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 
1130, 1153 n.43 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting the NAS report as countering “the 
assumption that there is a discoverable no-effects threshold”). 
 170. COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, CLEAN AIR ACT AMEND-
MENTS OF 1977, H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 110 (1977). 
 171. COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, CLEAN AIR ACT AMEND-
MENTS OF 1976, H.R. REP. NO. 94-1175, at 89 (1976). 
 172. Id. at 91. 
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The House Committee report endorsed verbatim the NAS’s as-
sertion that “it is impossible at this time to establish an ambient 
air concentration for any pollutant—other than zero—below 
which it is certain that no human beings will be adversely af-
fected.”173 Even by 1976, “[t]he idea that the national primary 
standards are adequate to protect the health of the public ha[d] 
been belied.”174 
In the floor debates leading up to 1977 Clean Air Act Amend-
ments, various members of both chambers endorsed a non-
threshold view of NAAQS contaminants.175 The bill’s chief au-
thor, Senator Edmund Muskie, emphasized a consistent theme 
throughout the deliberations: “There is no threshold health ef-
fect which can be used to say that above this threshold there is 
danger to health and below it there is not. The testimony before 
the committee is replete over 14 years to that effect.”176 Only 
 
 173. Id. (citing NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS: CONFER-
ENCE ON HEALTH EFFECTS OF AIR POLLUTION 7 (1973)). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Senators Muskie and Brooke, as well as Representatives Waxman, Rog-
ers, Preyer, Maguire, and Staggers, all contested the assumption of a “safe” 
threshold. See generally ENVTL. POLICY DIV., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., A LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1977: A CONTINUA-
TION OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970 (1979), https://catalog 
.hathitrust.org/Record/002947778 (collecting six volumes of congressional re-
ports, floor debates, and testimony for the 1977 amendments). 
 176. 123 CONG. REC. 18,043 (1977) (statement of Sen. Muskie). Senator Mus-
kie was emphatic on this point, stressing that: 
Long-term, low-level exposure to pollutants produce health effects 
which are not guarded against by national primary standards. We 
would have to get down to zero pollution in order to eliminate all health 
effects. At any level between zero pollution and the pollution permitted 
by national primary standards, there are health effects. 
  Let us not disabuse ourselves on that score. 
Id. at 18,460. Senator Muskie’s views on environmental legislation have held 
particularly strong sway in the federal courts. As Professor Richard Lazarus 
concluded: 
Congressional intent in the context of federal environmental law may 
be fairly equated with the intent of Senator Ed Muskie of Maine. Fed-
eral courts in their opinions have cited to the views of Senator Muskie 
in the enactment of federal environmental statutes in at least 293 sep-
arate cases. That is an enormous number of cases. The United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has itself cited to Mus-
kie’s views in fifty-four cases. . . . 
  Looking just to the United States Supreme Court, the statistics are 
even more striking. The Justices have cited to Muskie in twenty-two 
different cases. They include eight Clean Air Act cases, and eleven 
Clean Water Act cases. For each of those laws, that number constitutes 
a large percentage of Clean Air and Clean Water Act cases decided by 
the Court. 
  The Senator, moreover, was cited most often by the Court majority 
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seven years into the Clean Air Act regime, Senator Muskie was 
unequivocal, stating that “there is no such thing as a threshold 
for health effects. Even at the national primary standard level, 
which is the health standard, there are health effects that are 
not protected against.”177 There was evidence suggesting these 
pollutants were non-threshold before the 1970 Clean Air Act was 
passed, and at least some members of Congress were aware of 
that issue.178 But whatever Congress believed in 1970, by 1977 
Congress had determined that a non-threshold approach was 
well-supported. 
Importantly, the core element of the Prevention of Signifi-
cant Deterioration (PSD) program is inconsistent with the notion 
that criteria pollutants have thresholds. The PSD program con-
strains the degradation of ambient air quality in areas that have 
air quality that is better than the NAAQS.179 If criteria pollu-
tants had thresholds and if the NAAQS were set at these thresh-
olds, then there would be no reason for Congress to attempt to 
provide such protection. A program of this sort would have costs 
but no benefits. Quite to the contrary, in establishing the PSD 
program, Congress rejected the argument now being made by 
opponents of the Obama Administration’s environmental regu-
lations: that there can be no benefits from particulate reductions 
below the NAAQS.180 
In sum, a broad collection of evidence—advisory group re-
ports, committee reports, floor debates, and the structure of the 
legislation itself—all indicate that by 1977, Congress had re-
jected the threshold model for criteria pollutants. Only a few 
 
in those cases, meaning that his views literally influenced the reason-
ing underlying the Court’s ruling. Seventeen different majority opin-
ions cited to Muskie. . . . The Justices referred to the Senator as “the 
principal Senate sponsor” and the “primary author” of federal environ-
mental legislation. 
Lazarus, supra note 71, at 239, 242–43 (citations omitted). 
 177. 123 CONG. REC. 18,460 (1977) (statement of Sen. Muskie). 
 178. In fact, Muskie asserted that Congress was aware of this issue when it 
passed the original Act: “The [1970] Clean Air Act is based on the assumption, 
although we knew at the time it was inaccurate, that there is a threshold.” 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977: Hearing on S. 251, S. 252 and S. 253 Before 
the Subcomm. on Envtl. Pollution of the S. Comm. on Env’t & Pub. Works, 95th 
Cong. 8 (1977) (statement of Sen. Muskie); see also Coglianese & Marchant, su-
pra note 162 (asserting that the Senate knew there was no threshold when it 
passed the 1977 amendments, if not earlier). 
 179. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7473(b) (2012). 
 180. See supra notes 26–30 and accompanying text; infra notes 285–302 and 
accompanying text (providing an overview of opposing views toward particulate 
reduction regulations). 
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years after the setting of the first standards for criteria pollu-
tants, Congress equated “[t]he concept of a ‘no-effect’ concentra-
tion” with “a chimera.”181 
B. SHIFT IN THE EPA’S APPROACH: A CASE STUDY OF LEAD 
Some early EPA practices, before the 1977 amendments, 
were consistent with a threshold model. However, the Agency 
subsequently rejected this approach as a result of advances in 
scientific understanding. In this Section, we illustrate the EPA’s 
shift through a comparison of how the EPA set the NAAQS levels 
for one pollutant—lead—for the first time in 1978 and how the 
EPA revised these levels in 2008. 
When the EPA first developed standards for criteria pollu-
tants, the Agency treated these contaminants similarly to the 
way in which it treats other noncarcinogens, using language sug-
gesting criteria pollutants had thresholds.182 The first model de-
veloped by the EPA was used during the promulgation of the 
1978 lead standard,183 which focused on finding the “safe level of 
total lead exposure.”184 To find this level, the EPA employed the 
“critical population, critical effects” model: identify a “critical 
population” and “critical effect,” analyze the relationship be-
tween environmental exposure and the critical effect, and deter-
mine an averaging period.185 The first step of this model was to 
 
 181. COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, CLEAN AIR ACT AMEND-
MENTS OF 1977, H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 111 (1977) (quoting 1974 NAS REPORT, 
supra note 165, at 57). The report further quotes NAS’s findings that it had 
“been unable to . . . prove[ ]  that a threshold for nitrogen dioxide-induced injury 
exists” and that “ozone is a compound like carbon monoxide for which no safe 
threshold exists.” Id. (quoting 1974 NAS REPORT, supra note 165, at 41, 50). 
 182. See Livermore & Revesz, supra note 74, at 1202, 1203 n.111, 1206, 
1227–28 (discussing the EPA’s use of threshold language for its earliest 
NAAQS). It is worth noting that even by the 1978 Lead Rule, which as discussed 
in this section included language suggestive of a threshold of health effects for 
lead, the EPA acknowledged that a threshold may not, in fact, exist. “It is also 
true that the absence of statistical correlation of EP levels with blood lead levels 
below 15 μg Pb/dL does not necessarily mean that these lower blood lead levels 
are known to be without risk.” Lead: Proposed National Primary and Secondary 
Ambient Air Quality Standards, 42 Fed. Reg. 63,076, 63,079 (proposed Dec. 14, 
1977) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50) [hereinafter 1977 Lead Proposed Rule]. 
 183. See Livermore & Revesz, supra note 74, at 1211. 
 184. 1977 Lead Proposed Rule, supra note 182. A “safe level” assumes that 
there is a threshold; by definition, a threshold is a level below which there are 
no health effects. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. For a more detailed 
discussion of how the EPA set the 1978 lead standard, see Livermore & Revesz, 
supra note 74, at 1202–06. 
 185. See Livermore & Revesz, supra note 74, at 1211 (explaining the “criti-
cal-population-critical-effect” framework as applied to lead). 
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identify the critical population, a particularly vulnerable seg-
ment of the population that differed depending on the pollutant 
and the type of harm posed.186 The EPA chose young children 
ages one to five as the critical population for lead, both because 
young children are more susceptible to adverse health effects at 
lower exposure levels than adults, and because children are at 
higher risk of exposure to lead through dirt and soil.187 The EPA 
noted that children are at greater risk because of higher intake 
of lead per unit of body weight, greater absorption and retention 
of ingested lead, physiologic stresses due to rapid growth and di-
etary habits, incomplete development of metabolic defense 
mechanisms, and greater sensitivity of developing systems.188 
The EPA acknowledged that there were other potential critical 
populations, notably pregnant women and fetuses, but stated 
that there was no available evidence to indicate that this popu-
lation would require more stringent standards than small chil-
dren.189 
The critical effect is defined by the EPA as “the first adverse 
effect, or its known precursor” which occurs in the critical popu-
lation.190 The EPA identified lead-induced elevation of erythro-
cyte protoporphyrin (EP) elevation as the critical effect.191 EP el-
evation is limited iron absorption in red blood cells that can be 
caused by exposure to lead.192 The EPA noted that EP elevation 
causes impairment of cell functions which should not, in the 
Agency’s view, be permitted to persist as a chronic condition.193 
In 1978, the EPA reasoned that if the most sensitive popu-
lation was protected, everyone else would be protected as well.194 
 
 186. See id.  
 187. See 1977 Lead Proposed Rule, supra note 182, at 63,077–78 (“EPA be-
lieves that young children (ages 1–5 years) should be regarded as the foremost 
critically sensitive population for setting the lead standard.”). 
 188. Id. at 63,078. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Risk Assessment for Other Effects, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/fera/risk-assessment-other-effects (last updated Jan. 31, 
2017). 
 191. See 1977 Lead Proposed Rule, supra note 182, at 63,078 (“EPA is pro-
posing that lead-induced elevation in children of EP should be accepted as the 
pivotal adverse effect of lead.”). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See National Primary and Secondary Ambient Air Quality Standards 
for Lead, 43 Fed. Reg. 46,246, 46,250, 46,252, 46,254 (Oct. 5, 1978) (to be codi-
fied at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50) [hereinafter 1978 Lead Final Rule] (reasoning that the 
proposed standard will protect adults in part because “children are known to 
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Moreover, if the critical population was protected against the 
critical effect, then everyone would be protected against every 
effect of the pollutant.195 After making these two determinations, 
the EPA established a relationship between environmental ex-
posure and the critical effect of EP elevation. The Agency first 
determined the blood lead level at which children ages one to five 
would experience EP elevation. The EPA selected 30 μg/dL as 
the “maximum safe blood level for an individual child.”196 This 
was the individual threshold of risk for children established by 
the Center for Disease Control (CDC) at that time.197 The EPA 
then selected 15 μg/dL as the average blood level target, reason-
ing that at that level 99.5% of the population of children would 
have blood levels below the 30 μg/dL level.198 
The EPA then attempted to account for non-air sources of 
lead, which are much more significant than airborne lead pollu-
tion and include lead paint, which may be ingested by small chil-
dren.199 Studies examined by the EPA suggested non-air pollu-
tion to be from 10.2 μg/dL to as much as 14.4 μg/dL,200 from 
which the Agency estimated a contribution of 12 μg/dL.201 The 
EPA then subtracted the non-air contributions from its target 
average blood level of 15 μg/dL, leading to a permissible air con-
tribution of 3 μg/dL.202 
 
have greater net absorption and retention of lead than adults”); see also Liver-
more & Revesz, supra note 74, at 1203. 
 195. Livermore & Revesz, supra note 74, at 1203. 
 196. 1978 Lead Final Rule, supra note 194, at 46,253. 
 197. 1977 Lead Proposed Rule, supra note 182, at 63,079 (“[I]n 1975 the Cen-
ter for Disease Control established as a guideline for undue or increased lead 
absorption in children a blood lead level of 30 μg Pb/dL or EP levels of 60 
μg/dL.”). 
 198. See id. Despite its use of a threshold model, the EPA effectively opted 
to leave more than 20,000 children unprotected and likely subjected to lead lev-
els above 30 μg/dL in their blood. See Livermore & Revesz, supra note 74, at 
1207 (citing to 1978 Lead Final Rule, supra note 194, at 46,255). Thus, even 
when the Agency tried to set a threshold standard, it knowingly failed to set 
that standard at a level below which no adverse health effects occurred.  
 199. See 1978 Lead Final Rule, supra note 194, at 46,253–54 (discussing the 
rulemaking approach for non-air sources of lead exposure). 
 200. Id.  
 201. Id. at 46,254. One consequence of selecting the 12 μg/dL estimate for 
contribution was that individuals living in areas of the country in which non-
air contribution exceeded 12 μg/dL were left unprotected by the threshold that 
the EPA ultimately chose. Livermore & Revesz, supra note 74, at 1207–08. 
 202. See 1978 Lead Final Rule, supra note 194, at 46,254; 1977 Lead Pro-
posed Rule, supra note 182, at 63,081 (showing the EPA calculations). 
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The EPA then needed to translate the target level of lead in 
blood into a limitation on lead in air, which is what the NAAQS 
regulate. To do so, the EPA estimated the ratio of lead in air to 
lead in blood. Finally, the Agency divided the air-to-blood ratio 
it had selected by two.203 The final standard set was a maximum 
allowable concentration of lead in the air of 1.5 μg/m3.204 
In 2008, the EPA under President George W. Bush revisited 
its 1978 lead NAAQS determination and revised the standard 
from 1.5 μg/m3 to one tenth that amount; 0.15 μg/m3.205 New ep-
idemiological research on the effects of even very low blood lead 
levels on intelligence quotient (IQ) convinced EPA officials to 
lower NAAQS for lead.206 By 2008, there was broad consensus in 
the scientific community that these effects were among the most 
sensitive of lead’s harms and of the greatest public concern.207 
Though the EPA focused on loss of IQ points, the EPA eliminated 
the “critical effect” language.208 
In evaluating potential lead limits, the EPA focused on 
measurements of lead in urban areas209 where lead pollution and 
lead exposure is generally higher.210 The EPA chose three urban 
case studies: Cleveland, Chicago, and Los Angeles to measure 
ambient air quality.211 The EPA also included a “general urban 
 
 203. See 1978 Lead Final Rule, supra note 194, at 46,252, 46,254 (“On the 
basis of an estimated relationship of air lead to blood lead of 1 to 2, EPA con-
cludes that the ambient air standard should be 1.5 μg/m3.”); 1977 Lead Proposed 
Rule, supra note 182, at 63,081. 
 204. 1978 Lead Final Rule, supra note 194, at 46,246 (“EPA is setting a na-
tional ambient air quality standard for lead at a level of 1.5 micrograms lead 
per cubic meter of air (μg Pb/m3), averaged over a calendar quarter.”). 
 205. See 2008 Final Rule National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Lead, 
73 Fed. Reg. 66,964, 66,966 (Nov. 12, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50, 
51, 53, and 58) [hereinafter 2008 Lead Final Rule]. 
 206. See GERALD MARKOWITZ & DAVID ROSNER, LEAD WARS: THE POLITICS 
OF SCIENCE AND THE FATE OF AMERICA’S CHILDREN 96–121 (2013) (tracking the 
emergence and acceptance of research showing negative impacts on IQ at low 
lead blood levels despite lead industry interference). 
 207. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Lead, 73 Fed. Reg. 
29,184, 29,198 (proposed May 20, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50, 51, 
53, and 58) [hereinafter 2008 Lead Proposed Rule] (referring to neurological ef-
fects as being “currently clearly of greatest public health concern”). 
 208. See id. at 29,198–207. 
 209. See id. at 29,208 (“EPA . . . focused on characterizing risk for residential 
populations in three specific urban locations.”). 
 210. Ronnie Levin et al., Lead Exposures in U.S. Children, 2008: Implica-
tions for Prevention, 116 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1285, 1289 (2008), https:// 
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2569084/pdf/ehp-116-1285.pdf (“Lead 
contamination typically is greater in urban versus rural areas.”). 
 211. 2008 Lead Proposed Rule, supra note 207, at 29,210. 
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case study,” not based on a specific geographic area, but using 
simplifications to represent exposure of children in small resi-
dential areas near the current NAAQS.212 Finally, the EPA in-
cluded a “primary Pb smelter case study,” based on a specific 
area not currently in compliance with NAAQS.213 The Agency 
analyzed each of these cases under alternative NAAQS, includ-
ing the current standard, and calculated the median blood level 
associated with each scenario.214 To convert each ambient air 
standard into a distribution of blood levels in children, the EPA 
used two models that incorporated air, soil, and indoor dust es-
timations for each case study and separated sources of blood 
level into non-air related, “recent air,” including ingesting ambi-
ent air and dust recently carried into the home, and “past air,” 
including sources less immediately affected by a standard 
change, like ingesting outdoor soil and dust.215 For each blood 
level estimated as a result of a particular NAAQS scenario, the 
EPA attempted to estimate what percentage of the blood level 
was attributable to air sources, with the lower bound of the esti-
mate including only recent air sources and the upper bound in-
cluding recent and past air sources.216 
The EPA then needed to translate blood levels into lost IQ 
points. The EPA noted that “the slope for effects on IQ is steeper 
at lower blood lead levels,”217 meaning that one additional unit 
of exposure at low levels has a greater health effect than one ad-
ditional unit at higher levels. The EPA suggested that one pos-
sible reason for this is that lead at low exposures might interfere 
with different biological mechanisms than lead at higher expo-
sures, and the mechanisms affected at lower levels might be 
more easily saturated.218 
Across the case study locations, at the then-current stand-
ard of 1.5 μg/m3, the model showed a median loss of more than 
 
 212. Id. at 29,209. 
 213. Id. at 29,209–10. 
 214. See id. at 29,216–17, 29,217 tbl.3 (summarizing the results of simula-
tions with different NAAQS levels). 
 215. Id. at 29,210–11. 
 216. See id. at 29,215 tbl.2 (summarizing the air-related percentage of lead 
in blood levels across different potential NAAQS levels). 
 217. Id. at 29,201. 
 218. See NAT’L CTR. FOR ENVTL. ASSESSMENT RTP DIV., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, EPA/600/R-5/144aF, AIR QUALITY CRITERIA FOR LEAD, at 8-66 (2006), 
http://ofmpub.epa.gov/eims/eimscomm.getfile?p_download_id=459555 (“It is 
conceivable that . . . lower Pb levels may be disrupting different biological mech-
anisms than the more severe levels of high exposures . . . .”). 
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two IQ points, and an upper bound of four or more IQ points 
lost.219 This is not a small risk: because this figure measures a 
median loss, the actual loss for certain individuals at the high 
end of the distribution could be much greater.220 The EPA also 
estimated the number of children in Cleveland, Chicago, and Los 
Angeles likely to lose between one and seven IQ points under the 
1978 NAAQS regime, still in place at the time.221 One model pre-
dicted 395,528 children in Chicago, 13,857 in Cleveland, and 
284,945 in Los Angeles would lose more than one IQ point.222 
According to the same model, in Chicago, 100,159 children were 
estimated to lose more than seven IQ points; in Cleveland, 1858 
children would suffer such losses; as would 57,834 children in 
Los Angeles.223 As a result of the existing studies and risk as-
sessment, the Administrator determined the current standard 
did not protect public health with an adequate margin of 
safety.224 
Reviewing this data, a panel of the Clean Air Scientific Ad-
visory Committee (CASAC), a non-partisan entity tasked with 
providing independent scientific advice to the EPA,225 advised 
 
 219. 2008 Lead Proposed Rule, supra note 207, at 29,217. 
 220. See id. at 29,195 (“While levels in the U.S. general population, including 
geometric mean levels in children aged 1–5, have declined significantly, levels 
have been found to vary among children of different socioeconomic sta-
tus . . . and other demographic characteristics. . . . For example, while the 
2001–2004 median blood level for children aged 1–5 of all races and ethnic 
groups is 1.6 μg/dL, the median for the subset living below the poverty level is 
2.3 μg/dL and 90th percentile values for these two groups are 4.0 μg/dL and 5.4 
μg/dL, respectively. Similarly, the 2001–2004 median blood level for black, non-
Hispanic children aged 1–5 is 2.5 μg/dL, while the median level for the subset 
of that group living below the poverty level is 2.9 μg/dL and the median level for 
the subset living in more well-off households (i.e., with income more than 200% 
of the poverty level) is 1.9 μg/dL. Associated 90th percentile values for 2001–
2004 are 6.4 μg/dL (for black, non-Hispanic children aged 1–5), 7.7 μg/dL (for 
the subset of that group living below the poverty level) and 4.1 μg/dL (for the 
subset living in a household with income more than 200% of the poverty level).”). 
 221. Id. at 29,219–20 tbls.4, 5 & 6. 
 222. Id. at 29,219–20 tbl.5 (employing a log-linear model). 
 223. Id. at 29,220 tbl.6. 
 224. Id. at 29,229. 
 225. CASAC was established as part of the 1977 amendments “to review the 
criteria and standards promulgated [by the EPA], and provide other related sci-
entific and technical advice.” EPA Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CA-
SAC): Charter, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (June 5, 2015), https:// 
yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/WebCASAC/currentcharter? 
OpenDocument. By statute, CASAC is composed of seven members appointed 
by the EPA Administrator, “including at least one member of the National Acad-
emy of Sciences, one physician, and one person representing State air pollution 
control agencies.” Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(2)(A) (2012). 
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the EPA that a population IQ loss of one to two points repre-
sented a “highly significant” public health loss226 and advised a 
standard “no higher than 0.2 μg/m3.”227 Using the air-to-blood 
ratio and the concentration-response function, the Administra-
tor determined in the final rule that 0.15 μg/m3 would result in 
a mean IQ loss within the subset population below two points.228 
Between 1978 and 2008, the EPA’s analysis shifted signifi-
cantly with regard to the issue of thresholds.229 In 1978, the EPA 
adopted the CDC’s threshold of 30 μg/dL as the “maximum safe 
blood lead level.”230 The Agency’s next steps were all premised 
on the assumption that so long as a child’s blood level remained 
below this limit, adverse health effects would be avoided. In the 
EPA’s 2008 revision for lead, this premise was no longer valid as 
a result of new epidemiological studies about lead’s effects at low 
doses.231 The proposed rule explicitly stated that “the Adminis-
trator recognizes that [lead] can be considered a non-threshold 
pollutant.”232 Moreover, the EPA noted in 2008 that the CDC 
recognized that no “safe” threshold for blood lead has been iden-
tified,233 and stated that “[t]hreshold levels, in terms of blood 
[lead] levels in individual children, for neurological effects can-
not be discerned from the currently available studies.”234 The 
Agency acknowledged that there are effects from lead at very low 
 
 226. 2008 Lead Proposed Rule, supra note 207, at 29,226. 
 227. Id. at 29,241. 
 228. 2008 Lead Final Rule, supra note 205, at 67,005–06. Note that the pro-
posed rule modeled the median loss of IQ points, whereas the final rule modeled 
the mean loss of IQ points. Compare 2008 Lead Final Rule, supra note 205, at 
67,005 tbl.4 (showing mean IQ loss), with 2008 Lead Proposed Rule, supra note 
207, at 29,218 tbl.4 (showing median IQ loss). 
 229. Though the 2008 method represents a significant shift, there are still 
concerns about this analysis. For a brief overview, see Livermore & Revesz, su-
pra note 74, at 1214. The most significant issue is that the population IQ loss of 
one to two points is rather arbitrary. Id. 
 230. 1978 Lead Final Rule, supra note 194, at 46,253. 
 231. See MARKOWITZ & ROSNER, supra note 206, at 111–20. 
 232. 2008 Lead Proposed Rule, supra note 207, at 29,244. This claim is reit-
erated in the final rule, albeit qualified by the possibility that thresholds may 
still exist “at levels distinctly lower than the lowest exposures examined in these 
epidemiological studies.” 2008 Lead Final Rule, supra note 205, at 66,984. 
 233. 2008 Lead Final Rule, supra note 205, at 66,972. 
 234. Id. at 66,975. 
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levels,235 and even asserted that the slope for effects on IQ is ac-
tually steeper at lower blood lead levels.236 Further, though the 
EPA based the final steps of its analysis around the significant 
health effect of loss of one to two IQ points, the Agency did not 
claim that this was a level below which there are no health 
risks.237 The Administrator even acknowledged that standards 
would ideally be set so that no children would lose IQ points due 
to lead pollution.238 The rule’s Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA), 
which examines the “the potential social benefits and social costs 
of a regulation,”239 effectively reaffirmed these conclusions: 
while the EPA ultimately adopted an updated standard of 0.15 
μg/m3, it had also analyzed the costs and benefits of a more strin-
gent standard of 0.10 μg/m3,240 and found additional total bene-
fits from moving to a 0.15 μg/m3 level to a 0.10 μg/m3 level to be 
between $1.1 billion and $1.7 billion.241 These are benefits that 
would not exist below a true threshold. The EPA acknowledged 
that the decision was ultimately a “public health policy judg-
ment” because there is no “evidence- or risk-based bright line 
that indicates a single appropriate level.”242 Overall, this 2008 
 
 235. Id. at 66,992 n.68. The EPA “recognizes today that ‘there is no level of 
[lead] exposure that can yet be identified, with confidence, as clearly not being 
associated with some risk of deleterious health effects.’” Id. (quoting 2006 Cri-
teria Document, at 8-63). 
 236. Id. at 66,987. 
 237. See id. at 66,998; 2008 Lead Proposed Rule, supra note 207, at 29,243. 
 238. Id. at 29,242. 
 239. Regulatory Impact Analyses for Air Pollution Regulations, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/economic-and-cost-analysis-air 
-pollution-regulations/regulatory-impact-analyses-air-pollution (last updated 
Sept. 11, 2018). The Agency’s RIAs include descriptions of social costs and ben-
efits “that cannot be quantified in monetary terms and a determination of the 
potential net benefits of the rule[,] including an evaluation of the effects that 
are not monetarily quantified.” Id. 
 240. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS OF THE 
PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS FOR 
LEAD, at ES-1 to -7 (2008), https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/docs/ria/naaqs-lead_ 
ria_final_2008-10.pdf. 
 241. Id. at 5-2. This number is the difference between the low estimate for 
the 0.10 μg/m3 level and the 0.15 μg/m3 level and the difference between the 
high estimates at those levels. Both estimates are calculated using a 3% dis-
count rate, though the EPA also calculates benefits and costs using a 7% dis-
count rate. Id. However, economists generally find the 7% rate to be unrealisti-
cally high for air pollution estimates. See Newell, supra note 9. The benefits 
discussed in this section were all calculated using the 3% discount rate unless 
otherwise noted. 
 242. 2008 Lead Final Rule, supra note 205, at 67,006. 
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rulemaking reflected an important shift in how the EPA regu-
lates NAAQS pollutants: from assuming that there is a threshold 
below which no health effects will occur to acknowledging that 
the decision is ultimately a policy judgment because there is no 
exposure level where all risks can be avoided.243 
C. REJECTING THRESHOLDS AND CALCULATING BENEFITS 
BELOW THE NAAQS 
The EPA’s rejection of thresholds for lead is not atypical. 
Across the range of criteria pollutants, the EPA has moved to-
ward a non-threshold model. For many criteria pollutants, the 
EPA has explicitly acknowledged—in some cases for decades—
where it has evidence to suggest that NAAQS pollutants lack a 
threshold. Further, for all but one of the criteria pollutants,244 
the Agency has calculated benefits from alternatives more strin-
gent than what the EPA ultimately selected as its standard, and 
 
 243. In 2016, the EPA again reviewed the lead NAAQS and declined to ad-
just the standard, leaving in place the 0.15 μg/m3 level. The Agency noted that 
newly available evidence “reaffirms conclusions” from the 2008 NAAQS and 
stated that the “currently available evidence is generally consistent with the 
evidence available in the last review.” Review of the National Ambient Air Qual-
ity Standards for Lead, 81 Fed. Reg. 71,906, 71,907 (Oct. 18, 2016) (to be codified 
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50). The Agency also reiterated that the NAAQS were not a no-
risk threshold. Id. at 71,929. In reviewing the 2008 standard, the EPA “recog-
niz[ed] the continued lack of a discernible threshold of exposure associated with 
neurocognitive effects.” Id. Moreover, the Administrator, responding to com-
ments that there is no safe level of lead exposure, instead noted that she was 
not required by the Clean Air Act to establish a NAAQS with zero risk. Id. at 
71,928; see also Joseph M. Feller, Non-Threshold Pollutants and Air Quality 
Standards, 24 ENVTL. L. 821, 824–25, 837 (1994) (“The absence of health or 
welfare thresholds is well-known not only to scientists but also to Congress, 
EPA, and the courts, which are often called on to oversee EPA’s implementation 
of the Act. Nonetheless, attempts to deal rationally with the problems of air 
pollution are frustrated because the threshold assumption is built into the 
structure of the Act. . . . While recognizing that health-effects thresholds may 
not exist for some pollutants, EPA has nonetheless generally structured its 
NAAQS rulemakings as if they do.”(citations omitted)). 
 244. The EPA found benefits for every criteria pollutant for which it has per-
formed an RIA in recent times. The sole exception is carbon monoxide: the 
Agency reviewed the carbon monoxide NAAQS in 2011, but did not conduct an 
RIA. See Review of National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Carbon Mon-
oxide, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,294 (Aug. 31, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50, 
53, and 58) [hereinafter 2011 Carbon Monoxide Review]. The most recent RIA 
for carbon monoxide was conducted in 1985. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
EPA-450/5-85-007, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL AMBIENT 
AIR QUALITY STANDARDS FOR CARBON MONOXIDE (1985), http://nepis.epa.gov/ 
Exe/ZyPURL.cgi?Dockey=2000NK80.TXT. 
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it has done so under presidents from both parties.245 That the 
EPA finds additional benefits for levels more stringent than the 
NAAQS is inconsistent with the existence of a threshold for 
these pollutants: below a threshold there should be no additional 
benefits from reductions. This section surveys the EPA’s histor-
ical practices for ozone, carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, and 
sulfur dioxide,246 revealing the Agency’s consistent calculations 
of benefits below NAAQS levels and its more explicit finding on 
the lack of evidence of thresholds. A similar analysis for partic-
ulates follows in Part III. 
As early as 1979, the EPA began to acknowledge the diffi-
culty of identifying thresholds for criteria pollutants. In its revi-
sion for ozone, the Carter EPA noted that the rule’s “criteria doc-
ument supports the contention that a clear threshold of adverse 
health effects cannot be identified with certainty for ozone.”247 In 
revising that standard, the George H.W. Bush EPA concluded 
that “[t]here appears to be no threshold level below which mate-
rials damage will not occur; exposure of sensitive materials to 
any non-zero concentration of O3 (including natural background 
levels) can produce effects if the exposure duration is sufficiently 
long.”248 In its 1997 review for ozone, the Clinton EPA went even 
further. The Agency recognized “O3 may elicit a continuum of 
biological responses down to background concentrations.”249 In 
stark terms, the Agency noted that, “in the absence of any dis-
cernible threshold, it is not possible to select a level below which 
 
 245. These calculations are part of the EPA’s efforts to comply with Execu-
tive Order 12,866, issued during the Clinton Administration, and OMB Circular 
A-4, issued during the George W. Bush Administration. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS (RIA) FOR THE NO2 NATIONAL 
AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS (NAAQS), at ES-2 (2010), https://www3 
.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/docs/ria/naaqs-no2_ria_final_2010-01.pdf (discussing these 
documents as presenting “guidelines for EPA to assess the benefits and costs of 
the selected regulatory option, as well as one less stringent and one more strin-
gent option”). 
 246. The additional benefits for more stringent lead standards were dis-
cussed as part of the case study supra Part II.B, while the benefits for additional 
particulate matter reductions are discussed in depth infra Part III. 
 247. Revisions to the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Photo-
chemical Oxidants, 44 Fed. Reg. 8202, 8213 (Feb. 8, 1979) (“Rather, there is a 
continuum consisting of ozone levels at which health effects are certain, through 
levels at which scientists can generally agree that health effects have been 
clearly demonstrated, and down to levels at which the indications of health ef-
fects are less certain and harder to identify.”). 
 248. Proposed Rule for National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 
57 Fed. Reg. 35,542, 35,553 (Aug. 10, 1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50). 
 249. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 
38,856, 38,863 (July 18, 1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50). 
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absolutely no effects are likely to occur . . . [or] to identify a level 
at which it can be concluded with confidence that no ‘adverse’ 
effects are likely to occur.”250 In 2008, the George W. Bush EPA’s 
final rule for ozone repeatedly confirmed that “the underlying 
scientific evidence is [not] certain enough to support a focus on 
any single bright-line benchmark level.”251 The rule’s RIA explic-
itly noted that “ozone is a non-threshold pollutant.”252 In 2015, 
the EPA under President Obama noted in its final rule for ozone 
that “[f]rom the inception of the NAAQS standard-setting pro-
cess, the EPA and the courts have acknowledged that scientific 
uncertainties in general, and the lack of clear thresholds in pol-
lutant effects in particular, preclude any [] definitive determina-
tions [of zero risk standards].”253 Similarly, the rule’s Integrated 
Science Assessment stated more explicitly the Agency’s “overall 
conclusion[] that the epidemiologic studies . . . indicated a gen-
erally linear [concentration-response] function with no indica-
tion of a threshold . . . .”254 
The EPA in 2008 also included benefits calculations for lev-
els below the standard set by the regulation. While the EPA se-
lected a standard of 0.075 ppm, the Agency also analyzed a more 
stringent standard of 0.070 ppm—the level later selected by the 
Obama Administration in 2015—as well as an even more strin-
gent 0.065 ppm standard.255 The Agency provided third-party es-
timates of benefits for its chosen standard of 0.075 ppm which 
ranged from $2 billion to $19 billion in 2020.256 For a more strin-
gent standard of 0.070 ppm, the Agency estimated benefits of 
 
 250. Id. 
 251. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 73 Fed. Reg. 
16,436, 16,465, 16,471, 16,476–77, 16,481–82 (Mar. 27, 2008) (to be codified at 
40 C.F.R. pts. 50 and 58). Moreover, the rule noted that, in light of the contin-
uum of effects associated with varying levels of exposure to ozone, adverse 
health effects are “related to the actual magnitude of the O3 concentration, not 
just whether the concentration is above a specified level.” Id. at 16,475. The 
Administrator recognized “that exposures of concern must be considered in the 
context of a continuum of the potential for health effects of concern, and their 
severity, with increasing uncertainty associated with the likelihood of such ef-
fects at lower O3 exposure levels.” Id. at 16,465–66. 
 252. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FINAL OZONE NAAQS REGULATORY IM-
PACT ANALYSIS, at 6-30 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 FINAL OZONE RIA], 
https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/docs/ria/naaqs-o3_ria_final_2008-03.pdf. 
 253. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 80 Fed. Reg. 
65,292, 65,355 (Oct. 26, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50, 51, 52, 53, and 
58). 
 254. Id. at 65,309. 
 255. 2008 FINAL OZONE RIA, supra note 252, at ES-1. 
 256. Id. at 7-3 tbl.7.1a. 
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$3.5 billion to $36 billion.257 For the most stringent standard of 
0.065 ppm, the EPA included estimates of benefits ranging from 
$5.5 billion to $58 billion in 2020.258 
In its 2015 RIA, the EPA again calculated benefits for reduc-
tions in ozone below its chosen NAAQS level. In the RIA analyz-
ing a revision of the secondary standard for ozone from 75 to 70 
parts per billion (ppb),259 the EPA provided an analysis of the 
benefits of a 70 ppb standard and an alternative of 65 ppb.260 The 
Agency estimated the benefits of the 70 ppb level to be between 
$2.9 and $5.9 billion in 2025, and the benefits of a 65 ppb level 
to be between $15 and $30 billion over the same period.261 Fur-
ther, the Agency found that in 2025, the 70 ppb standard would 
prevent between 96 and 160 ozone-related premature deaths and 
220 to 500 particulate matter-related premature deaths.262 How-
ever, the 65 ppb level would prevent between 490 and 820 ozone-
related deaths and between 1100 and 2500 particulate matter-
related deaths.263 
In its 1985 revision for nitrogen dioxide, the Reagan EPA 
asserted a qualified rejection of NO2 thresholds, stating that 
“none of the evidence presented in the Criteria Document shows 
a clear threshold of adverse health effects for NO2.”264 As it had 
done six years earlier with ozone, the Agency described adverse 
health effects from nitrogen dioxide exposure as occupying “a 
continuum, ranging from NO2 levels at which health effects are 
undisputed, through levels at which many, but not all scientists 
generally agree that health effects have been convincingly 
shown, down to levels at which the indications of health effects 
 
 257. Id. at 7-3 tbl.7.1c. 
 258. Id. at 7-4 tbl.7.1d. 
 259. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-452/R-15-007, REGULATORY IMPACT 
ANALYSIS OF THE FINAL REVISIONS TO THE NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY 
STANDARDS FOR GROUND-LEVEL OZONE, at 1-1 (2015), https://www3.epa.gov/ 
ttn/ecas/docs/ria/naaqs-o3_ria_final_2015-09.pdf. The standard was set with an 
averaging time of eight hours and the form of annual fourth-highest daily max-
imum averaged over three years. Id. 
 260. Id. at ES-2. 
 261. Id. at ES-15 tbl.ES-5. These figures were calculated at a 7% discount 
rate as the EPA only summarized benefits at the 7% discount rate. Id. 
 262. Id. at ES-16 tbl.ES-6. 
 263. Id. at ES-16 tbl.ES-6. 
 264. Retention of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Nitrogen 
Dioxide, 50 Fed. Reg. 25,532, 25,537 (June 19, 1985) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pt. 50). 
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are less certain and more difficult to identify.”265 In the 2010 up-
date to that standard, the Obama EPA noted that “[t]his meta-
analysis does not provide any evidence of a threshold below 
which effects do not occur.”266 The revision’s Integrated Science 
Assessment also “concluded that NO2 epidemiologic studies pro-
vide ‘little evidence of any effect threshold’” and that “concentra-
tion-response relationships . . . appear linear.”267 That 2010 re-
view prompted the EPA to set a new short-term NO2 standard of 
100 ppb, based on the three-year average of the 98th percentile 
of one-hour daily maximum concentrations.268 
The Agency in 2010 also found additional benefits for reduc-
tions in nitrogen dioxide below NAAQS levels. In addition to its 
100 ppb standard, the EPA also analyzed a lower, more stringent 
level of 80 ppb.269 At and above 100 ppb, according to the con-
trolled human exposure studies, increased airway responsive-
ness was observed in “a large percentage of asthmatics.”270 How-
ever, the EPA acknowledged that people with more severe 
asthma would be expected to experience symptoms at concentra-
tions below the 100 ppb standard.271 The Agency calculated that 
an 80 ppb standard would have an additional $3.2 to $8.6 million 
in benefits in 2020 over the 100 ppb standard that the EPA 
chose.272 
The primary sulfur dioxide NAAQS standard was most re-
cently revised under the Obama Administration in 2010. The fi-
nal rule recognized that “the available health effects evidence 
reflects a continuum consisting of ambient levels of SO2 at which 
 
 265. Id. The Agency went on to note that there was uncertainty, acknowl-
edging that based on evidence available at the time, “[t]his does not necessarily 
mean that there is no threshold, other than zero, for NO2 related health effects; 
it simply means no precise threshold can be identified with certainty based on 
existing medical evidence.” Id. 
 266. Primary National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Nitrogen Dioxide, 
75 Fed. Reg. 6474, 6500 (Feb. 9, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50 and 
58). 
 267. Id. at 6480. For further discussion of the EPA’s acknowledgment of sci-
entific “uncertainty” of thresholds, see infra Part III.C. 
 268. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 
(RIA) FOR THE NO2 NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS (NAAQS), at 
ES-1 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 FINAL NO2 RIA], https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/ 
docs/ria/naaqs-no2_ria_final_2010-01.pdf. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Livermore & Revesz, supra note 74, at 1218. 
 271. Id. 
 272. 2010 FINAL NO2 RIA, supra note 268, at ES-6 tbl.ES-1, ES-7 tbl.ES-2. 
This is at the 65% gradient, which was the level the EPA chose in its final reg-
ulation. Id. 
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scientists generally agree that health effects are likely to occur, 
through lower levels at which the likelihood and magnitude of 
the response become increasingly uncertain.”273 
As part of these regulations, the EPA set a new standard of 
75 ppb, based on the three-year average of the 99th percentile of 
one-hour daily maximum concentrations,274 but also analyzed al-
ternative primary standards of 50 ppb.275 At the 75 ppb level, the 
EPA found $2.2 million in benefits, including 260 fewer emer-
gency room visits for respiratory symptoms.276 At the lower 50 
ppb level, the EPA calculated $8.5 million in benefits, including 
930 fewer such emergency room visits.277 The Agency also calcu-
lated that a 50 ppb standard could have yielded as much as $46 
billion in additional PM2.5 co-benefits compared to the 75 ppb 
standard.278 
In its 2011 revision for carbon monoxide, the Obama EPA 
recognized carbon monoxide pollution as similarly exhibiting a 
“continuum” of adverse health effects with varying degrees of 
certainty.279 The Agency highlighted two studies that were una-
ble to discern a threshold for cardiovascular effects from carbon 
monoxide exposure.280 The rule’s Integrated Science Assessment 
 
 273. Primary National Ambient Air Quality Standard for Sulfur Dioxide, 75 
Fed. Reg. 35,520, 35,529 (June 22, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50, 53, 
and 58). 
 274. Id. at 35,524. 
 275. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 
(RIA) FOR THE SO2 NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS (NAAQS), at 
ES-1 (2010), https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/docs/ria/naaqs-so2_ria_final_2010 
-06.pdf. 
 276. Id. at 5-20, 5-21 tbl.5.5 (showing figures that represent “the incidences 
of health effects and monetized benefits of attaining the alternative standard 
levels by health endpoint. Because all health effects from SO2 exposure are ex-
pected to occur within the analysis year, the monetized benefits for SO2 [for 
these figures] do not need to be discounted. Please note that these benefits do 
not include any of the benefits listed as ‘unquantified’ . . . nor do they include 
the PM co-benefits . . . .”). 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. at 5-31 (comparing estimates in particulate matter co-benefits cal-
culated in the Laden study, using a 3% discount rate). 
 279. 2011 Carbon Monoxide Review, supra note 244, at 54,308 (“These judg-
ments are informed by the recognition that the available health effects evidence 
generally reflects a continuum, consisting of ambient levels at which scientists 
generally agree that health effects are likely to occur, through lower levels at 
which the likelihood and magnitude of the response become increasingly uncer-
tain.”). 
 280. Id. at 54,300 (“Among the controlled human exposure studies, the ISA 
places principal emphasis on the study of CAD patients by Allred et al. (1989a, 
1989b, 1991) (which was also considered in the previous review) for the follow-
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concluded that “[e]pidemiologic analyses investigating the expo-
sure-response relationship for mortality and cardiovascular 
morbidity did not find evidence for a departure from linearity or 
a threshold for CO effects.”281 
In short, the EPA has moved away from the “critical effect” 
language it originally developed for NAAQS pollutants in 1978 
and which might have suggested a threshold,282 and since the 
late 1970s has openly rejected the threshold assumption for cri-
teria pollutants on the basis of advances in the scientific under-
standing. The EPA also calculates benefits for criteria pollutant 
reductions below the levels the Agency chose for each of the most 
recent NAAQS.283 All of this is flatly inconsistent with the no-
tion, advanced by the Trump Administration and by other oppo-
nents of Obama-era regulations in litigation,284 that the NAAQS 
represent a no-harm threshold for criteria pollutants, and that 
Obama-era rules inflated benefits in ways inconsistent with his-
torical EPA practices. 
III.  CALCULATING HEALTH BENEFITS FROM 
PARTICULATE MATTER REDUCTIONS BELOW THE 
NAAQS   
Critics of climate change regulations argue that particulate 
reduction benefits do not exist below the NAAQS, which they 
characterize as a no-harm threshold.285 According to adherents 
of this view, “[b]oth theory and data suggest that thresholds ex-
ist below which further reductions in exposure to PM2.5 do not 
yield changes in mortality response and that one should expect 
 
ing reasons: (1) Dose-response relationships were observed; (2) effects were ob-
served at the lowest COHb levels tested (mean of 2–2.4% COHb following ex-
perimental CO exposure), with no evidence of a threshold.” (citations omitted)). 
The EPA later in the same section on “Cardiovascular Effects” notes that “an 
important finding of the multilaboratory study was the dose-response relation-
ship observed between COHb and the markers of myocardial ischemia, with ef-
fects observed at the lowest increases in COHb tested, without evidence of a 
measurable threshold effect.” Id. 
 281. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA/600/R-09/019F, INTEGRATED SCIENCE 
ASSESSMENT FOR CARBON MONOXIDE, at 2-16 (2010), http://ofmpub.epa.gov/ 
eims/eimscomm.getfile?p_download_id=494432. 
 282. See supra notes 185–95 and accompanying text; supra notes 207–08 and 
accompanying text.  
 283. Note that the EPA did not calculate benefits for carbon monoxide, the 
lone exception to this pattern, as the EPA did not produce a new RIA. See supra 
note 139. 
 284. See supra notes 30–38. Moreover, this argument is not supported for 
particulate matter. See infra notes 409–25 and accompanying text. 
 285. See supra note 26. 
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diminishing returns as exposures are reduced to lower and lower 
levels.”286 Similarly, the Heartland Institute, which bills itself as 
“the world’s most prominent think tank supporting skepticism 
about man-made climate change,”287 advocates that there is a 
“widely held belief among scientists and health experts, sup-
ported by ample research, that some threshold must exist below 
which pollution has no health impact. That belief is often sum-
marized as ‘[t]he dose makes the poison.’”288 More recently, it has 
deemed PM2.5 a “favorite new bogeyman” of the EPA, calling it a 
“fabricate[d] . . . disease entity . . . [of] post-modern pseudo-sci-
ence.”289 The National Mining Association advances the same 
line of reasoning in Michigan v. EPA in its challenge to the Mer-
cury and Air Toxics Standards: 
EPA concedes that most of these benefits supposedly result from reduc-
ing [particulate matter] concentrations to below the level that EPA set 
in its PM2.5 NAAQS . . . . But EPA set the [particulate matter] NAAQS, 
as it set all of the NAAQS, at a level that is “requisite to protect the 
public health” with a margin of safety and without considering compli-
ance costs.290 
 
 286. Susan E. Dudley, OMB’s Reported Benefits of Regulation: Too Good To 
Be True?, 36 REG. 26, 28 (2013), http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/ 
serials/files/regulation/2013/6/regulation-v36n2-4.pdf. 
 287. Arthur B. Robinson Center on Climate and Environmental Policy: 
About, HEARTLAND INST., https://www.heartland.org/Center-Climate 
-Environment/About/index.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2018). 
 288. Jay Lehr, Warning: New HEI Report on PM10 Easy to Misinterpret, 
HEARTLAND INST. (June 17, 2004), https://www.heartland.org/news-opinion/ 
news/warning-new-hei-report-on-pm10-easy-to-misinterpret?source=policybot; 
see also Paul Driessen, EPA’s Dangerous Regulatory Pollution, HEARTLAND 
INST. (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.heartland.org/news-opinion/news/epas 
-dangerous-regulatory-pollution (“How can it be that PM2.5 particulates are dan-
gerous or lethal for Americans in general, every time they step outside—but 
harmless to human guinea pigs [in EPA experiments] who were intentionally 
administered pollution dozens of times worse than what they would encounter 
outdoors? How can it be, as EPA-funded researchers now assert, that ‘acute, 
transient responses seen in clinical studies cannot necessarily be used to predict 
health effects of chronic or repeated exposure’—when that is precisely what 
EPA claims they can and do show?”). The Heartland Institute now asserts that 
the EPA’s PM2.5 science constitutes “an attempted takeover of absolutely all in-
dustry in the United States,” despite “[t]he best scientific research show[ing] 
these particles are ubiquitous and, contrary to EPA’s claims, . . . harmless.” H. 
Sterling Burnett, EPA Air Quality Research, Regulations Flawed, Study Finds, 
HEARTLAND INST. (Aug. 23, 2017), https://www.heartland.org/news-opinion/ 
news/epa-air-quality-research-regulations-flawed-study-finds. 
 289. Charles Battig, Driving Policies Through Fraud and Fear-Mongering, 
HEARTLAND INST. (July 10, 2015), https://www.heartland.org/news-opinion/ 
news/driving-policies-through-fraud-and-fear-mongering?source=policybot. 
 290. Opening Brief of Petitioner the National Mining Ass’n at 41 n.19, Mich-
igan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) (No. 14-46) (citations omitted) (quoting 42 
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In other words, the National Mining Association asserts that if 
the EPA followed its mandate to regulate particulate matter to 
the extent required under the NAAQS regime, then there would 
be no benefits below the NAAQS standard because the NAAQS 
standard would be set at the point at which benefits would not 
accrue below it.291 Either, it claims, the EPA has not appropri-
ately set the particulate matter NAAQS standard with the req-
uisite margin of safety, or the asserted co-benefits of particulate 
matter reduction are nonexistent.292 
Opponents also challenge the science underlying the EPA’s 
calculation of additional benefits from pollution reduction below 
the NAAQS. The EPA’s use of a linear, non-threshold approach 
for low-level particulate matter concentrations293 has been criti-
cized as “highly imprecise” and guilty of “cherrypicking” epide-
miology studies en route to a “biased assessment of the available 
data.”294 Moreover, the EPA’s assertion of benefits from particu-
late matter have been deemed “[i]llusory”;295 based on “empty 
generalities and speculative claims”;296 “based on questionable 
assumptions and . . . likely overstated”;297 “specious”;298 and “em-
ploy[ing] a methodology that places a thumb on the scale at every 
step of its benefit calculations and that regularly eschews real 
data in place of unrealistic assumptions and wild specula-
tions.”299 These purported benefits are allegedly “vague[,] un-
monetized,”300 and “too speculative,”301 with the implication that 
if benefits are too uncertain to be quantified, they are too uncer-
 
U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012)). 
 291. See id. 
 292. See id. at 41 (asserting that the EPA cannot prove co-benefits exist). 
 293. See NAAQS Particulate Matter, supra note 147, at 3119; infra notes 
399–400 and accompanying text. 
 294. Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners 
at 25 n.21, Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) (No. 14-46). 
 295. Opening Brief of State and Industry Petitioners, supra note 13, at 51. 
 296. Id. at 56. 
 297. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, the 
National Ass’n of Manufacturers, the National Federation of Independent Busi-
ness, & the National Ass’n of Home Builders as Amici Curiae in Support of Pe-
titioners at 22 n.15, Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) (Nos. 14-46, 14-47, 
14-49). 
 298. Brief of Amicus Curiae Cato Institute in Support of Petitioners at 3, 
Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, No. 16-1127 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 18, 2016). 
 299. Id. 
 300. Opening Brief of State and Industry Petitioners, supra note 13, at 55. 
 301. Id. at 56. 
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tain to be contemplated at all. The Agency simply “cannot quan-
tify them [because] they are not supported by the scientific liter-
ature.”302 
Benefits from particulate matter reductions are thus a key 
battleground in the fight over major Obama-era Clean Air Act 
rules and will almost certainly be a point of contention in future 
climate change regulations. Because of the size of these benefits, 
both in absolute terms and in comparison with other regulatory 
effects, there is a substantial incentive for both sides to misrep-
resent them, and a critical need to get these estimates right. The 
following section describes the robust scientific basis for the de-
termination that particulate matter lacks a threshold below 
which adverse health effects occur. 
A. SCIENTIFIC BASIS 
Particulate matter (PM) is a mixture of very small particles 
and liquid droplets that are found in the air.303 Some particles 
are large enough to be visible, such as dust, dirt, soot, and smoke, 
while others are too small to be seen with the naked eye.304 Ex-
posure to particulate matter can have negative effects on lung 
and heart health, including coughing or difficulty breathing, ag-
gravating asthma and decreased lung function, as well as heart 
attacks and irregular heartbeat.305 Exposure can be deadly, par-
ticularly for people with heart or lung disease.306 
The EPA regulates particulate matter under two standards, 
which are based on the size of the particulate matter particles.307 
Extremely small particles, those measuring 2.5 micrometers or 
less, are regulated under the PM2.5 standards, while larger par-
ticles measuring between 2.5 and 10 micrometers are regulated 
under the PM10 standards.308 The current standards for particu-
late matter set limits on PM2.5 of 35 μg/m3 averaged over 24 
 
 302. Id. 
 303. Particulate Matter (PM) Basics, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/pm-pollution/particulate-matter-pm-basics#PM (last up-
dated Sept. 10, 2018). 
 304. Id. 
 305. Health and Environmental Effects of Particulate Matter (PM), U.S. 
ENVT’L PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/pm-pollution/health-and 
-environmental-effects-particulate-matter-pm (last updated June 20, 2018) 
(listing the health effects linked to exposure to particulate matter). 
 306. See id.  
 307. See NAAQS Particulate Matter, supra note 147, at 3086 (explaining the 
standards for fine particles). 
 308. Id. 
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hours and of 12 μg/m3 averaged annually.309 The PM10 standard 
is a 24-hour average of 150 μg/m3, and there is no annual stand-
ard.310 
These standards do not represent the level at which there 
are no health effects from particulate matter exposure.311 The 
science on benefits from reductions in particulate matter below 
the NAAQS, some of which is summarized in this section, is ro-
bust.312 In general, the evidence suggests there is no threshold 
for particulate matter, which means that risk from particulate 
matter exists at every level of exposure.313 
For example, in 2006, the EPA solicited a report of judg-
ments from experts on the concentration response relationship 
between small particulate matter particles (PM2.5) and mortal-
ity.314 The twelve experts who participated in the report were 
selected through a peer-nomination process and included ex-
perts in epidemiology, toxicology, and medicine.315 As part of this 
study, the experts were asked about their views on the concen-
tration-response function, which measures health effects at dif-
ferent levels of exposure.316 While all experts believed that indi-
viduals may exhibit thresholds for PM-related mortality, eleven 
of the twelve rejected the idea of a population threshold, stating 
 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id. at 3089. 
 311. See, e.g., Jonathan O. Anderson et al., Clearing the Air: A Review of the 
Effects of Particulate Matter Air Pollution on Human Health, 8 J. MED. TOXI-
COLOGY 166, 172 tbl.5 (2012) (showing that “[u]nusually sensitive people” can 
experience adverse effects and are recommended to avoid heavy exertion even 
when the particulate matter exposure is below the current standards). 
 312. For extensive examples of research on the benefits particulate matter 
reductions below the current NAAQS, see infra notes 314–69 and accompanying 
text. 
 313. See infra notes 314–69. It is well beyond the scope of this Article to 
comprehensively review and independently evaluate all of the scientific re-
search on the relationship between particulate matter exposure and negative 
health outcomes. The research presented here thus focuses primarily on aggre-
gated reports written by scientists, doctors, and other experts on the effects of 
particulate matter on human health. In doing so, the authors defer to the ex-
pertise of these writers and their judgments in aggregating and analyzing evi-
dence on the health effects of particulate matter. 
 314. See INDUS. ECON., EXPANDED EXPERT JUDGMENT ASSESSMENT OF THE 
CONCENTRATION-RESPONSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PM2.5 EXPOSURE AND 
MORTALITY, at i–ii (2006), https://www3.epa.gov/ttnecas1/regdata/Uncertainty/ 
pm_ee_report.pdf (documenting “expert judgments concerning the impact of a 
one μg/m3 change in ambient, annual average PM2.5 on annual, adult, all-cause 
mortality in the U.S.”). 
 315. See id. at ii. 
 316. Id. at iv. 
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that there was insufficient evidence to support such a thresh-
old.317 Seven experts noted that a population threshold was un-
likely due to variations in susceptibility as a result of genetic, 
environmental, and socioeconomic factors.318 The single expert 
who believed it was possible to make a conceptual argument for 
a population threshold noted that he did not believe such a 
threshold was detectable in currently available epidemiologic 
studies.319 This expert also stated that he was 50% certain a pop-
ulation threshold existed, and that if there were a threshold, he 
thought there was an 80% chance the threshold would be less 
than 5 μg/m3, and a 20% chance that it would fall between 5 and 
10 μg/m3.320 Both levels cited by the expert are lower than the 
current NAAQS levels for PM2.5 of 12 μg/m3.321 
A 2010 scientific report from the American Heart Associa-
tion reached similar conclusions.322 The authors of that report 
included specialists in a wide range of disciplines: “cardiovascu-
lar and environmental epidemiology and statistics, atmospheric 
sciences, cardiovascular and pulmonary medicine, basic science 
research, and public policy.”323 The report comprehensively re-
viewed studies, published between 2004 and 2009, on the rela-
tionship between particulate matter and heart health.324 The re-
port concluded that “there appeared to be no lower-limit 
threshold below which PM10 was not associated with excess [car-
diovascular] mortality.”325 With regard to PM2.5, the report 
stated that there appeared to be a linear concentration-response 
relationship between the small particles and mortality risk with-
out a discernible safe threshold.326 The report suggested that an 
area for future research was determining whether there is any 
safe PM threshold that protects both healthy and susceptible in-
 
 317. Id. at 3-25. For a discussion of the difference between individual and 
population thresholds, see supra notes 145–47 and accompanying text. 
 318. INDUS. ECON., supra note 314, at 3-25. 
 319. Id. at 3-25 to -26. 
 320. Id. at 3-26. 
 321. See NAAQS Particulate Matter, supra note 147, at 3157. 
 322. See Robert D. Brook et al., Particulate Matter Air Pollution and Cardi-
ovascular Disease: An Update to the Scientific Statement from the American 
Heart Association, 121 CIRCULATION 2331, 2338 (2010) (finding there is an in-
creased mortality rate for PM levels lower than the current NAAQS threshold). 
 323. Id. at 2332. 
 324. See generally id. 
 325. Id. at 2338. 
 326. Id. at 2350–51. 
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dividuals, but noted that current evidence supports the conclu-
sion that there is no safe threshold.327 
The American Thoracic Society (ATS), in a 2016 article, like-
wise reported adverse health effects below the NAAQS.328 The 
ATS recommended an annual standard for PM2.5 of 11 μg/m3, 
which is lower than the current NAAQS requirements.329 The 
report estimated the health impacts from PM exposure in places 
that violated the ATS’s annual standard, including places in 
compliance with the EPA’s requirements.330 The report found 
that relative to current particulate matter levels across the coun-
try,331 an estimated 2913 deaths and 5543 instances of morbidity 
would be avoided if the 11 μg/m3 were met.332 The report also 
noted that “this approach does not imply that further health ben-
efits would not be achieved by still further reductions in pollu-
tion levels,” relying in part on the EPA’s own statement that 
there is no epidemiological evidence of a threshold for PM.333 
The Harvard School of Public Health Six Cities Study334 and 
an American Cancer Society study335 are two key studies in the 
evaluation of particulate matter exposure health impacts, and 
both have been extensively relied upon by the EPA in its partic-
ulate matter NAAQS rulemakings.336 Both studies include fol-
low up research; the Six Cities Study was originally published in 
 
 327. See id. at 2365–66. 
 328. See Kevin R. Cromar et al., American Thoracic Society and Marron In-
stitute Report Estimated Excess Morbidity and Mortality Caused by Air Pollu-
tion Above American Thoracic Society-Recommended Standards, 2011–2013, 13 
ANNALS AM. THORACIC SOC’Y 1195, 1201 (2016) (“The ATS recommendations 
for . . . PM2.5 . . . are more stringent than the current NAAQS determined by the 
EPA.”). 
 329. Id. at 1195. 
 330. Id. at 1197 (finding annually approximately 6408 deaths can be at-
tributed to pollution concentrations higher than ATS’s recommendation). 
 331. Note that many parts of the United States violate the current NAAQS 
levels. See id. at 1197 fig.1. As such, these estimates reflect cumulative effects 
of current violations of the NAAQS plus the benefits of lowering the PM2.5 from 
the current 12 μg/m3 to 11 μg/m3, as recommended by the American Thoracic 
Society. See id. at 1196–97. 
 332. Id. at 1198 fig.3. 
 333. Id. at 1201. 
 334. Douglas W. Dockery et al., An Association Between Air Pollution and 
Mortality in Six U.S. Cities, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1753, 1753 (1993). 
 335. C. Arden Pope III et al., Particulate Air Pollution as a Predictor of Mor-
tality in a Prospective Study of U.S. Adults, 151 AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL 
CARE MED. 669 (1995). 
 336. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-452/R-12-005, REGULATORY IM-
PACT ANALYSES FOR THE FINAL REVISIONS TO THE NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR 
QUALITY STANDARDS FOR PARTICULATE MATTER, at 1-12 (2012) [hereinafter 
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1993, with follow up research released in 2006 and again in 
2012;337 the American Cancer Society Study was released in 
1995 and updated in 2002 and 2004.338 These studies were cited 
by the Bush Administration EPA in the 2006 particulate matter 
NAAQS,339 by all experts solicited in the 2006 EPA expert solic-
itation,340 and were also relied upon by the Obama Administra-
tion in the 2016 particulate matter NAAQS,341 the Mercury and 
Air Toxics Standards report,342 the Clean Power Plan report,343 
and the Cross Border Air Pollution Rule report.344 The Bush EPA 
noted that “these studies have found consistent relationships be-
tween fine particle indicators and premature mortality across 
 
2012 PM RIA], https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/docs/ria/naaqs-pm_ria_final_ 
2012-12.pdf (“Since the proposed rule, the EPA has incorporated an array of 
policy and technical updates to the benefits analysis approach applied in this 
RIA, including incorporation of the most recent follow-up to the Harvard Six 
Cities cohort study (Lepeule et al., 2012).”); see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSES FOR THE REVIEW OF PARTICULATE MATTER NA-
TIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS, at 5-27 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 PM 
RIA], https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/docs/ria/naaqs-pm_ria_final_2006-10.pdf 
(“The most extensive analyses have been based on data from two prospective 
cohort groups, often referred to as the Harvard ‘Six-Cities Study’ . . . and the 
‘American Cancer Society or ACS study’ . . . .”). 
 337. See 2012 PM RIA, supra note 336, at 5-7 (citing the Six Cities Study 
updates from 2006 and 2012); 2006 PM RIA, supra note 336, at 5-27 (citing the 
Harvard Six Cities Study history from 1993 and 2006). 
 338. See 2006 PM RIA, supra note 336, at 5-27 (citing the American Cancer 
Society study’s versions from 1995, 2002, and 2004). 
 339. Id. (citing the Six Cities Study and the American Cancer Society study). 
 340. See INDUS. ECON., supra note 314, at viii (“Experts relied upon a core 
set of cohort epidemiology studies to derive their quantitative estimates, mainly 
those associated with the ACS and Six Cities cohort.”). 
 341. 2012 PM RIA, supra note 336, at 1-12 (stating that the EPA relied on 
the Six Cities Study for its report). 
 342. MATS RIA, supra note 21, at 5-27 (relying on the analyses from the Six 
Cities Study and the American Cancer Society study). 
 343. CLEAN POWER PLAN RIA, supra note 22, at 4-16 to -17 (stating that the 
EPA used the American Cancer Society report and the Six Cities Study to help 
determine “PM-related mortality”). 
 344. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-452/R-16-004, REGULATORY IMPACT 
ANALYSIS OF THE CROSS-STATE AIR POLLUTION RULE (CSAPR) UPDATE FOR THE 
2008 NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS FOR GROUND-LEVEL OZONE, 
at 5-11 to -13 (2016) [hereinafter CSAPR RIA], https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/ 
docs/ria/transport_ria_final-csapr-update_2016-09.pdf (citing findings from the 
Six Cities Study and the American Cancer Society study); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE FEDERAL IMPLEMENTATION 
PLANS TO REDUCE INTERSTATE TRANSPORT OF FINE PARTICULATE MATTER AND 
OZONE IN 27 STATES; CORRECTION OF SIP APPROVALS FOR 22 STATES, at 5-
27 (2011), https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/docs/ria/transport_ria_final-csapr 
_2011-06.pdf (citing findings from the Six Cities Study and ACS study). 
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multiple locations in the United States.”345 The EPA summa-
rized in the Cross Border Air Pollution Rule report that the au-
thors of the 2012 Six Cities Study follow-up “found significant 
associations between PM2.5 exposure and increased risk of prem-
ature all-cause, cardiovascular and lung cancer mortality,” and 
“concluded that the [concentration-response] relationship was 
linear down to PM2.5 concentrations of 8 μg/m3.”346 This level is 
substantially lower than 12 μg/m3, the current NAAQS annual 
standard for particulate matter.347 
Experts outside of the EPA have also relied on the findings 
of the Six Cities Study and the American Cancer Society study 
to support their determination that particulate matter is a no 
threshold pollutant.348 In 2002, relying on the American Cancer 
Society study, the National Research Council’s Committee on es-
timating the Health-Risk-Reduction Benefits of Proposed Air 
Pollution Regulations349 concluded that “there is no evidence for 
any . . . indication of a threshold” for particulate matter.350 Ad-
ditionally, the Health Effects Subcommittee (HES) of the Advi-
sory Council on Clean Air Compliance Analysis relied on both 
the Six Cities Study and the American Cancer Society study to 
conclude that it “fully supports EPA’s use of a no-threshold 
model to estimate the mortality reductions associated with re-
duced PM exposure.”351 It reasoned that the EPA’s “decision is 
 
 345. 2006 PM RIA, supra note 336, at 5-27. 
 346. CSAPR RIA, supra note 344, at 5-12 to -13. 
 347. See NAAQS Particulate Matter, supra note 147, at 3086 (stating that 
the current NAAQS levels for PM2.5 is 12 μg/m3). 
 348. For an example of how experts have relied on these studies see infra 
notes 349–54 and accompanying text. 
 349. In 2000, due to congressional concerns about the EPA’s method of esti-
mating health benefits from air pollution reduction, the Senate appropriated 
funds to the EPA and directed the Agency to request a study from the National 
Academy of Sciences on the EPA’s methodologies. The National Academy of Sci-
ence arranged for the National Research Council’s Committee on Estimating 
the Heath-Risk-Reduction Benefits of Proposed Air Pollution Regulations to 
prepare a report in 2002, which reviewed and critiqued the EPA’s benefit anal-
ysis. See COMM. ON ESTIMATING THE HEALTH-RISK-REDUCTION BENEFITS OF 
PROPOSED AIR POLLUTION REGULATIONS, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ESTIMAT-
ING THE PUBLIC HEALTH BENEFITS OF PROPOSED AIR POLLUTION REGULATIONS 
1–2 (2002) [hereinafter HEALTH-RISK-REDUCTION COMMITTEE]. 
 350. Id. at 109. The committee went on to recommend that if the EPA plans 
to base its benefit analysis on the assumption that a threshold exists, which is 
not proven in any scientific study, the EPA should make its assumptions and 
reasoning clear. Id. at 111. 
 351. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY ADVISORY COUNCIL ON CLEAN AIR COMPLI-
ANCE ANALYSIS HEALTH EFFECTS SUBCOMM., REVIEW OF EPA’S DRAFT HEALTH 
BENEFITS OF THE SECOND SECTION 812 PROSPECTIVE STUDY OF THE CLEAN AIR 
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supported by the data, which are quite consistent in showing ef-
fects down to the lowest measured levels.”352 Also, a 2008 follow-
up to the Harvard Six Cities Study found that there was an 86% 
probability that PM2.5 followed a linear no-threshold model.353 
This report explained that “[a] key finding of this study is that 
there is little evidence for a threshold in the association between 
exposure to fine particles and the risk of death on follow-up.”354 
Instead of reducing PM concentration by relying on “an arbitrary 
standard,” such as a threshold model, the study recommended 
“reduc[ing] particle concentration everywhere, at all times, to 
the extent feasible and affordable.”355 Another 2012 follow-up to 
the Harvard Six Cities Study provided additional data suggest-
ing the health effects from PM exposure do not have a threshold 
and follow a linear model at low doses.356 
The World Health Organization (WHO), a specialized 
agency of the United Nations,357 in a report cataloguing the 
global impact of particulate matter pollution, noted that this pol-
lution represents one of the world’s biggest environmental 
health risks, killing around three million people annually world-
wide.358 The report explains that this “pollution has health im-
pacts even at very low concentrations—indeed no threshold has 
been identified below which no damage to health is observed.”359 
WHO recommends that countries set standards at the lowest 
concentrations possible, and has set guideline values for PM2.5 at 
 
ACT 2 (2010) [hereinafter REVIEW OF EPA’S DRAFT], https://yosemite.epa.gov/ 
sab/sabproduct.nsf/0/72D4EFA39E48CDB28525774500738776/$File/EPA-
COUNCIL-10-001-unsigned.pdf. Similarly to the National Research Council’s 
Committee on Estimating the Heath-Risk-Reduction Benefits of Proposed Air 
Pollution Regulations, see HEALTH-RISK-REDUCTION COMMITTEE, supra note 
349, the HES was tasked with drafting a report in order to provide the EPA 
with guidance on how it estimates benefits and uncertainties for particulate 
matter and ozone. See id. 
 352. Id. at 13. 
 353. Joel Schwartz et al., The Effect of Dose and Timing of Dose on the Asso-
ciation Between Airborne Particles and Survival, 116 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 
64, 67 (2008). 
 354. Id. 
 355. Id. at 68. 
 356. Johanna Lepeule et al., Chronic Exposure to Fine Particles and Mortal-
ity: An Extended Follow-up of the Harvard Six Cities Study from 1974 to 2009, 
120 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 965, 967 (2012) (finding results “indicating a linear 
relationship with PM2.5”). 
 357. World Health Org. [WHO] Const. pmbl. (1946). 
 358. WORLD HEALTH ORG., AMBIENT AIR POLLUTION: A GLOBAL ASSESS-
MENT OF EXPOSURE AND BURDEN OF DISEASE 11 (2016), http://apps.who.int/iris/ 
bitstream/10665/250141/1/9789241511353-eng.pdf?ua=1. 
 359. Id. at 21. 
  
2019] NEXT BATTLEGROUND 1407 
 
10 µg/m3 annual mean and 25 µg/m3 24-hour mean,360 which is 
well below the current NAAQS of 12 µg/m3 annual mean and 35 
µg/m3 24-hour mean.361 
A recent study from the Harvard School of Public Health 
confirms these findings and strengthens the evidence of health 
effects from particulate matter exposure below the current 
NAAQS. The 2017 study, which included a cohort of all Medicare 
beneficiaries (approximately 60 million people) throughout the 
United States, focused specifically on measuring health effects 
below the current particulate matter and ozone NAAQS.362 The 
researchers measured health effects for people residing in places 
where PM2.5 concentrations ranged from 6.21 to 15.64 μg/m3.363 
The study reported “a relationship between PM2.5, ozone, and all-
cause mortality that was almost linear, with no signal of [a] 
threshold down to 5 μg[/m3]” in annual exposure.364 Moreover, 
the authors found that “[t]here was a significant association be-
tween PM2.5 exposure and mortality when the analysis was re-
stricted to concentrations below 12 μg per cubic meter [the cur-
rent NAAQS], with a steeper slope below that level.”365 This 
study, which contains a very large sample size representing a 
geographically and socioeconomically diverse cross section of the 
country,366 concludes that in the entire population studied “there 
was significant evidence of adverse effects related to exposure to 
PM2.5 . . . concentrations below current national standards.”367 
The study “found no evidence of a threshold value—the concen-
tration at which PM2.5 exposure does not affect mortality—at 
concentrations as low as approximately 5 μg per cubic meter,”368 
confirming a finding similar to those of other studies.369 
 
 360. Id. 
 361. See NAAQS Particulate Matter, supra note 147, at 3086 (stating the 
current NAAQS). 
 362. See Di et al., supra note 25, at 2514 (explaining the method of the na-
tionwide study). 
 363. Id. at 2515. 
 364. Id. at 2518. 
 365. Id. at 2520. A steeper slope at low levels indicates that the marginal 
health risk from additional exposure at low levels is actually higher than the 
marginal risk at higher levels of exposure. See id. 
 366. See id. at 2515 tbl.1 (providing information of the large cohort’s charac-
teristics). 
 367. Id. at 2513. 
 368. Id. at 2520. 
 369. See id. 
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The Trump Administration has attacked the validity of 
these studies in a rulemaking announced in April 2018.370 The 
proposed rule on “Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory 
Science” targets the use of most primary scientific literature cur-
rently available on the health impacts of particulate matter.371 
Specifically, the rulemaking would prohibit the EPA from using 
“data and models underlying the science” unless that data “is 
publicly available in a manner sufficient for validation and anal-
ysis.”372 Though a rule requiring transparency in scientific data 
may seem innocuous, in practice the regulation would severely 
hamstring the EPA. Individual medical data used in scientific 
studies generally cannot be made fully public,373 in order to pro-
tect the confidential medical information of study partici-
pants.374 Under this proposed rule it would no longer be permis-
sible for the EPA to use any of these studies when performing 
cost benefit analyses on particulate matter or other public health 
regulations. Even the Medicare data used in the 2017 Harvard 
School of Public Health study is confidential and protected from 
general public access, though it may be requested by scientists 
or industry to conduct their own independent analysis.375 The 
 
 370. See generally Strengthening Transparency, supra note 117 (explaining 
the EPA’s proposed rule under the Trump Administration). 
 371. Cf. id. at 18,769 (stating that the purpose of the rule is to “[e]nhanc[e] 
the transparency and validity of the scientific information relied upon by EPA”). 
 372. Id. There is a provision which would allow the Administrator to: 
exempt significant regulatory decisions on a case-by-case basis if he or 
she determines that compliance is impracticable because it is not fea-
sible to ensure that all dose response data and models underlying piv-
otal regulatory science are publicly available in a fashion that is con-
sistent with law, protects privacy and confidentiality, and is sensitive 
to national and homeland security, or in instances where OMB’s Infor-
mation Quality Bulletin for Peer Review provides for an exemption 
(Section IX). 
Id. at 18,772. Of course, aggressive utilization of this provision would blunt the 
effects of this regulation, but because the provision is entirely discretionary, it 
is also possible that this provision would provide no relief at all from the impacts 
of this proposed rule. 
 373. See Jennifer Lu & Abby Smith, EPA Plan to Limit Science Use May 
Undercut Air, Climate Programs, BLOOMBERG ENV’T (Apr. 25, 2018), 
https://bnanews.bna.com/environment-and-energy/epa-plan-to-limit-science 
-use-may-undercut-air-climate-programs (“The studies use individual medical 
data that can’t be made public, and that would be prohibited from agency use 
under the EPA’s new plans.”). 
 374. See id. (stating researchers are required to keep private medical data 
confidential). 
 375. See Lu & Smith, supra note 373 (stating the Harvard Six Cities Study 
contains private individuals’ medical information that cannot be shared pub-
licly). 
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proposed rule, if finalized, would have the effect of dramatically 
reducing estimates of the negative health effects of particulate 
matter and other air pollutants. This, in turn, would lower the 
estimated benefits from regulating these pollutants, and thus 
could be used to justify less stringent regulations. 
B. REGULATORY TREATMENT 
The EPA has consistently found over three decades, and un-
der administrations of both parties, that there are health effects 
from particulate matter exposure at low levels, below the 
NAAQS. The Agency has done so at different times by explicitly 
stating that there is no evidence of a threshold, by calculating 
benefits for reductions in particulate matter below the level of 
the NAAQs, or both.  
As early as 1984, the EPA under President Reagan explicitly 
stated that there is no evidence of a threshold for particulate 
matter.376 Specifically, the Agency’s 1984 Regulatory Impact 
Analysis stated that “the data do not . . . show evidence of a clear 
threshold in exposed populations. Instead they suggest a contin-
uum of response with both the likelihood (risk) of effects occur-
ring and the magnitude of any potential effect decreasing with 
concentration.”377 This language was reiterated verbatim in the 
1987 final rule.378 
In 1997, the Clinton EPA determined that “the available ep-
idemiological studies provide strong evidence suggesting that 
 
 376. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS ON THE NA-
TIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS FOR PARTICULATE MATTER, at VI-15 
to -17 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 PM RIA], http://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPURL 
.cgi?Dockey=9101HEPX.TXT (explaining research in a staff paper that con-
cluded there was no evidence to show “a clear threshold”). 
 377. Id. at VI-15. The 1984 RIA was also the first time the EPA calculated 
the economic benefits for ambient air standards, and the Agency also analyzed 
benefits from particulate matter at different levels. See id. at VI-1. While the 
EPA did not analyze an alternative that was equally or more stringent for both 
the annual average and 24-hour standard, it did analyze an annual standard 
lower than the one it ultimately selected, paired with a 24-hour limit higher 
than what it chose. See id. at VI-15. In the 1987 NAAQS, the EPA selected a 
PM10 annual average limit of 50 μg/m3 and a 24-hour limit of 150 μg/m3. 1987 
Revisions to NAAQS, supra note 30, at 24,634. However, in its RIA, the EPA 
reviewed benefits from a PM10 annual limit of 48 μg/m3 paired with a 24-hour 
limit of 183 μg/m3. 1984 PM RIA, supra note 376, at VI-38 tbl.VI.G.2. While the 
EPA did not conduct an analysis of benefits at the level it ultimately selected, 
see id. at VI-40, making it impossible to directly compare the two options, the 
EPA did find benefits at the 48 μg/m3 annual limit scenario. See id. at VI-37 to 
-40. 
 378. 1987 Revisions to NAAQS, supra note 30, at 24,642. 
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PM causes or contributes to health effects at levels below the 
current standards”379 and that “the level or even existence of 
population thresholds below which no effects occur cannot be re-
liably determined.”380 The Agency also calculated benefits for re-
ducing particulate matter below the level it ultimately se-
lected.381 In the 1997 NAAQS revision, the EPA set the annual 
average standard for PM2.5 at 15μg/m3, and the 24-hour limit at 
65 μg/m3.382 In the accompanying RIA, the EPA analyzed the 
costs and benefits of the level it chose along with a more strin-
gent standard. The more stringent standard the EPA reviewed 
was an annual standard set at 15μg/m3, in combination with a 
lower 24-hour standard set at 50 μg/m3.383 At the level the EPA 
eventually selected for the NAAQS standard, the Agency found 
annual benefits from partial attainment384 to be between $19 bil-
lion (low estimate) and $104 billion (high estimate).385 However, 
the EPA found greater benefits, a high estimate of $107 billion, 
under this more stringent level.386 
 
 379. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 62 
Fed. Reg. 38,652, 38,670 (July 18, 1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50) [here-
inafter 1997 PM NAAQS]. 
 380. Id. 
 381. Compare id. at 38,652 (setting the 24-hour PM2.5 limit at 65 μg/m3), with 
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSES FOR THE PARTICU-
LATE MATTER AND OZONE NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS AND 
PROPOSED REGIONAL HAZE RULE, at ΕΣ−23 tbl.ES-3 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 
PM RIA], https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/docs/ria/naaqs-o3-pm_ria_proposal_ 
1997-07.pdf (reviewing a lower 24-hour standard for PM2.5 at 50 μg/m3). 
 382. 1997 PM NAAQS, supra note 379, at 38,652. 
 383. 1997 PM RIA, supra note 381 (comparing the annual costs and benefits 
alternatives for 2010, including one at the low rate of a 15μg/m3 annual stand-
ard with a 50 μg/m3 24-hour standard). 
 384. The 1997 RIA refers to “partial attainment” rather than full attainment 
because the analysis “does not attempt to force its models to project full attain-
ment of the new standard in areas not predicted to achieve attainment by 2010,” 
the year selected for the baseline. Id. at ΕΣ−13. Instead, the RIA attempts to 
account for the probability “that counties with PM2.5 levels above the standard 
will likely need more time beyond 2010; new control strategies (e.g., regional 
controls or economic incentive programs); and/or new technologies in order to 
attain the standard.” Id. at ΕΣ−12. Additionally, “[f ]or the PM analysis [in the 
RIA], a $1 billion/μg/m3 cut-off is used to limit the adoption of control measures. 
Control measures providing air quality improvements are less than $1 bil-
lion/μg/m3 are adopted where the air quality model and cost analysis identify 
control measures as being necessary.” Id.  
 385. Id. at ΕΣ−19. These are annual gross benefits. See id. ΕΣ−14 to −15. 
“There are benefits from PM control that could not be monetized in the benefits 
analysis[.] . . . The effect . . . leads to an underestimation of the monetized ben-
efits presented.” Id. at ΕΣ−19. 
 386. Id. at ΕΣ−23 tbl.ES-3. The RIA does not provide a low estimate of an-
nual benefits or annual costs for the more stringent 15μg/m3 standard. See id. 
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In 2006, the EPA under George W. Bush found that “effect 
thresholds can neither be discerned nor determined not to ex-
ist.”387 The Agency also noted that “several new studies available 
in [its] review have used different methods to examine [particu-
late matter concentration-response relationships], and most 
have been unable to detect threshold levels in time-series mor-
tality studies.”388 The EPA again calculated benefits at a partic-
ulate matter standard more stringent than the one it ultimately 
chose for the NAAQS. The 2006 final rule established a PM2.5 24-
hour standard of 35 μg/m3 and retained the annual standard of 
15 μg/m3.389 The RIA also included an analysis of benefits from 
a more stringent annual standard of 14 μg/m3 paired with the 
same 35 μg/m3 24-hour limit.390 Again, the EPA found higher 
benefits for the more stringent standard.391 Using a 3% discount 
rate,392 the EPA found $17 billion in benefits at the 15 μg/m3 
standard, but $30 billion in benefits under the more stringent 14 
μg/m3 standard.393 Again using a 3% discount rate, the EPA also 
calculated benefits using a different methodology and found be-
tween $9 billion and $76 billion in benefits from the 15 μg/m3 
standard, but $17 billion to $140 billion in benefits for the 14 
μg/m3 standard.394 
Further, the Bush EPA calculated additional health and 
welfare benefits under the more stringent standard. Under mul-
tiple valuation methods, the EPA found that approximately 
twice as many deaths would be avoided under the 14 μg/m3 
standard compared with the 15 μg/m3 standard it ultimately se-
lected.395 The EPA found that chronic bronchitis effects would be 
 
at ΕΣ−14 to −23. 
 387. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 71 
Fed. Reg. 61,144, 61,152 (Oct. 17, 2006) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50). 
 388. Id. at 61,158. 
 389. Id. at 61,144. 
 390. 2006 PM RIA, supra note 336, at ES-1 to -2. 
 391. Id. at ES-7 tbl.ES-1 (showing the estimated benefits for the more strin-
gent standards versus the 1997 revised standards). 
 392. As noted above, the 3% discount rate presents a more realistic figure 
for calculating the present value of benefits from reduction of future air pollu-
tion. See Newell, supra note 9. 
 393. 2006 PM RIA, supra note 336, at ES-7 tbl.ES-1 (comparing full attain-
ment benefits with social costs through incremental attainment of the 1997 
standards). 
 394. Id. 
 395. Id. at ES-8 tbl.ES-2 (estimating the reduction of adverse health and 
welfare effects associated with incremental attainment of alternative stand-
ards). 
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reduced by 4600 cases under a more stringent standard but by 
2600 under the standard it selected.396 Hospital admissions for 
respiratory events would be reduced by 980 under the stricter 
level but by 530 under EPA’s standard, and hospital admissions 
for cardiovascular events for people over the age of seventeen 
would decrease by 2100 under the stricter level but by only 1100 
under the standard selected.397  
In the most recent revision of particulate matter NAAQS 
under the Obama Administration, the EPA expressed its clear-
est rejection of thresholds for particulate matter. The Agency 
noted in the Final Rule updating the NAAQS in 2013 that, be-
cause “there is no discernible population-level threshold below 
which effects would not occur, . . . it is reasonable to consider 
that health effects may occur over the full range of concentra-
tions observed in the epidemiological studies, including the 
lower concentrations in the latter years.”398 The EPA also explic-
itly addressed comments from the American Petroleum Institute 
and the American Chemistry Council asserting that “there is a 
threshold in the PM-health effect relationship and that the log-
linear model is not biologically plausible.”399 The Agency coun-
tered that: 
The EPA disagrees with this assertion due to the number of studies 
evaluated in the Integrated Science Assessment that continue to sup-
port the use of a no-threshold, log-linear model to most appropriately 
represent the PM concentration-response relationship. . . . [EPA’s 
Clean Air Science Advisory Committee] likewise advised that 
“[a]lthough there is increasing uncertainty at lower levels, there is no 
evidence of a threshold.”400 
As in previous administrations, the EPA again found additional 
benefits from a standard more stringent than the NAAQS. The 
 
 396. Id. 
 397. Id. 
 398. NAAQS Particulate Matter, supra note 147, at 3148. 
 399. Id. at 3119. 
 400. Id. Further, when the EPA acknowledged in its Integrated Review Plan 
for the 2016 PM NAAQS rulemaking that particulate matter lacks a threshold 
of effects, the Clean Air Science Advisory Committee affirmed that conclusion. 
See Memorandum from Dr. Ana V. Diez Roux, Chair, Clean Air Sci. Advisory 
Comm., to Gina McCarthy, Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency, CASAC Review of the 
EPA’s Integrated Review Plan for the National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
for Particulate Matter (External Review Draft - April 2016) (Aug. 31, 2016), 
https://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/0/9920C7E70022CCF9852580200 
0702022/$File/EPA-CASAC+2016-003+unsigned.pdf (noting that “[t]he ap-
proach in the last review to setting an annual standard when there is ‘no dis-
cernible population level threshold’ for health effects is clearly explained” and 
appropriate). 
  
2019] NEXT BATTLEGROUND 1413 
 
2012 RIA presents the benefits for the NAAQS levels the EPA 
chose, a PM2.5 24-hour standard of 35 μg/m3 and an annual aver-
age standard of 12 μg/m3.401 The Agency also calculated benefits 
from an 11μg/m3 annual standard.402 At a 3% discount rate, the 
EPA found between $3.7 and $9 billion in benefits for the 12 
μg/m3 standard, but $11 to $29 billion in benefits at the more 
stringent 11 μg/m3 level.403 
C. ADDRESSING UNCERTAINTY 
The preceding discussion should not be read to suggest that 
there is no uncertainty about the health effects of particulate 
matter at low levels of exposure. Exposure studies generally do 
not examine populations exposed to ambient levels down to zero. 
Rather, studies generally have a lowest measured level (LML), 
which is the lowest level of exposure studied.404 The EPA is 
tasked with the difficult job of extrapolating a dose-response re-
lationship below these levels, and it has acknowledged that un-
certainty remains about the shape of that relationship.405 
One tactic of regulatory critics is to conflate this uncertainty 
with the existence of a threshold. For example, state and indus-
try challengers to the Clean Power Plan emphasized the EPA’s 
admission that there is uncertainty about the scale of particulate 
matter health effects at very low exposure levels.406 These chal-
lengers asserted that NAAQS are “‘precautionary and preventa-
tive’ in nature . . . and intended to protect the most sensitive sub-
groups in the population, [yet] EPA did not have confidence that 
 
 401. See 2012 PM RIA, supra note 336, at ES-2. 
 402. Id. 
 403. Id. at ES-14 to -15 tbl.ES-2 (showing total monetized benefits, costs, 
and net benefits for full attainment by 2020). 
 404. For example, the RIA for the proposed repeal of the Clean Power Plan 
states that:  
[e]stimates were calculated assuming that the number of PM2.5-at-
tributable premature deaths falls to zero at PM2.5 levels at or below the 
Lowest Measured Level of each of two [long-term] epidemiological stud-
ies used to quantify PM2.5-related risk of death (Krewski et al. 2009, 
LML = 5.8 μg/m3; Lepeule et al. 2012; LML = 8 μg/m3). 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE REVIEW OF THE 
CLEAN POWER PLAN: PROPOSAL 10 (2017), https://www.epa.gov/sites/ 
production/files/2017-10/documents/ria_proposed-cpp-repeal_2017-10_0.pdf. 
The EPA routinely deals with this issue for carcinogens as well. See GUIDELINES 
FOR CARCINOGEN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 78, at 1-14, 3-16 to -17 (describ-
ing the use of the “point of departure” method).  
 405. GUIDELINES FOR CARCINOGEN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 78, at 3-
16 to -17. 
 406. Opening Brief of State and Industry Petitioners, supra note 13, at 53. 
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a level below 12 μg/m3 was needed to provide the rigorous pro-
tections the Act requires.”407 The group further asserted that if 
the EPA, in its 2013 NAAQS review of particulate matter, deter-
mined that the health benefits of reductions were “so uncertain 
that it [was] not appropriate to include exposures below 12 μg/m3 
within the ‘adequate margin of safety’ provided by the NAAQS,” 
the EPA should not later be able to claim that reductions below 
that same level will yield billions of dollars in benefits.408 
However, over the course of several decades, the EPA has 
consistently considered and incorporated uncertainty into its as-
sessments of the NAAQS on the basis of the relevant scientific 
research. In its 1997 Regulatory Impact Analysis for particulate 
matter, the EPA noted that “one significant source of uncer-
tainty is the possible existence of a threshold concentration be-
low which no adverse health effects occur.”409 The EPA ad-
dressed this uncertainty in its benefits calculations, providing a 
“high end” estimate, which assumed that health benefits from 
reductions in particulate matter occur “all the way down to back-
ground levels” for certain health effects.410 The EPA also pro-
vided a “low end” estimate which assumed that health benefits 
from particulate matter reductions occur “only down to the level 
of the standard.”411 
In 2006, the EPA acknowledged that there was a debate as 
to whether a threshold exists for particulate matter,412 and ad-
dressed the uncertainty by assuming that the particulate matter 
concentration-response function was linear within the concen-
trations “under consideration,” which the EPA defined to be 
above an assumed threshold of 10 μg/m3.413 The Agency also 
 
 407. Id.  
 408. Id. “EPA cannot justify its decision to regulate EGU HAPs under § 112 
based on asserted public health benefits it only recently concluded did not jus-
tify regulation of those non-HAPs.” Id. at 51. 
 409. 1997 PM RIA, supra note 381, at 12-14. 
 410. Id. 
 411. Id. 
 412. 2006 PM RIA, supra note 336, at 5-20. 
 413. Id. at 5-7 (“The C-R function for fine particles is approximately linear 
within the range of ambient concentrations under consideration (above the as-
sumed threshold of 10 μg/m3). Thus, we assume that the [C-R] functions are 
applicable to estimates of health benefits associated with reducing fine particles 
in areas with varied concentrations of PM, including both regions that are in 
attainment with PM2.5 standards and those that do not meet the standards.”). 
However, the EPA also examined several alternative thresholds in a sensitivity 
analysis. See id. at 5-44 (“Five cutpoints (including the base case assumption) 
were included in this sensitivity analysis: (a) 14 μg/m3 (assumes no impacts be-
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noted that its Science Advisory Board, which provides advice to 
the EPA on benefits analysis methods, “model[ed] premature 
mortality associated with PM exposure as a non-threshold effect, 
that is, with harmful effects to exposed populations regardless of 
the absolute level of ambient PM concentrations.”414 
By 2012, a much larger number of studies had produced ev-
idence of the health effects of particulate matter exposure at low 
levels. The EPA acknowledged that there was still uncertainty 
in the 2012 RIA, but both the language used by the Agency and 
the assumptions it makes reflect the growing body of evidence 
that particulate matter has health effects at low levels. Specifi-
cally, the EPA stated that it was “more confident in the magni-
tude of the risks we [estimated] from simulated PM2.5 concentra-
tions that coincide with the bulk of observed PM 
concentrations.”415 The EPA further acknowledged that it was 
“less confident in the risk we estimate from simulated PM2.5 con-
centrations that fall below the bulk of the observed data in these 
studies.”416 
The EPA likewise discussed uncertainties in developing the 
Mercury and Air Toxics Standards. The EPA calculated particu-
late matter reduction benefits for the Mercury and Air Toxics 
Standards using studies measuring health impacts below the 
 
low the alternative annual NAAQS), (b) 12 μg/m3 (c) 10 μg/m3 (reflects com-
ments from CASAC - 2005), (d) 7.5 μg/m3 (reflects recommendations from SAB-
HES to consider estimating mortality benefits down to the lowest exposure lev-
els considered in the Pope 2002 study used as the basis for modeling chronic 
mortality) and (e) background or 3 μg/m3 (reflects NRC recommendation to con-
sider effects all the way to background).”) For the more stringent 7.5 μg/m3 and 
3 μg/m3 threshold cutpoints, the sensitivity analyses estimated increased bene-
fits relative to the assumed 10 μg/m3 threshold, albeit with increasing uncer-
tainty at lower concentrations. See id. at 5-81 to -84 (estimating greater reduc-
tions in mortality incidence and greater monetized benefits from reduced 
mortality risk for lower threshold cutpoints). 
The 2008 RIA for PM reiterated the Science Advisory Board’s discussion of 
PM exposure as a non-threshold effect and endorsed the use of a non-threshold 
model at low concentrations. See 2008 FINAL OZONE RIA, supra note 252, at 6c-
5 n.2 (“For the studies of long-term exposure, . . . the most careful work on this 
issue . . . report[s] that the associations between PM2.5 and both all-cause and 
cardiopulmonary mortality were near linear within the relevant ranges, with 
no apparent threshold. Graphical analyses of these studies . . . also suggest a 
continuum of effects down to lower levels. Therefore, it is reasonable for EPA to 
assume a no threshold model down to, at least, the low end of the concentrations 
reported in the studies.”). 
 414. 2006 PM RIA, supra note 336, at 5-20. 
 415. 2012 PM RIA, supra note 336, at 5-81.  
 416. Id.  
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NAAQS levels, but above the zero exposure level.417 The LML of 
these studies helped inform EPA’s analysis.418 The EPA calcu-
lated the benefits at LMLs of major PM studies and found that 
11% of the estimated benefits from avoided premature deaths 
occur at or above an annual mean PM2.5 level of 10 μg/m3,419 and 
73% of the benefits occur at or above 7.5 μg/m3.420 The EPA mod-
eled benefits below the LML, in line with the Agency’s acknowl-
edgement that particulate matter is not a threshold pollutant, 
but noted that the Agency has lower confidence in the exact 
value of those estimates.421 The EPA also noted that it addressed 
uncertainties in the magnitude of effects by following the same 
approach used by the Bush EPA in the 2006 particulate matter 
NAAQS RIA.422 
However, the fact that uncertainty remains does not mean 
there is evidence to conclude that particulate matter causes no 
health effects below a certain level. As the EPA noted in the 2012 
RIA, “[i]t is important to emphasize that ‘less confidence’ does 
not mean ‘no confidence.’ . . . [W]e still have high confidence that 
PM2.5 is causally associated with risk at those lower air quality 
concentrations.”423 The EPA went on to note that although it 
uses benchmarks as part of its analysis, including the LML, this 
does not mean that the EPA views “these concentration bench-
marks as a concentration threshold below which we would not 
quantify health benefits of air quality improvements.”424 In 
short, the EPA has consistently acknowledged scientific uncer-
tainty and accounts for it at various times, but this does not pre-
vent the Agency from modeling health effects at low levels of ex-
posure.425 And the EPA has found adverse health effects below 
 
 417. MATS RIA, supra note 21, at 5-98, 5-100. 
 418. See id. 
 419. Id. at 5-100. For the Laden et al. study, a major 2006 study and a follow 
up to the Harvard Six Cities study, 10 μg/m3 was the LML. Id. (citing Francine 
Laden et al., Reduction in Fine Particulate Air Pollution and Mortality: Ex-
tended Follow-up of the Harvard Six Cities Study, 173 AM. J. RESPIRATORY & 
CRITICAL CARE MED. 667 (2006)).   
 420. MATS RIA, supra note 21, at 5-100. For the Pope et al. study of 2002, 
another prominent study, 7.5 µg/m3 was the LML. Id. (citing C. Arden Pope III 
et al., Lung Cancer, Cardiopulmonary Mortality, and Long-term Exposure to 
Fine Particulate Air Pollution, 287 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1132 (2002)).  
 421. MATS RIA, supra note 21, at 5-100. 
 422. Id. at 5-17. 
 423. 2012 PM RIA, supra note 336, at 5-81 to -82. 
 424. Id. at 5-82. 
 425. See, e.g., id. at ES-1; 2006 PM RIA, supra note 336, at ES-1; 1997 PM 
RIA, supra note 381, at ΕΣ−23 tbl.ES-3; 1984 PM RIA, supra note 376, at VI-
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the NAAQS nearly every time the Agency has studied exposure 
effects below those levels.426 
D. ADJUSTING BASELINES 
In addition to asserting that particulate matter reductions 
below the NAAQS yield no health benefits, critics of regulations 
also attack the methods the EPA uses to measure these effects. 
Specifically, critics claim that the EPA has not adjusted the 
baseline to account for prior regulation of particulate matter, ef-
fectively “double counting” particulate matter benefits.427 This 
section addresses those criticisms, showing that the EPA prac-
tice has consistently accounted for emission reductions resulting 
from prior regulations in setting its basis of comparison. 
A baseline is the status quo that would exist without a new 
regulation, and it is necessary to measure the benefits of the reg-
ulation. OMB Circular A-4 instructs agencies to “[i]dentify a 
baseline” so as to “evaluate properly the benefits and costs of 
regulations and their alternatives.”428 Baselines are straightfor-
ward in theory but quite complex in practice. For example, think 
of a rule that has already been promulgated but is not scheduled 
to go into effect immediately and will be rolled out over many 
years—or consider that the earlier rule may never be fully im-
plemented if a later administration decides to repeal it. How 
should the EPA measure that earlier rule? Should the Agency 
include it in the baseline for a new regulation? The EPA has de-
veloped standard methods for handling such questions to pro-
mote uniformity across regulations, which are discussed in this 
section. 
Opponents argue that the EPA is “double counting;” that is, 
inflating a regulation’s purported benefits by failing to account 
for existing regulations that will achieve the same reduction of 
the pollutant. According to one critic, the Agency “regularly 
flouts [a] basic principle of sound regulation by ignoring the 
PM2.5 and ozone reductions it has already mandated, and count-
ing those reductions again as benefits in new rules. The same 
ton of pollutant thus serves to justify multiple rules, even though 
the pollution can only be prevented once.”429 Tellingly, former 
 
15. 
 426. See supra Part III.B (cataloging the EPA’s consistent finding over three 
decades of adverse health effects from particulate matter below NAAQS levels). 
 427. See LESSER, supra note 26. 
 428. CIRCULAR A-4: REGULATORY ANALYSIS, supra note 66, at 2. 
 429. Gray, supra note 26. 
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Trump EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt expressed a commitment 
to ensuring that his Agency would not “double count” benefits 
from existing regulations; he asserted that the EPA “shouldn’t 
take pollutants that we regulate under our [NAAQS] program 
and then count that as a benefit when we’re already achieving 
that with other regulation and contribute it to . . . the Clean 
Power Plan cost-benefit analysis. And [the Obama Administra-
tion] did that because the costs were so extraordinary.”430 
These claims ignore the reality that the EPA has main-
tained clear standards designed to prevent double counting. The 
EPA’s guidance on baselines states that it is the Agency’s com-
mon practice “to assume full compliance with regulatory require-
ments,”431 which includes newly enacted but not yet imple-
mented regulations.432 This means that benefits from prior rules 
are accounted for in the baseline—these benefits are not ignored 
and then used again for a later regulation.433 The Agency specif-
ically notes that this general rule allows the EPA to focus on in-
cremental economic effects of the new rule “without double 
counting benefits and costs captured by analyses performed for 
other rules.”434 
The EPA also explicitly discusses the ways in which it ac-
counts for prior benefits achieved under the NAAQS. For the 
Mercury and Air Toxics Standards, the EPA notes that its base-
line accounts for “the emissions reductions of SOx, NOx, directly 
emitted PM, and CO2 . . . consistent with application of federal 
rules, state rules and statutes, and other binding, enforceable 
commitments in place by December 2010,”435 as well as the 
Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR) as finalized in July 
2011.436 Likewise, in the Clean Power Plan, the EPA states that 
it included in its baseline all state and federal air regulations 
either in effect or enacted and clearly delineated at the time.437 
 
 430. Justin Worland, EPA Head Scott Pruitt Says Oil and Coal Companies 
He Met with Aren’t ‘Polluters,’ TIME (Oct. 20, 2017), http://time.com/4990060/ 
scott-pruitt-interview-epa-schedule-meetings (showing Scott Pruitt’s interview 
with TIME). 
 431. GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES, supra note 56, at 5-
3. 
 432. Id. at 5-9. 
 433. Id. 
 434. Id. 
 435. MATS RIA, supra note 21, at 1-11. 
 436. See id. 
 437. See CLEAN POWER PLAN RIA, supra note 22, at 1-5 (“Base Case v.5.15 
includes the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR), the Mercury and Air Tox-
ics Rule (MATS), the proposed Carbon Pollution Standards for New Power 
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The EPA also notes in its Base Case, which documents the 
Agency’s calculations of the baseline used to measure the bene-
fits and costs of new regulations, that the baseline includes 
“NAAQS to the extent that state regulations . . . contain 
measures to bring non-attainment areas into attainment.”438 
The EPA further notes that “[a]part from these state regula-
tions, individual permits issued by states in response to 
[NAAQS] are only captured [to the extent they are reported to 
EPA].”439 Thus, the EPA includes benefits from NAAQS require-
ments to the extent they are implemented by states. Such treat-
ment makes sense in light of the regulatory structure created by 
the Clean Air Act. Under the Act, the EPA sets the NAAQS, 
which are a national standard for allowable air pollution levels. 
However, the NAAQS are implemented by the states through 
State Implementation Plans (SIPs). States have a great deal of 
discretion in determining how to work toward achieving the 
NAAQS. As a result of this structure, when the EPA promul-
gates the NAAQS and attempts to estimate the costs and bene-
fits of these standards, the Agency must make a number of as-
sumptions about how states will ultimately choose to regulate 
pollution. The SIPs provide a much clearer picture of the actual 
costs and benefits of the NAAQS. Further, it is the SIPs, and not 
the NAAQS, which are actually enforceable. The EPA used the 
SIPs as its baseline for the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards 
and the Clean Power Plan, which were promulgated to bring ar-
eas into attainment with the NAAQS. 
 
Plants, the Cooling Water Intakes (316(b)) Rule, the Combustion Residuals 
from Electric Utilities (CCR), and other state and Federal regulations to the 
extent that they contain measures, permits, or other air-related limitations or 
requirements.”). 
 438. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA BASE CASE V.5.14 USING IPM: INCRE-
MENTAL DOCUMENTATION 1 (2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/ 
2015-08/documents/epa_base_case_v514_incremental_documentation.pdf. The 
Base Case in place when the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards rule was prom-
ulgated in 2011 similarly included “ozone and particulate matter standards to 
the extent that some of the state regulations . . . contain measures to bring non-
attainment areas into attainment.” U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DOCUMENTA-
TION FOR EPA BASE CASE V.4.10 USING THE INTEGRATED PLANNING MODEL, at 
1-1 (2010) [hereinafter BASE CASE 4.10], https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/ 
P100CF8G.PDF?Dockey=P100CF8G.PDF. 
 439. BASE CASE 4.10, supra note 438 (regarding which permits are included, 
the EPA specifically notes that “to the extent that they are reflected in the NOx 
rates reported to EPA under [CSAPR], Title IV and the NOx Budget Program 
which are incorporated in the base case and . . . to the extent that SO2 permit 
limits are used in the base case to define the choice of coal sulfur grades that 
are available to specific power plants”). 
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The EPA likewise accounts for rules that have the co-benefit 
of reducing NAAQS pollutants in its baseline for future NAAQS. 
Particulate matter is regulated directly under the NAAQS but is 
also affected indirectly by rules like the Mercury and Air Toxics 
Standards and the Clean Power Plan that directly target other 
pollutants. In a subsequent update of the NAAQS for particulate 
matter, the EPA stated that it included the Mercury and Air Tox-
ics Standards in that baseline as well, noting that “[e]mission 
reductions achieved under rules that require specific actions 
from sources—such as [Mercury and Air Toxics Standards]—are 
in the baseline of this NAAQS analysis, as are emission reduc-
tions needed to meet the current NAAQS.”440 
In its draft repeal of the Clean Power Plan, the Trump Ad-
ministration also raises the issue of baselines. However, the 
Agency takes a different approach than other critics of these reg-
ulations. Rather than arguing that the EPA’s 2015 Regulatory 
Impact Analysis for the Clean Power Plan double counts partic-
ulate matter benefits, the proposed rule points out that particu-
late matter could be regulated in other ways. This is, of course, 
the case; particulate matter is regulated directly under the Na-
tional Ambient Air Quality Standards. From this fact, the 
Trump EPA presents the following hypothetical:  
“[H]ad those SO2 and NOx [particulate matter] reductions been 
achieved through other means, then they would have been represented 
in the baseline for this proposed repeal (as well as for the 2015 Final 
[Clean Power Plan]), which would have affected the estimated costs 
and benefits of controlling CO2 emissions alone.”441  
The Agency then presents calculations of the forgone benefits of 
repealing the Clean Power Plan, with all of the SO2 and NOX 
benefits removed.442 The logic seems to be that because these 
benefits could be achieved through other regulations, the Agency 
need not calculate the benefits of reducing the pollution through 
this regulation; rather, it can just assume the benefits have al-
ready been achieved through another regulation. Of course, such 
a regulation does not exist. The EPA cannot wish away benefits 
by pretending we live in a world where the benefits have already 
been achieved, and courts tasked with overseeing the EPA 
should not stand idly by while the Agency attempts to do so. Not 
only does the Trump Administration’s approach deviate from the 
 
 440. 2012 PM RIA, supra note 336, at ES-18. 
 441. Clean Power Plan Proposed Repeal, supra note 8, at 48,044 n.24. 
 442. Id. at 48,044–45. 
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EPA’s longstanding methodology for determining baselines, but 
its benefits calculations also depart from reality. 
IV.  CONSIDERING CO-BENEFITS   
Particulate matter reductions are often co-benefits, or ancil-
lary benefits, from rules targeting other types of pollution.443 For 
example, the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards directly limit 
mercury emissions from power plants but would likewise have 
the effect of reducing particulate matter emissions. Similarly, 
the Clean Power Plan directly regulates carbon dioxide emis-
sions from power plants because these well-known greenhouse 
gases contribute to global climate change.444 However, because 
the rule requires energy generators to internalize the cost of 
emissions, thus raising the cost of polluting, the rule would likely 
cause a shift in sources of energy production away from sources 
that produce large quantities of greenhouses gases, notably coal, 
to cleaner forms of energy. This shift would additionally have the 
effect of reducing particulate matter because coal-fired power 
plants are also significant sources of particulate pollution. 
Critics of regulations argue that cost-benefit analyses for 
specific pollutants should not include co-benefits from reductions 
in non-targeted pollutants. They contend that only direct and 
quantifiable benefits resulting from the reduction of the specific 
pollutant at issue should be included in a rule’s calculus. In their 
view, the consideration of co-benefits extends beyond the scope 
of the problems Congress intended to address, and instead is a 
“sleight of hand” to “circumvent the[] statutory limitations on 
[the EPA’s] authority.”445 According to regulation opponents, 
“[p]ermitting EPA to use such illusory and statutorily irrelevant 
co-benefits to justify the Rule would . . . amount to an unconsti-
tutional delegation of legislative power.”446 
 
 443. Of course, for the NAAQS regulating particulate matter, benefits from 
PM reduction are the target benefits. 
 444. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2013–THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS: WORKING GROUP I CONTRIBU-
TION TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL 
ON CLIMATE CHANGE 467 (Thomas F. Stocker et al. eds., 2014); NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, CLIMATE STABILIZATION TARGETS: EMISSIONS, CONCENTRATIONS, 
AND IMPACTS OVER DECADES TO MILLENNIA 3–4 (2011); Climate Change Sci-
ence: Causes of Climate Change, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https:// 
19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/climate-change-science/causes-climate 
-change_.html (last updated Dec. 27, 2016). 
 445. Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 
supra note 294, at 4. 
 446. Brief of 166 State and Local Business Ass’ns as Amici Curiae in Support 
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This theme arose prominently in the litigation leading to 
Michigan v. EPA, where co-benefits were attacked as a means of 
impermissibly enabl[ing the EPA] to expand its authority to con-
duct additional PM2.5 regulation without following the proper 
procedures of imposing such restrictions upon the country.447 
Critics argued that the Agency “routinely takes credit for reduc-
tions of PM2.5 caused by rules that address harms from other 
pollutants” as a “power grab” in order to regulate “outside the 
specific [statutory] authority under which they are acting”448 and 
to obligate further PM2.5 reductions beyond those required under 
other Clean Air Act programs.449 Mercury, the pollutant directly 
regulated by the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards, was deemed 
“a Trojan horse used to justify regulation under Section 112, 
when EPA’s real focus was particulate-matter emissions by 
power plants, which the agency has targeted across numerous 
rulemakings in recent years.”450 Because they are not targeted 
by the section of the statute upon which the rule is based, critics 
argue that including co-benefits circumvents the Clean Air Act 
by additionally reducing pollutants that are directly regulated 
by other sections of the Act,451 so as to “indirectly require further 
reductions in PM2.5 emissions from power plants that EPA 
would be unable to require directly.”452 At oral argument in the 
Michigan case, Chief Justice John Roberts suggested that indi-
rect benefits merely served as “an end run” around statutory re-
strictions.453 Chief Justice Roberts also noted that he believed it 
was a “good thing if your regulation also benefits in other ways. 
 
of Petitioners at 26, West Virginia v. EPA, Nos. 15-1363 et al. (D.C. Cir. Feb. 
23, 2016). 
 447. Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief and Brief of the Chamber 
of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners at 1–4, Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) (Nos. 14-46, 14-47, 
14-49). 
 448. Id. at 16–17. 
 449. Id. at 23. 
 450. Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 
supra note 294, at 22. 
 451. See Opening Brief of State and Industry Petitioners, supra note 13, at 
47. 
 452. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, the 
National Ass’n of Manufacturers, the National Federation of Independent Bus., 
and the National Ass’n of Home Builders as Amici Curiae in Support of Peti-
tioners, supra note 297, at 16. 
 453. See Opening Brief of State and Industry Petitioners, supra note 13, at 
47 (internal citations omitted) (noting that at oral argument in Michigan, Chief 
Justice Roberts described relying on co-benefits as “an end run” around § 109’s 
restrictions and as an issue that “raises the red flag”). 
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But when it’s such a disproportion, you begin to wonder whether 
it’s an illegitimate way of avoiding the different—quite different 
limitations on EPA that apply in the criteria program.”454 
Opponents contend that even if a rule yields co-benefits, 
those effects are essentially “irrelevant”455 or mere “regulatory 
externalities”456 that should play no part in a cost-benefit analy-
sis. Critics of co-benefits have called their use a “well-worn ac-
counting trick”457 and “a controversial and legally dubious ac-
counting method.”458 Petitioners in Michigan v. EPA argued that 
“ancillary co-benefits from lower PM2.5 emissions are not relevant 
benefits for the purpose of deciding whether it is appropriate to 
regulate [hazardous air pollutant] emissions from electric utili-
ties. Congress required EPA to determine whether reducing 
emissions of hazardous air pollutants (not PM2.5) is ‘appropri-
ate.’”459 Put differently: 
Even if Congress intended that EPA may consider co-benefits—a con-
cept found nowhere in the statute—in setting technology-based stand-
ards, Congress certainly did not dictate that the purported co-benefits 
may force regulation of [hazardous air pollutants] under Section 
112(n)(1)(A) where the reductions of the [hazardous air pollutants] 
themselves provide no relative benefits in comparison to the substan-
tial costs of regulation.460 
Others have called co-benefits “inflated”461 and “unlaw-
ful[,] . . . obscur[ing] the impact of the rule on the targeted pollu-
tant (CO2) and creates deliberate confusion regarding the Rule’s 
costs and benefits.”462 
 
 454. Clean Power Plan Proposed Repeal, supra note 8, at 48,044 n.23 (quot-
ing Chief Justice Roberts at oral argument in Michigan v. EPA). 
 455. Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 
supra note 294, at 3; Opening Brief of State and Industry Petitioners, supra 
note 13, at 49. 
 456. Brief of Amicus Curiae Cato Institute in Support of Petitioners, supra 
note 298, at 4. 
 457. Brief of 166 State and Local Business Associations as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners, supra note 446. 
 458. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, the 
National Ass’n of Manufacturers, the National Federation of Independent Busi-
ness, and the National Ass’n of Home Builders as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners, supra note 297, at 3. 
 459. Brief for Petitioners State of Michigan, et al. at 48, Michigan v. EPA, 
135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) (Nos. 14-46, 14-47, 14-49) (emphasis in original). 
 460. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, the 
National Ass’n of Manufacturers, the National Federation of Independent Busi-
ness, and the National Ass’n of Home Builders as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners, supra note 297, at 22. 
 461. Gray, supra note 26. 
 462. Brief of 166 State and Local Business Ass’ns as Amici Curiae in Support 
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In the case of the Clean Power Plan, critics argue that 
“[w]ithout the artificial consideration of these purported co-ben-
efits, the Rule’s benefits would be seen for what they are: vastly 
exceeded by its costs.”463 The Trump EPA echoed this claim 
when, in announcing the repeal of the Clean Power Plan, it de-
cried co-benefits as “essentially hiding” the plan’s true cost.464 
The Trump Administration EPA also described the Obama Ad-
ministration’s inclusion of co-benefits in the Plan as an area of 
“controversy and/or uncertainty,”465 suggesting that the incorpo-
ration of these benefits is outside common EPA practice. 
The arguments against considering co-benefits ring hollow, 
however, when looked at in context. The EPA has consistently 
and over multiple presidential administrations considered both 
co-benefits and their mirror image, indirect costs, in evaluating 
the consequences of regulation. Removing co-benefits would 
mean systematically considering a narrower range of benefits 
than costs, because it would leave intact the EPA’s current prac-
tice of measuring indirect costs while ignoring co-benefits.466 
Were this not the case, critics would potentially have a valid 
point. Were it true that the EPA only considers indirect effects 
that are benefits, then the EPA arguably would be inflating ben-
efits, as critics accuse.467 However, because the EPA does con-
sider both indirect costs and benefits, what critics really want is 
to put a thumb on the scale against regulation by forcing the 
EPA to ignore some indirect effects while embracing others. This 
Part examines the well-established use of co-benefits in cost-ben-
efit analyses by presidential administrations, the EPA, and the 
courts, as well as their endorsement in the academic literature. 
A. CO-BENEFITS AND INDIRECT COSTS 
The question of how to measure indirect costs and benefits 
arises in the context of cost-benefit analyses. Federal agencies 
have been required to perform these analyses since 1981, when 
President Reagan issued Executive Order 12,291.468 Previous 
 
of Petitioners, supra note 446, at 27. 
 463. Id. 
 464. See EPA Takes Another Step to Advance President Trump’s America 
First Strategy, supra note 64. 
 465. See id. 
 466. For a more detailed discussion of co-benefits as the “mirror image” of 
indirect costs, see Rascoff & Revesz, supra note 4. 
 467. See Gray, supra note 26. 
 468. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,193–94 (Feb. 19, 1981). 
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presidents had required some assessment of the impacts of pro-
posed regulatory actions,469 but the Reagan Administration was 
the first to formalize this requirement.470 The EPA’s early cost-
benefit analyses focused only on the direct costs and benefits of 
regulations.471 However, substantial academic, administrative, 
and judicial attention turned to the consideration of countervail-
ing risks in the 1990s with the publication of Risk Versus Risk 
by John D. Graham and Jonathan Baert Wiener.472 The book 
outlined the leading framework for considering indirect costs, 
also known as countervailing risks: risk-risk analysis.473 The 
guiding principal of risk-risk analysis, as conceived by Graham 
and Wiener, is that regulations intended to minimize or elimi-
nate certain health or environmental risks can have the perverse 
effect of promoting other risks, and thus a more comprehensive 
and accurate accounting of regulatory effects would consider 
these countervailing risks.474 
 
 469. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661, 12,662–63 (Mar. 
24, 1978) (requiring agencies to consider “the direct and indirect effects of the 
regulation” and report a “Regulatory Analysis” that contains “an analysis of the 
economic consequences of . . . [regulatory] alternatives”). See generally Richard 
H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1, 11, 13 (1995) (tracing the President’s control over the regulatory state 
to “Theodore Roosevelt’s creation, in 1903, of a commission designed to study 
the scientific work done by government agencies” and the “Nixon Administra-
tion’s system of ‘Quality of Life’ reviews” in which “agencies were required to 
submit significant rules to [the] OMB in advance of publication in the Federal 
Register”). 
 470. Exec. Order No. 12,291 was later revoked and replaced by President 
Clinton under Executive Order 12,866, which remains in effect today. See Exec. 
Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993). President Obama rein-
forced the continued viability of this order and expanded it modestly under Ex-
ecutive Order 13,563, which moderately increased the scope of cost-benefit anal-
yses to permit consideration of “values that are difficult or impossible to 
quantify, including equity, human dignity, fairness, and distributive impacts.” 
Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011). 
 471. See, e.g., Exec. Order 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. at 13,194 (only requiring 
agencies to provide a “description of the potential benefits [and costs] of the 
rule”). 
 472. RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVI-
RONMENT (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995). 
 473. Graham and Wiener coined the term “risk tradeoff analysis.” John D. 
Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs, in RISK VERSUS 
RISK, supra note 472, at 1, 4. 
 474. RISK VERSUS RISK, supra note 472, at 270. For example, Graham exam-
ines Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards, a Department of 
Transportation regulation intended to improve automobile fuel standards and 
reduce attendant environmental and health harms, as potentially promoting 
countervailing risks in the economic, energy, and national security sectors. John 
D. Graham, Saving Gasoline and Lives, in RISK VERSUS RISK, supra note 472, 
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Risk-risk analysis picked up traction among academics spe-
cializing in administrative law. In addition to Graham and Wie-
ner, Professor Cass Sunstein, a prominent administrative law 
scholar and the head of the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (OIRA) under President Obama, advocated at that time 
for broad application of risk-risk analysis.475 W. Kip Viscusi, a 
prominent economist and leading proponent of cost-benefit anal-
ysis, also endorsed risk tradeoff analysis in the regulatory pro-
cess.476 
Judges at this time began to embrace risk-risk analysis as 
well. Justice Breyer, concurring in Whitman v. American Truck-
ing Ass’ns, agreed with the Court’s unanimous ruling that the 
Clean Air Act prohibits the consideration of costs in setting the 
NAAQS but wrote separately to argue that the “statute . . . per-
mits the Administrator to take account of comparative health 
risks.”477 Judge Stephen Williams of the D.C. Circuit was also a 
notable proponent of risk-risk analysis. For example, in a con-
currence in International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace 
& Agricultural Implement Workers v. OSHA, Judge Williams 
used risk-risk analysis to challenge what he viewed as the “cas-
ual assumption that more stringent regulation will always save 
lives.”478 He argued that the health-wealth connection479 re-
quired consideration of negative economic effects of regulation 
 
at 87–103. In a separate article, Wiener discusses how risk-risk analysis reveals 
a “bewildering array of countervailing risks that face efforts to prevent global 
warming.” Jonathan Baert Wiener, Protecting the Global Environment, in RISK 
VERSUS RISK, supra note 472, at 193–225. 
 475. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1533, 1537 (1996); see also Rascoff & Revesz, supra note 4, at 1764–65. 
 476. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Regulating the Regulators, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1423, 1455 (1996) (arguing that “regulatory agencies should be concerned with 
this broader effect [ancillary costs] of regulatory policy since their mandate is 
to improve the health and welfare of citizens generally”); see also Rascoff & 
Revesz, supra note 4, at 1792. 
 477. 531 U.S. 457, 495 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring). The D.C. Circuit opin-
ion in that case examined a different countervailing risk: less protection from 
harmful ultraviolet radiation as a result of reducing ozone pollution. Am. Truck-
ing Ass’ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1036–37 (D.C. Cir. 1999), rev’d on other 
grounds sub nom. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
 478. 938 F.2d 1310, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Williams, J., concurring). 
 479. There is much evidence to suggest that the “health-wealth” effect, 
which asserts that less wealth causes worse health outcomes, is fallacious. For 
a detailed discussion of this criticism, see RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. 
LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BET-
TER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 67–76 (2008), which ques-
tions the “health-wealth” effect and offers alternative explanations for both 
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and their purported effect on health: “More regulation means 
some combination of reduced value of firms, higher product 
prices, fewer jobs in the regulated industry, and lower cash 
wages. All the latter three stretch workers’ budgets tighter. . . . 
And larger incomes enable people to lead safer lives.”480 
The growing focus on examining the broader range of regu-
latory effects ultimately led to Office of Management and Budget 
Circular A-4, which was promulgated when John D. Graham 
served as Administrator of OIRA.481 OIRA, which resides with 
the Office of management and Budget, is responsible for oversee-
ing regulatory efforts of administrative agencies and has the 
power to issue guidance which they must follow.482 Circular A-4 
guides federal agencies in the cost-benefit regulatory analyses 
required under Executive Order 12,866,483 “standardizing the 
way benefits and costs of Federal regulatory actions are meas-
ured and reported.”484 As part of this standardization, Circular 
A-4 explicitly requires the consideration of countervailing risks, 
enshrining the analysis of the type of risks Graham and Weiner 
identified.485 However, Circular A-4 goes a step further by like-
wise requiring consideration of ancillary benefits.486 The Circu-
lar instructs agencies to “look beyond the direct benefits and di-
rect costs” to “consider any important ancillary benefits and 
countervailing risks.”487 Further, it states that “[t]he same 
standards of information and analysis quality that apply to di-
rect benefits and costs should be applied to ancillary benefits and 
countervailing risks.”488 
B. THE EPA’S PRACTICE 
The EPA has long acknowledged the relevance of co-bene-
fits, and specifically has done so for regulations promulgated un-
der the Clean Air Act. First, the EPA’s current guidelines for 
 
health and wealth—notably, education—as well as the potential for reverse cau-
sation (i.e., that worse health causes lower wealth). 
 480. 938 F.2d at 1326. 
 481. CIRCULAR A-4: REGULATORY ANALYSIS, supra note 66, at 1. 
 482. See The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–21 (1980) 
(establishing the Federal Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)). 
 483. CIRCULAR A-4: REGULATORY ANALYSIS, supra note 66, at 1. 
 484. Id. 
 485. See RISK VERSUS RISK, supra note 472. 
 486. CIRCULAR A-4: REGULATORY ANALYSIS, supra note 66, at 26. 
 487. Id. 
 488. Id. 
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cost-benefit analyses, which were adopted in 2010 after exten-
sive peer review, instruct the Agency to assess “all identifiable 
costs and benefits,”489 and state that an economic analysis of reg-
ulations should include both “directly intended effects . . . as well 
as ancillary (or co-) benefits and costs.”490 The aim of these anal-
yses is to “inform decision making” and allow meaningful com-
parisons between policy alternatives.491 
These guidelines build on principles applied in previous ad-
ministrations. For example, the George W. Bush EPA used sim-
ilar language in its 2008 draft “Guidelines for Preparing Eco-
nomic Analyses,” declaring that “[a]n economic analysis of 
regulatory or policy options should present all identifiable costs 
and benefits that are incremental to the regulation or policy un-
der consideration. These should include directly intended effects 
and associated costs, as well as ancillary (or co-) benefits and 
costs.”492 The proposed George W. Bush guidelines also stated 
that “[f]or a regulation that is expected to have substantial indi-
rect effects beyond the regulated sector, it is important to choose 
a model that can capture those effects.”493 
Likewise, the Clinton EPA’s guidelines for conducting cost-
benefit analyses endorsed the importance of considering indirect 
costs and benefits.494 Issued in 2000, the Clinton guidelines in-
cluded indirect costs as a component of its calculations for health 
and social costs.495 Emphasizing that “[a] complete benefits anal-
ysis is also useful because it makes explicit the assumptions 
about the value of benefits embedded in different policy 
choices,”496 the guidelines determined that indirect benefits are 
cognizable, focusing on indirect ecological benefits.497 Moreover, 
 
 489. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC 
ANALYSES, at 11-2 (2010) [hereinafter OBAMA EPA GUIDELINES], https://www 
.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-08/documents/ee-0568-50.pdf. 
 490. Id. 
 491. Id. at 7-1. 
 492. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC 
ANALYSES (EXTERNAL REVIEW DRAFT), at 10-4 (2008) (on file with author). 
 493. Id. at 8-17. 
 494. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC 
ANALYSES 67, 70, 81 (2000), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-09/ 
documents/ee-0228c-07.pdf. 
 495. Id. at 82–83, 94, 114–15. 
 496. Id. at 59. 
 497. Id. at 70 (noting that “[e]cosystem services that do not directly provide 
some good or opportunity to individuals may be valued because they support 
off-site ecological resources or maintain the biological and biochemical processes 
required for life support”). 
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the guidelines noted that “immediately following a net benefit 
calculation, there should be a presentation and evaluation of all 
benefits and costs that can only be quantified but not valued, as 
well as all benefits and costs that can be only qualitatively de-
scribed.”498 The implication is that, even for effects that cannot 
be monetized, informed decision-making requires consideration 
of all benefits and costs, not just direct ones. In short, all three 
iterations of guidelines authored by the EPA—the 2000 guide-
lines, the 2008 draft guidelines, and the 2010 guidelines—called 
for the use of co-benefits in cost-benefit analyses. 
The EPA’s cost-benefit analyses for clean air rules have also 
long included co-benefits.499 The EPA began acknowledging 
these benefits in Clear Air Act rules all the way back in the 
1980s. In 1985, the EPA under President Ronald Reagan con-
ducted an extensive analysis of co-benefits from reductions of 
non-target pollutants in its landmark 1985 regulation reducing 
lead in gasoline, including an analysis of benefits from reduc-
tions in ozone, nitrogen oxides, and hydrocarbons.500 As part of 
this analysis, the EPA found monetized co-benefits from reduc-
ing hydrocarbons, nitrogen oxides, and carbon monoxide, ben-
zene, and other non-targeted pollutants to be worth an estimated 
$222 million over just a one-year period.501 The Reagan-era EPA 
also proposed developing New Source Performance Standards 
for municipal waste combustors.502 As part of this proposal, the 
EPA discussed the importance of considering “indirect benefits” 
from its regulation of toxic emissions from municipal waste com-
bustors.503 The EPA explained that it would include “indirect 
 
 498. Id. at 177. 
 499. The Senate Report accompanying the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments 
indicated that the EPA could take co-benefits into account when setting stand-
ards for hazardous air pollutants. S. REP. NO. 101-228, at 172 (1989) (“When 
establishing technology-based standards under this subsection, the Administra-
tor may consider the benefits which result from the control of air pollutants that 
are not listed but the emissions of which are, nevertheless, reduced by control 
technologies or practices necessary to meet the prescribed limitation.”). 
 500. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-230-05-85-006, COSTS AND BENEFITS 
OF REDUCING LEAD IN GASOLINE: FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, at VI-
1 to -74 (1985), https://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/vwan/ee-0034-1.pdf/ 
%24file/ee-0034-1.pdf. 
 501. Id. at E-8. 
 502. See Assessment of Municipal Waste Combustor Emissions Under the 
Clean Air Act, 52 Fed. Reg. 25,399 (July 7, 1987) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
 503. Id. at 25,406. 
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benefits accruing from concomitant reductions in other regu-
lated pollutants.”504 
Under President George H.W. Bush, the EPA in 1991 justi-
fied performance standards in a proposed rule for landfill gases 
in part on “the ancillary benefit of reducing global loadings of 
methane.”505 Further, the EPA examined countervailing climate 
change risks. The Agency noted that carbon dioxide emissions 
under the proposed standard would increase, but justified regu-
lation in part because of the climate change benefits from me-
thane emission reductions.506 The EPA took into consideration 
both the ancillary benefits of methane reductions in reducing 
greenhouse gas pollution as well as the countervailing risk of in-
creasing carbon dioxide emissions.507 The EPA’s judgment on 
how to regulate was guided by the full scope of effects. 
The EPA under President Bill Clinton in a 1998 rule estab-
lishing standards for hazardous air pollutant emissions from 
pulp and paper producers analyzed indirect effects, both co-ben-
efits from reductions in emissions and indirect costs from in-
creases in emissions, for NAAQS criteria pollutants.508 Though 
hazardous air pollutants were directly targeted by the rule, the 
EPA nonetheless analyzed the effects of its regulation on other 
air pollutants, including the criteria pollutants.509 For the “Best 
Available Technology” standards which govern existing 
plants,510 the EPA estimated small increases in emissions of car-
bon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, and sulfur dioxides from the rule, 
but a significant decrease in particulate matter.511 For the New 
Source Performance Standards, which govern new sources of 
emissions, the EPA concluded that in addition to decreasing haz-
ardous air pollutants, the rule would also decrease many criteria 
pollutant emissions including particulate matter.512 Rather than 
 
 504. Id. 
 505. Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources and Guidelines 
for Control of Existing Sources: Municipal Solid Waste Landfills, 56 Fed. Reg. 
24,468, 24,469 (May 30, 1991) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, and 60). 
 506. Id. at 24,472. 
 507. Id. 
 508. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for 
Source Category: Pulp and Paper Production; Effluent Limitations Guidelines, 
Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Performance Standards: Pulp, Paper, 
and Paperboard Category, 63 Fed. Reg. 18,504, 18,504, 18,576 (Apr. 15, 1998) 
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 63, 261, and 430). 
 509. Id. at 18,576–77. 
 510. See id. at 18,508. 
 511. Id. at 18,576. 
 512. Id. at 18,579. 
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ignoring some or all of these effects because they did not derive 
from the target pollutants, the EPA estimated these effects and 
analyzed them as part of its rule-making process. 
In 2005, the EPA under George W. Bush noted that its Clean 
Air Interstate Rule, which targeted particulate matter and ozone 
emissions, would also reduce mercury emissions,513 and included 
the benefits from mercury reductions in its cost-benefit analysis 
for the rule.514 The Bush EPA also discussed co-benefits as part 
of a regulation governing hazardous air pollutants from mobile 
sources (primarily cars).515 The Agency noted that though the 
rule dealt with control of air toxics and not criteria pollutants 
including particulate matter and ozone, “this co-benefit . . . is 
significant.”516 The EPA calculated that the standards would re-
duce exhaust emissions of direct particulate matter by over 
19,000 tons in 2030 nationwide.517 The Agency also analyzed the 
effects of the rule on ozone emissions, concluding that overall 
ozone emissions reductions would be small, but some areas 
would have “non-negligible improvements in projected eight-
hour ozone.”518 The EPA further noted that it viewed “these im-
provements as useful in meeting the eight-hour ozone 
NAAQS.”519 
In sum, the EPA has consistently examined a full range of 
effects from regulations. Rather than arbitrarily ignoring certain 
effects because they are ancillary or indirect, the EPA discusses 
and analyzes indirect costs and co-benefits. The Agency has done 
so through multiple presidential administrations of different 
parties, and in a wide range of clean air regulations. These prac-
tices have been standard since the Reagan Administration. Two 
of its OIRA administrators, Christopher DeMuth and Judge 
Douglas Ginsburg, noted that: “the EPA and other agencies fre-
quently include ancillary benefits in their benefits estimates.”520 
 
 513. Rule to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and 
Ozone (Clean Air Interstate Rule); Revisions to Acid Rain Program; Revisions 
to the NOX SIP Call, 70 Fed. Reg. 25,162, 25,170 (May 12, 2005) (codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 51, 72, 73, 74, 77, 78, and 96). 
 514. Id. at 25,312. 
 515. Control of Hazardous Air Pollutants from Mobile Sources, 72 Fed. Reg. 
8428, 8430, 8461 (Feb. 26, 2007) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 59, 80, 85, and 86). 
 516. Id. at 8461. 
 517. Id. at 8453. 
 518. Id. at 8458. 
 519. Id. 
 520. Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Rationalism in Regu-
lation, 108 MICH. L. REV. 877, 887 (2010) (reviewing REVESZ & LIVERMORE, su-
pra note 479). 
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They also observed that “OIRA itself recommends that agencies 
account for ancillary benefits as well as countervailing risks.”521 
Similarly, high-profile Obama-era EPA regulations like the Mer-
cury and Air Toxics Standards and the Clean Power Plan reflect 
the requirement of OMB Circular A-4 that the Agency consider 
co-benefits, and the requirement of the EPA’s own guidelines to 
consider “all identifiable costs and benefits.”522 The inclusion of 
co-benefits in these regulations is well in line with the longstand-
ing practice of the EPA to include co-benefits and countervailing 
risks in its assessment of clean air regulations. 
C. JUDICIAL RECOGNITION 
Courts are often asked to review the adequacy of an agency’s 
cost-benefit analysis, and in this context they have addressed the 
issue of indirect benefits and costs.523 Reviewing courts have fre-
quently required agencies to include ancillary impacts.524 This 
Section first discusses judicial decisions requiring the consider-
ation of indirect risks, and then turns to the nascent case law on 
co-benefits. 
In 1991, the Fifth Circuit rejected the EPA’s attempt to ban 
asbestos-based brakes under the Toxic Substances Control 
Act.525 A central part of the court’s holding was its finding that 
the EPA needed to consider the indirect safety effects of other 
potential, non-asbestos options for car breaks.526 The court de-
termined that under the Toxic Substances Control Act, the EPA 
“was required to consider both alternatives to a ban and the costs 
of any proposed actions and to ‘carry out [the Act] in a reasonable 
and prudent manner [after considering] the environmental, eco-
nomic, and social impact of any action.’”527 The court noted with 
disapproval that the Agency had not evaluated the harm from 
increased use of substitute products.528 Because the EPA did not 
 
 521. Id. 
 522. OBAMA EPA GUIDELINES, supra note 489. 
 523. See generally Cecot & Viscusi, supra note 41 (collecting and analyzing 
cases where courts reviewed agencies’ cost-benefit analyses). 
 524. See, e.g., Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Ad-
min., 956 F.2d 321, 323–25 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 
947 F.2d 1201, 1229–30 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 525. Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1229–30. 
 526. Id. at 1225. 
 527. Id. at 1215 (quoting Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601(c) 
(1988)). 
 528. Id. at 1220–21. 
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account for “the dangers posed by the substitutes, including can-
cer deaths from the other fibers used and highway deaths occa-
sioned by less effective, non-asbestos brakes,” the Agency’s “fail-
ure to examine the likely consequence of the EPA’s regulation 
render[ed] the ban of asbestos friction products unreasona-
ble.”529 In short, the EPA’s cost-benefit analysis did not, in the 
court’s view, adequately address indirect costs and was therefore 
unsupported by “substantial evidence” as required under the 
statute.530 
A year later the D.C. Circuit also struck down a regulation, 
this time promulgated by the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA), for failing to consider indirect costs.531 
NHTSA had attempted to increase fuel efficiency standards for 
cars.532 The Agency failed to consider the potential increased 
safety risks because smaller, more fuel efficient cars might be 
less protective in a crash.533 The court admonished the Agency 
and required NHTSA to “reconsider the matter and provide a 
genuine explanation for whatever choice it ultimately makes.”534 
Without calculating these indirect costs, the court found that the 
Agency had not met the requirement of reasoned decision-mak-
ing.535 
Other circuit court decisions have likewise addressed the is-
sue of indirect costs and have rejected cost-benefit analyses that 
lacked an estimate of these effects. In 1993, the Seventh Circuit 
partially vacated an OSHA regulation putting standards in place 
to limit the transmission of communicable diseases.536 The 
Agency failed to consider the indirect health effects that might 
result if the rule increased health care costs and thus limited 
 
 529. Id. at 1224. 
 530. Id. at 1207. 
 531. Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 956 
F.2d 321, 323–25 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
 532. Id. at 322–23.  
 533. Id. at 326–27. 
 534. Id. at 327. 
 535. Id. (“When the government regulates in a way that prices many of its 
citizens out of access to large-car safety, it owes them reasonable candor. If it 
provides that, the affected citizens at least know that the government has faced 
up to the meaning of its choice. The requirement of reasoned decision-making 
ensures this result and prevents officials from cowering behind bureaucratic 
mumbo-jumbo. Accordingly, we order NHTSA to reconsider the matter and pro-
vide a genuine explanation for whatever choice it ultimately makes.”). 
 536. Am. Dental Ass’n v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823, 823–27, 830–31 (7th Cir. 
1993). 
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access to care.537 OSHA’s “consideration of the indirect costs of 
the rule is thus incomplete.”538 Similarly, the D.C. Circuit also 
rebuffed an EPA regulation revising the NAAQS for ozone and 
particulate matter in 1999 because in the court’s view, the 
Agency failed to consider the potential health detriments from 
lowering pollution.539 Specifically, the EPA failed to consider 
whether “ground-level (tropospheric) ozone—the subject of th[e] 
rule—has [an ultraviolet radiation]-screening function inde-
pendent of the ozone higher in the atmosphere”540 with indirect 
health benefits, such as reducing incidences of cataracts and 
skin cancers.541 The court asserted that by ignoring these conse-
quences, the EPA looked only at “half of a substance’s health ef-
fects.”542 As a result, the Agency’s interpretation of Title VI of 
the Clean Air Act543 failed under the reasonableness standard 
laid out in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense 
Council, Inc.544 In 2002, the D.C. Circuit also overturned two 
Federal Communications Commission rules for the Agency’s fail-
ure to consider the rules’ indirect costs545 in contravention of the 
language and objectives of the Telecommunication Act.546 
 
 537. Id. at 826 (“OSHA also exaggerated the number of lives likely to be 
saved by the rule by ignoring lives likely to be sacrificed by it, since the in-
creased cost of medical care, to the extent passed on to consumers, will reduce 
the demand for medical care, and some people may lose their lives as a result.”). 
 538. Id. (citing a comparison to Competitive Enter. Inst., 956 F.2d 321). 
 539. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1036–37 (D.C. Cir. 
1999), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 
U.S. 457 (2001). 
 540. Id. at 1052. 
 541. Id. at 1051. 
 542. Id. at 1052. 
 543. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7671–7671q (2012). 
 544. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 175 F.3d at 1052 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)). 
 545. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 424–25 (D.C. Cir. 2002). One 
rule required incumbent local exchange carriers to lease “unbundled network 
elements” to competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs), while the other rule 
unbundled the spectrum of local copper loops such that the CLECs would be 
positioned to offer competitive internet access. Id. at 417. However, the court 
found that the Commission “loftily abstracted away all specific markets” and 
did not take into account indirect cost differentials in different competitive mar-
kets. Id. at 423. Moreover, the Agency “completely failed to consider the rele-
vance of competition in broadband services coming from cable” and satellite 
companies, another crucial indirect cost. Id. at 428. 
 546. Id. at 427–29 (noting that the FCC “must ‘apply some limiting stand-
ard, rationally related to the goals of the Act,’ . . . [and] ‘cannot, consistent with 
the statute, blind itself to the availability of elements outside the incumbent’s 
network.’” (quoting AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 388–89 
(1999))). 
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Futhermore, the D.C. Circuit has explicitly addressed the 
“mirror image” of indirect costs: co-benefits.547 In 2016, the 
court’s decision in United States Sugar Corp. v. EPA upheld the 
EPA’s consideration of co-benefits in regulating the effects of re-
ducing hazardous air pollutants from boilers, process heaters, 
and incinerators.548 Specifically, the EPA decided not to adopt 
more lenient hydrogen chloride emission standards, reasoning 
that it could weigh additional factors such as the “cumulative 
adverse health effects due to concurrent exposure to other [haz-
ardous air pollutants] or emissions from other nearby sources” 
and the “potential impacts of increased emissions on ecosys-
tems.”549 Industry challengers argued that the EPA’s considera-
tion of these co-benefits in its decision to maintain the more 
stringent emissions standard rendered the Agency’s decision ar-
bitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure 
Act.550 The EPA asserted that “its consideration of these co-ben-
efits was not a regulation of other pollutants; rather, it was 
simply choosing not to ignore the purpose of the [Clean Air 
Act]—to reduce the negative health and environmental effects of 
[hazardous air pollutant] emissions—when exercising its discre-
tionary authority under the Act.”551 The D.C. Circuit held that 
the EPA acted within its legal authority when it considered not 
only the direct benefits of reducing hydrogen chloride, but also 
the co-benefits from that reduction—namely, indirect reductions 
of other hazardous air pollutants.552 The court agreed that the 
use of co-benefits conforms with the Clean Air Act’s purpose, 
finding that “[t]he EPA was . . . free to consider potential co-ben-
efits that might be achieved” from enforcing the more stringent 
standard.553 
Courts that have examined cost-benefit analyses have 
acknowledged the logic of evaluating the indirect effects of regu-
lations and using this information to guide the rule-making pro-
cess. While there have been more cases concerning indirect costs, 
modern cases have addressed indirect benefits as well and no 
court has said there is any reason to treat them differently. 
Courts are correct to do so; these terms are merely descriptors 
 
 547. See Rascoff & Revesz, supra note 4, at 1793 (noting that indirect costs 
and indirect benefits “are simply mirror images of each other”). 
 548. 830 F.3d 579, 591, 625 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 549. Id. at 624. 
 550. Id. at 625. 
 551. Id. 
 552. Id. at 624–25. 
 553. Id. at 625. 
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that helpfully depict whether effects are positive or negative and 
they provide no justification for focusing on some effects while 
ignoring others.554 Further, as DeMuth and Ginsburg note, 
“[t]here appear to be no legal, political, or intellectual . . . imped-
iments to treating ancillary benefits and countervailing risks 
equally in cost-benefit analysis and regulatory design.”555 It 
would therefore be incoherent to consider the negative indirect 
effects of regulations without also considering the positive indi-
rect effects. 
  CONCLUSION   
Considering co-benefits from reductions in particulate mat-
ter and other criteria pollutants below the NAAQS is clearly sup-
ported by science and long-standing EPA precedent. It is also 
necessary in order to give the public an accurate understanding 
of the effects of regulation and deregulation. Critics of regulation 
seek to paint benefits below the NAAQS as illusory and suggest 
their inclusion in rules targeting other pollutants is overreach 
by an overzealous regulator. In this Article, we have shown that 
this narrative rings hollow. Through multiple presidential ad-
ministrations, the EPA has calculated benefits from criteria pol-
lutant reductions below the NAAQS, following established sci-
ence. The health and mortality reduction benefits are also 
exceptionally well documented for particulate matter reductions, 
and account for the bulk of the criteria pollutant benefits in the 
Mercury and Air Toxics Standards, Clean Power Plan, and likely 
in any future regulation of greenhouse gases. The EPA has con-
sistently acknowledged there is no evidence supporting a thresh-
old for particulate matter over the past thirty years and has cal-
culated benefits from reductions below particulate matter 
NAAQS levels for two decades. The science on these benefits 
clearly indicates that no threshold can be identified and shows 
that reducing this pollution at levels well below the current 
NAAQS will yield dramatic health benefits. 
The Trump Administration has embraced an anti-regula-
tory stance in its efforts to repeal the Clean Power Plan. The Ad-
ministration, and other regulation opponents, suggest that their 
approach is a logical way to account for effects, arguing that in-
cluding these benefits artificially inflates the positive effects of 
 
 554. See Rascoff & Revesz, supra note 4, at 1793 (“Risk tradeoffs and ancil-
lary benefits are simply mirror images of each other. There is no justification 
for privileging the former and ignoring the latter.”). 
 555. DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 520, at 888. 
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regulating. But what they advocate is a dishonest attempt to ob-
scure the actual effects of regulations from the public. 
Ideological differences about the appropriate role for govern-
ment to play in the control of pollution are a natural part of dem-
ocratic debate. But public participation is a key attribute of a 
vibrant democracy, and such participation is meaningful only if 
the public is given accurate information about the effects of dif-
ferent proposals. Hiding these substantial benefits obscures the 
real-world effects of deregulation. We encourage policy makers 
and the courts that oversee them to embrace well-accepted sci-
ence and economics, and to require transparent and accurate ac-
counting of the benefits of air pollution regulations. 
